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circulation as full of deceit and dubiousness, and at another level, by conjoining the meaning of cultivating
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that could inhabit modalities of organized politics, which, in an era of expanding franchise, became available
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ideology of labor as the touchstone of Bengali Muslim politics in the late colonial period for our
understanding of the conjunction between leftist populism and religious nationalism rooted in a regional
identity.
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ABSTRACT 
LABORS OF REPRESENTATION: CULTIVATING LAND, SELF, AND 
COMMUNITY AMONG MUSLIMS IN LATE COLONIAL BENGAL 
                                             Ananya Dasgupta  
                                                Lisa Mitchell 
This dissertation studies how the specificity of regional practices of cultural productions, 
ideological strands, forms and practices of civil associations, and styles of literary 
expressions among Muslims inflected the Pakistan movement in late colonial Bengal. 
Using wide-ranging sources that include vernacular religious tracts, the popular genre of 
Muslim improvement texts, pamphlets of tenant-peasant associations, journals, diaries, 
autobiographies, and literary archives, I trace historical transformations in practices and 
ideas about religion and political representation among the Muslims of Bengal from the 
mid-nineteenth century to the late colonial period.  In so doing, I examine key shifts in 
Islamic theological concepts, Muslim forms of civil associations, social movements and 
Muslim literary cultures to argue that by the inter-war period (in the 1920s and 1930s) 
these altered the meaning of being Muslim, in the context of Bengal, in very critical ways 
by, at one level, linking up notions of cultivation of self and community to ideas of 
cultivating land, thus valorizing labor as a positive repository of value, while positing 
sites and actors engaged in the spheres of exchange and circulation as full of deceit and 
dubiousness, and at another level, by conjoining the meaning of cultivating land and 
Islamic moral community to the land of Bengal, thereby creating new kinds of claims of 
ethnic belonging rooted in a regionalism. I show how such transformations were critical 
in instantiating subjectivities that could inhabit modalities of organized politics, which, in 
an era of expanding franchise, became available to mobilization and manipulation by 
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political players and parties who championed the primacy of the producer in a claim to 
politically represent them. Broadly speaking, my dissertation traces the rise of an 
ideology of labor as the touchstone of Bengali Muslim politics in the late colonial period 
for our understanding of the conjunction between leftist populism and religious 
nationalism rooted in a regional identity.   
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION 
All translations from Bengali are mine, unless otherwise indicated. I have devised and 
followed my own code of transliteration in this dissertation, keeping in mind that the non-
English words and terms mentioned here appear in at least three, if not more, South Asian 
languages: Bengali, Urdu, and Hindi. To mark their specificities in words and texts, I 
have abided by the following general rules: 
1. I have avoided cumbersome diacritics, and instead, used phonetic transliterations 
attuned to American English. However, in remaining faithful to their usage in 
primary sources, certain non-English terms, personal and place names may appear 
in variant forms in quotations or titles. For instance, a term such as  ‘zamindar’ 
appears as ‘zemindar’ in a quote, or the proper noun Abdul Latif appears as 
Abdool Luteef in a quote from a colonial document. 
2. Non-English terms are italicized. For a term which is italicized, its meaning is 
explained either in context, parenthetical remarks, or finds mention in the glossary 
provided at the end of the dissertation. A few words common in Anglo-Indian 
usage are not put in italics, for example, zamindar, nawab, and bazaar. 
3. All names of places have been transliterated according to the official spellings 
followed by the Governments of Bangladesh and India respectively. The only 
exception is my use of the name Calcutta, instead of the now-official Kolkata, in 
part to denote a larger than colonial association with the name.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
This dissertation is a cultural history of distinctive ideological strands, institutions, forms 
of social associations, and literary styles, operational in different social strata, that came 
together to energize the specific form in which the demand for Pakistan took root among 
the Muslims in late colonial Bengal. Focusing my lens of scrutiny on representational 
practices, using wide-ranging sources that include vernacular religious tracts, the popular 
genre of Muslim improvement texts, pamphlets, journals, diaries, autobiographies, 
poetry, essays, and short stories, my dissertation traces how a whole range of affective 
investments, attitudes to work, self, and community, and disciplines of religio-moral and 
political self-making paved the conditions of possibility for a Bengali Pakistanism rooted 
in the primacy of the value of labor and redistributive justice as exemplified in the 
powerful slogan “land to the tiller”.  
 Formulation of Research Question 
In Bengal, one of the provinces in British India where Muslims outnumbered Hindus, the 
imperative of the Bengal Muslims to be drawn into the Pakistan movement demanding 
separate statehood in the years immediately preceding decolonization cannot be 
explained as stemming from the community’s fear of being reduced to a political 
minority in the impending postcolonial polity. Especially since Ramsay MacDonald’s 
Communal Award of 1932, which dramatically altered the balance of power in the 
provincial political domain, gave the Muslims of Bengal a decisive edge in the domain of 
organized provincial politics. Yet, notwithstanding the political advantage accruing from 
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their numbers, the demand for Pakistan found massive support among Bengali Muslims. 
How did the idea of Pakistan take root in Bengal?  
  Schematically put, South Asian historiography has been dominated by two ways 
of looking at the history preceding the formation of East Pakistan. The first, focusing on 
the Muslims of Bengal, propounds some variation or the other of “the communalization 
of the Muslim peasantry” thesis. The overarching narrative emplotment of such 
communalization thesis consists of how what was essentially a class-based movement of 
Muslim tenant-peasants got communalized (i.e. how the movement degenerated into the 
political organizing of a religious community for the furtherance of its own ends, often in 
hostile and violent ways).1 The starting point of the process of communalization varies – 
beginning way back at the turn of the twentieth century in one account,2 or in the 1920s 
in another,3 or in the 1930s in yet another.4  The agents instrumental in thus 
communalizing the Muslim peasantry are variously identified – in the rich Muslim 
peasant, or the ashraf, or the ulema, or a combination thereof. The second manner of 
dealing with the subject of the formation of East Pakistan is exemplified by the work of 
Joya Chatterjee, where the lens of scrutiny is focused on the phenomenon of bhadralok 
communalism instead of Muslim communalism and, very crucially, the ‘event’ of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This communalization of class thesis is most emphatically put forth by Taj-ul Hashmi. 
See Taj-ul Hashmi, Pakistan as a Peasant’s Utopia: Communalization of Class in 
Bengal. 1920-1947 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 
2 See Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengali Muslims, 1871-1906: The Quest for Identity (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
3 See P.K. Datta, Carving Blocs: Communal Ideology in Early Twentieth Century Bengal 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
4 See Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and Politics, 1919-1947 
(London Cambridge University Press, 1986), and Iftekhar Iqbal, The Bengal Delta: 
Ecology, State and Social Change, 1840-1943 (Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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partition of Bengal is understood as the outcome of bhadralok separatism, instead of 
Muslim separatism. Put differently, Joya Chatterjee’s work has shown how following the 
Communal Award of 1932 and the Government of India Act of 1935 – which in 
dramatically expanding franchise, not only enlarged the electorate by 600 per cent, 
enfranchising about six million people, in effect giving the vote to four Muslims for 
every three Hindu voters in Bengal, but also drastically reduced urban weightage – the 
Hindu bhadralok, ensconced in the metropolitan centers, became increasingly anxious 
about living under the tyranny of Muslim rule; this anxiety, ultimately, led to partition 
when the bhadralok deployed the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha to this end.5   
The scholarship that traces the communalization of the Muslim peasantry in terms 
of the rich (Muslim) peasant acquiring an upper hand in agrarian relations, also points to 
the increasing absence of the bhadralok from rural Bengal as a precondition for the “rise 
of the rich peasants.” Both Sugata Bose and Partha Chatterjee have argued that the 
process of empowerment of the rich peasants became particularly intensified with the 
onslaught of Depression in the early 1930s, when the bhadralok zamindars and 
moneylenders fled the countryside to engage increasingly in white-collar employments 
and trade. According to Bose, the exodus of the bhadralok from the countryside snapped 
practical patron-client relations that existed between them and the Muslim peasantry, 
thereby opening up a lacuna that came to be promptly occupied by Muslim jotedars/ rich 
peasants who inserted themselves into credit relations (as creditors) at a time when rural 
indebtedness intensified with the collapse of a cash crop market centered on the capital-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Joya Chatterjee, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994). 
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intensive cultivation of jute.6 Chatterjee does not necessarily contradict Bose’s thesis, but 
emphasizes that it was not merely in the relations of production that the Muslim jotedars 
assumed an increasingly advantageous position, but that they were successful in 
establishing hegemony over small Muslim peasants precisely because they rose to 
economic prominence from a hitherto culturally undifferentiated peasantry.7 Yet neither 
the cultural worlds of the Muslim peasantry, the ashraf, or the mofussil intelligentsia, nor 
the manner of establishing hegemony is analyzed in any detail in his study, which 
continues to be governed primarily by naturalized political economic categories of 
“labor”, “production”, “rent” and “debt” overlaid with a political history of 
representational politics in the Bengal Council and Legislative Assembly and a 
“prepolitical” history of peasant rioting.  
In a relatively recent and quite compelling work of scholarship, Iftekhar Iqbal has 
emphasized the active presence and indeed, the return of the bhadralok to rural Bengal in 
the early twentieth century induced by a dynamic agrarian domain that emerged in 
relation to the ecologically specific character of the deltaic regions of Bengal, where huge 
tracts of wastelands in the form of chars or alluvial deposits arising out of the fluvial 
actions of rivers, excluded from the revenue code of the Permanent Settlement, were 
made available for cultivation by the colonial state by offering low rates of rent and 
lenient terms of tenancies to cultivating settlers.8 Iqbal shows how in the 1920s and 
1930s, the bhadralok’s willingness to return to the agrarian environs of eastern Bengal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, social structure and politics, 1919-1947 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
7  Partha Chatterjee, Bengal 1920-1947: The Land Question (Calcutta: Center of Studies 
in Social Sciences [by] K. P. Bagchi, 1984). 
8 See Iftekhar Iqbal, Bengal Delta. 
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was facilitated by the government’s policy of giving preferential treatment in allocating 
such reclaimable low-rent khas mahal lands9 to the bhadralok, and allowing them to 
settle on such land as “ordinary cultivating raiyats”, often with the express purpose of re-
orienting persons who had abandoned revolutionary terrorism to a life of productive 
citizenship. Of course these newly settled bhadralok raiyats did not turn into actual 
cultivators; instead, the productive power on their lands was largely harnessed from the 
ranks of bargadars (sharecroppers). “It was no wonder that some of the most serious 
communal conflicts took place when the ecologically better domain came to be 
dominated by the bhadralok”, remarks Iftekhar Iqbal. He adds, “the victimization of the 
peasantry during the great Bengal famine (of 1943) fuelled further conflicts and 
suspicions between them and the bhadralok, these developments culminated in a support 
for partition.”10  
Iftekhar Iqbal is right in drawing our attention to the fact that in the riverine 
deltaic ecology of Bengal (particularly eastern Bengal), with land continually opening up 
from the rivers and made cultivable under arrangements where the government entered 
into direct settlements with the raiyats (tenants), large swathes of land were either 
actually outside the purview of Permanent Settlement or settled in a manner where 
Permanent Settlement was practiced with calculated indifference. It is also true that 
Permanent Settlement has long dominated the historiography on Bengal as the bane of 
peasant discontent, and a focus on social relations on land settled otherwise is absolutely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Khas mahal lands were typically outside the purview of Permanent Settlement, where 
the government had entered into direct settlements with the raiyats. 
10  Iftekhar Iqbal, ‘Return of the Bhadralok: Ecology and Agrarian Relations in Eastern 
Bengal’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 43, no. 6, Nov, 2009, p. 1352. 
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critical and needs to be attended to. Yet it is well known that in 1946, both the Muslim 
League and the Communists shared the slogan “land to the tiller”, both demanded the 
abolition of Permanent Settlement set in place by the British in the late eighteenth 
century. The abolition of zamindari without any compensation to the landlords (or the 
abolition of Permanent Settlement) was declared as an important objective of the party 
after the Bengal Muslim League Conference in January 1946, held under the presidency 
of Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah’s right-hand man. Such populist promises, without a doubt, 
contributed to the phenomenal performance of the Muslim League in the 1946 Bengal 
elections – bagging 110 out of 117 seats in constituencies reserved for Muslims – as it 
established itself credibly as the sole mouthpiece of the Muslims in Bengal and 
demonstrated popular Muslim support for a separate nation-state of Pakistan. By 1946, 
the League’s demand for ‘Pakistan’ became a slogan of such great power among large 
sections of the peasantry in Eastern Bengal that Hindu communist leaders of the Tebhaga 
movement often had to assume Muslim names (Barin Dutta, for instance, took the name 
Abdus Salam), attend namaz prayers with Muslim peasants in an expression of solidarity 
and hoist both the Red Flag of the Communists and the Green Flag of the Muslim League 
at the same meeting venues. That Muslim peasants chanted slogans in favor of both 
Pakistan and Tebhaga at the meeting organized by CPI leaders11 is telling in the manner 
in which the political cultures of leftist populism and religious nationalism had converged 
in Bengal’s Pakistan movement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Taj-ul-Hashmi, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: The Communalization of Class Politics 
in East Bengal, p. 219-267. 
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This begs the question: If large swathes of land were actually outside the ambit of 
Permanent Settlement, why then did the abolition of the same become such a powerful 
slogan among Muslims all over Bengal, particularly in the eastern part? Why was it one 
of the key planks on which the Muslim League contested the 1946 election, if social 
relations of production in the countryside where Muslims were most populous were, as 
Iftekhar Iqbal points out, not really over-determined by the terms of the Permanent 
Settlement?  
Economic histories and political economic frameworks alone cannot adequately 
explain the conundrum thus posed: when there is no direct one-to-one correspondence or 
an easy fit between the affective power of a popular political demand and the social 
relations of production structuring the lives of those who demand it, how does one 
explain wherefrom the demand, the slogan, and the political culture in which it resonates 
draw their power, without raising the old bogey of “false consciousness”?  It is in a 
modest attempt to face up to such conundrum that I turn to the realm of cultural practices 
of Muslims in late colonial Bengal – as they manifested themselves in the countryside in 
simply rhyming verse for easy memorization, or appeared in flamboyant apocalyptic 
poetry infused with Bolshevik ethos, or in the reformist Islamic rhetoric of the ulema – 
and to the nature of institutions in which such practices were anchored, whether in rural 
and mofussil anjumans, or literary associations and societies located in the urban centers 
of Calcutta and Dhaka. In studying the effects of such cultural practices and institutions, 
this dissertation attempts to trace the emergence of the concept of labor, which became 
the touchstone of Muslim politics in the Indian province of Bengal during the late 
colonial period.  
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Unlike the Punjab where rural Muslim political mobilization depended on 
navigating networks of colonially sanctioned hierarchical, kinship-based structures of 
socio-political authority rooted in the biradari/ “tribal” heads or zaildars who were 
almost always landlords12, the political mobilizational success in drawing Muslim 
peasants in Bengal depended on a strictly non-hierarchical, even a counter-hierarchical, 
political language and agenda which, from the 1920s onward, staunchly opposed 
landlordism, sought to strengthen occupancy rights of praja-peasants, and by 1936 was 
actually calling for  dismantling the institution of landlordism or at least substantially 
altering it in favor of raiyati interests. A comparison between the political landscapes of 
these two largest Muslim majority provinces of colonial India in the mid-1930s 
effectively dramatizes this difference: whereas in the Punjab, the 1937 elections re-
instated to provincial political power the Unionists, commonly understood as a landlords’ 
party, whose sphere of influence was rural Punjab, it was the Krishak Praja Party (The 
Peasant-Tenants’ Party; henceforth KPP) that aggressively rose to political prominence in 
rural Bengal, contesting elections exclusively from Muslim constituencies, on the plank 
of abolishing landlordism.   
Even the terms in which rural interests in Punjab and Bengal were articulated 
were dramatically different - in rural Punjab, Unionist support lay in its promise of 
warding off any threat to the Land Alienation Act (introduced in 1901) that prevented 
sale of land from groups that were gazetted as “agricultural tribes” (very often headed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)  
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landed sajjada nashins) to individuals who were not members of such groups13, whereas 
one of the key demands of the praja movement in Bengal, even before it was formalized 
into the Krishak Praja Party – a party with an overwhelmingly Muslim mass base, was 
the individual praja-peasant’s right to freely transfer landholding without any legal 
constraint whatsoever. 
 Ironically, the anti-hierarchical character of praja assertions increasingly 
demanding less stringent control of the zamindars over the sale and transfer of occupancy 
rights or tenancies had a tremendously damaging impact on the health of agrarian Bengal, 
intensifying the process of depeasantization during the depression years, when under 
duress of acute indebtedness, tenants with smaller landholdings readily sold off their 
lands to bigger tenants and to the non-cultivating bhadralok, thus swelling the ranks of 
bargadars, sharecroppers, and wage laborers, and paving the way for the consolidation of 
landholdings in the hands of the rich peasants and the return of the bhadralok neo-raiyats 
into rural Bengal. I underscore this to point to how the increasing assertion of the value of 
labor (of cultivation) in the domain of Muslim politics, and indeed in Bengal’s provincial 
politics as a whole, as signaled by the rise of the Krishak Praja Party (KPP), did not 
necessarily work to prevent the separation of actual producers from their ownership over 
the means of production and subsistence, quite to the contrary, it appears to have 
accelerated such a separation. It is not that this connection between depeasantization and 
the increasingly vocal pro-peasant demands, raised in the domain of official politics, to 
the right to free transfer of raiyati holdings had not been noted by historians (particularly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan. 
	   11	  
those of a Marxist inclination), either implicitly or explicitly.14 As a matter of fact, 
Iftekhar Iqbal himself acknowledges when a version of the Land Alienation Act that was 
set in place in Punjab in 1901, in an attempt to prevent land passing out of the hands of 
small cultivators to non-cultivating people, was passed in Bengal in 1944, it was already 
too late.15 
  A logical next step, it seemed to me, would then be to probe into how such 
ideologies of labor, which produced and entrenched relations of capital, historically 
emerged and took root in society, why such ideologies became such a defining feature of 
Muslim politics in late colonial Bengal, and why some Muslim landlords were forced to 
seek election on KPP tickets in spite of the party’s avowedly anti-landlord stance. 
Existing historiography gave me no satisfactory answers. In fact, it would not be unfair to 
say that these questions had not really been posed with any clarity, even by historians of a 
most rigorous Marxist variety. In re-reading the existing historiographical literature on 
the period of my research, it then struck me that the posing of such questions were 
prevented by methodological impasses rooted in a peculiarly anti-historicist Marxist 
prejudice, which in its unspoken assumption of the ontology of labor, refused to 
historicize it. To put it simply, in such literature the assumption that labor or production 
is the reliable and enduring source of all value acquired the status of metaphysics, which 
is to say that this assumption about value itself could not be made available to critical 
examination, and by extension, it could not be historicized.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Both Partha Chatterjee and Iftekhar Iqbal made note of this process of de-
peasantization. 
15 Iftekhar Iqbal, ‘Return of the Bhadralok: Ecology and Agrarian Relations in Eastern 
Bengal, c. 1905–1947’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol 43, Issue 6, Nov, 2009, p. 1351. 
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But if ideologies of labor, manifested in forms of leftist populism, featuring 
prominently in the domain of Muslim politics in colonial Bengal of the inter-war period, 
were major conduits for the production, reproduction, and entrenchment of relations of 
capital, that is to say, they effected the separation of the producer from the means of 
production (or “depeasantization” to use a term more prevalent in Bengal historiography), 
then the manner in which an ontology of labor took root in Bengal’s Muslim society 
needs to be historicized.  Precisely, this historicist impulse lay at the heart of my project.  
I set out to find answers to the following questions: In Bengal’s Muslim social 
imagination, how did value come to reside in the realm of production or in the act of 
tilling the earth? If the instantiation of this social imagination centered on the ontology of 
labor had a history, what discourses, institutions, practices, rhetorical styles produced this 
imagination? Which social actors were involved? If such actors belonged to different 
socio-economic strata, what maneuvers, or contingencies, or networks of patronage 
guaranteed that such socio-economic cleavages would not assume a relation of 
dominance that could explode an imaginary in which labor was posited as the primary 
and enduring source of all value? And ultimately, as “land to the tiller” emerged as one of 
the most potent slogans of Bengali Pakistanism, did such ideologies of labor only become 
available to communalist appropriation, as historiography has conventionally claimed, or 
did they also make themselves available to progressive articulations in legitimating the 
aspirations to a new kind of nation that Pakistan could stand for?  These are the key 
questions that have guided this dissertation.  
In relation to the emergence of Pakistan, David Gilmartin, Marcus Daeschel and 
Taj-ul Hashmi have approached the subject of varying regional specificities that 
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contributed to the strength of the Pakistan movement.16 My own project is also an attempt 
to give substantial recognition to the regional dynamics at play in colonial Bengal that 
inflected the movement for Pakistan.  
Gilmartin’s study of colonial Punjab is pioneering in marking a departure from an 
exclusive focus on institutional party politics and prominent political leaders, whose 
actions and motivations historians had hitherto studied to explain the demand for 
Pakistan.17 Gilmartin shifts the lens of inquiry on the relationship between Punjabi 
society and the state by delineating how the Pakistan movement in Punjab emerged 
through the interplay of two contending understandings of Muslim community – 
premised on radically different cultures of socio-political authority – that were 
operational in urban and rural colonial Punjabi society.18 According to Gilmartin, the 
urban centers of colonial Punjab spawned a non-hierarchical, horizontal imagination of 
Muslim community through a politics of self-making routed through direct identification 
with Islamic ideals as encapsulated in the classic Muslim idea of musawat, or the equality 
of believers, and the ideal of mard-e-khuda, the true man of God, who by saintly example 
and impassioned commitment to Islam could act as a bridge between common people and 
the supposedly classical Islamic ideals where musawat would be possible through 
individual moral transformation. But in rural Punjab, where the British had structured 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan; Taj-ul-
Islam Hashmi, Pakistan as a Peasant’s Utopia; Marcus Daeschel, Politics of Self 
Expression: The Urdu Middle Class Milieu in Mid-Twentieth Century India and Pakistan 
(New York, Routledge, 2006).              
17Ayesha Jalal’s monograph, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the 
demand for Pakistan (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), is 
typical of this approach of exclusively focusing on political leaders and parties. 
18 See David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan. 
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society through the recognition and patronage of “tribal- biradari” identities – organized 
via hierarchical relations of kinship – Muslim community was premised on an ideology 
of socio-political authority and leadership that was vertical, kinship-based, patronage-
oriented and essentially mediated between the society and the colonial state. Gilmartin 
reads the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan as tapping into urban Punjabi Muslim 
society’s search for a new moral ideological foundation for a state which, far from being 
premised on the colonially sanctioned ideology of hierarchical, “tribal” patronage-
oriented political authority, was to be founded as a direct expression of a religious 
community made up of individual ‘Muslims’ who were self-made through moral action. 
And yet during the Pakistan movement, notwithstanding the rhetoric of direct, individual 
attachment to Islamic symbols that sought to be popularized by the Muslim League, the 
mobilizational strategies of the Muslim League in rural Punjab, as Gilmartin shows, were 
heavily dependent on region-specific, hierarchical, “tribal” patronage-based structures of 
political authority that the British had put into place.  This was made possible by 
recruiting pirs (often sajjada nashins, or custodians of shrines whose power was 
grounded in hereditary rather than personal piety) who had influence over specific 
biradari networks that structured local politics in the countryside, but had, since Mughal 
times, combined a concern for local mediation with a religious interest in the overall 
cultural definition of the state. In their ideological commitment to Pakistan, these pirs 
were able to bring together hierarchical, kinship-based biradari identities, around which 
local influence was built, and Pakistanism’s express ideological commitment to a state 
resembling the perfect community of individual Muslims led by the prophet, without 
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actually resolving the tension between din (exemplary personal ideals) and dunya (the 
actual workings of rural socio-political structures of authority).19 
Marcus Daeschel’s work argues that the demand for Pakistan, as it came to be 
overwhelmingly articulated by the middle classes in Punjab and UP, requires to be 
understood in relation to an incipient culture of consumerism which – constituted through 
advertisements – structured middle class politics. As advertisements re-signified 
consumption as an act of self- expression, inasmuch as via choice of products one could 
showcase who he/she really was, consumerist logic created a style of “self-expressionist” 
politics which assumed that the only politically meaningful activity was the expression of 
an “inner”/ “authentic” self. Daeschel argues that, in the Punjab and UP, the idea of 
Pakistan as a primarily middle-class demand was the commoditization and consumption 
of the middle class’s need to generate some surrogate form of “authenticity” for itself. 20 
From Gilmartin and Daeschel, it is possible to aver that there were two distinct 
cultures operating in late colonial Punjab – an urban, middle-class political culture (the 
outcome of Islamic reform or consumerism), where religion and politics were seen as 
expressions of some “authentic”, “inner” self, and a rural political culture in which the 
question of “authenticity” of the self was not a necessarily a political (or religious) 
problem since here, politics was about managing social relationship through 
memberships in hierarchical kinship-based networks and not about the expression of 
some “inner self.” But in colonial Bengal, where peasant societies were not structured 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan.  
20 See Marcus Daeschel, Politics of Self Expression: The Urdu Middle Class Milieu in 
Mid-Twentieth Century India and Pakistan (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
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through colonial policies and legislation (of the Land Alienation Act, which required 
registering “agricultural tribes” and barring the sale of land from such “tribes” to those 
who were not members of such groups) that reified kinship-based or biradari-oriented 
access to state patronage and land, what was the nature of rural political culture on which 
the Pakistan movement took root? What kinds of institutions, discourses, and ideologies 
shaped notions of Muslim community in late colonial rural Bengal? Were there 
organizations, styles of rhetoric, and ideologies that were operational among the Muslims 
in rural Bengal that can explain the formation of subjectivities that could inhabit political 
demands, which were of a far more individuated nature than those of their counterparts in 
the Punjab? My research confirmed that there were, and pointed in the direction of the 
anjumans in Bengal – distinctly Muslim forms of civil associations – whose local 
chapters in mofussil towns and far-flung villages were undergoing significant 
transformations and struggles in terms of their class composition as well as their manner 
of functioning in the 1910s and the 1920s. Most importantly, they appear to have played 
a major role in spreading a culture that gave primacy to voluntary association of 
individuals, and were key in disseminating practices of individual voting as the basis of 
decision-making in such institutions. This at a time when franchise was severely 
restricted, and several individual Muslims voting in the anjumans, in all likelihood, had 
not yet acquired political votes. The impact of such practices in shaping individuated 
subjectivities in rural Bengal has been explored in this dissertation, in addition to the 
larger, but related question of how such anjumans were instrumental in changing the very 
notion of what it meant to represent the Muslim community, for such changing 
presuppositions about who could represent the community also took on a fundamentally 
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anti-hierarchical character. How such conceptions of Muslim community forged in rural 
Bengal interacted with, contradicted, or coalesced with conceptions of Muslim self and 
community that were being forged among sections of the Muslim literati and 
intelligentsia in the urban centers of Calcutta and Dhaka as they articulated visions of 
territorial collectivity, namely, Pakistan, is explored in this dissertation.  
Method, Sources, and Refinement of Topic 
I have attended closely to the culturally specific articulations of economic phenomena 
and socio-political identities for their power to explain how certain groups made meaning 
of supposedly self-evident and universally legible economic categories such as debt, for 
instance, or understood what it meant to be represented politically in modern democratic 
government began to implode the glass ceiling of apparent “transparency” that economic 
historians and political theorists routinely place on such phenomena.  
Let me furnish a quick example of what I mean. Credit relations in late colonial 
Bengal has been a topic over which much ink has been spilled by historians, and 
deservedly so. Since the Rent and Tenancy Legislations of 1859 and 1885 put checks on 
arbitrary enhancement of rent by zamindars – the latter legislation in fact ensured that 
rent could only be raised once every fifteen years, and fixed the quantum of such 
enhancement – rent ceased to be a major reason for peasant discontent21, while debt 
became the bane of the peasantry in the first half of the twentieth century.22  Historians 
have typically been attentive to the demand and supply of credit, to the social identities of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Bipasha Raha, The Plough and the Pen: Peasantry, Agriculture and the Literati in 
Colonial Bengal (New Delhi: Manohar, 2012), p. 15. 
22 See Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal. 
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the creditors and debtors, to the paucity of credit supply and its impact on agrarian social 
relations.23 But none paused to ask, in the cultural world that the peasants inhabited, what 
did debt actually mean? Was economic distress the only meaning they attached to it? As 
the problem of debt resulting from exorbitant rates of interest came to be identified 
increasingly as a problem affecting the Muslim community, did debt mean the same thing 
to the Muslim peasants of the countryside and their urban co-religionists?  It is possible 
that the so-called “prepolitical” resistance of the peasantry, as evinced in instances of 
rioting, is better understood not only in terms of the economic fact of being in debt, but in 
the historical specificity of its religio-culturally defined meaning? More importantly, did 
the religio-culturally defined meanings of debt or economic interest share the 
presuppositions that structure such phenomena for economic historians who set out to 
analyze their impact?  
To understand what debt, or labor, or political representation, or tenant (praja) 
identity, or citizenship in the nation-state of Pakistan really meant to the participants of 
the “prepolitical” resistances, the Muslim electorate, and the Pakistani nationalists from 
Bengal, required moving beyond the colonial archives of land settlement records, debt 
settlement reports, and government files to a rich and understudied world of Bengali 
vernacular ephemera including Muslim self-improvement texts, religious tracts, social 
pamphlets that circulated in rural Bengal in the period under consideration, 
autobiographies, memoirs and biographies of prominent Muslim social reformers, 
religious and literary figures from Bengal of the time, Bengali Muslim literary archives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal; Partha Chatterjee, Bengal 1920-1947, Vol. 1; 
Ifthekar Iqbal, Bengal Delta. 
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comprising of poetry, short stories, essays, novels as well as the institutional archives of 
Bengal’s Muslim literary associations and other kinds of civil society organizations as 
they left traces of their histories primarily through journals which they published or 
patronized. Public libraries such as the National Library and the Bangiya Shahitya 
Parishad and private collections such as the Jatindra Mohan Granthasala and the 
Hiteshranjan Sanyal Memorial Archives in Kolkata, as well as the Bangla Academy, the 
Dhaka University Library and the Nazrul Institute in Dhaka proved to be treasure troves 
for such sources.  In short, I was led to access a world of representations that was quite 
different from the order of representations that make up the colonial archive. Upon 
entering this world, I realized that ideological strands (such as the discourse of self-
improvement), identities (such as praja), and institutions (such as anjumans) that 
informed the thought-worlds and actions of rural Muslim populations were neither 
‘communal’ nor ‘secular’, nor were they expressions of ‘secular’ demands in a 
‘communal’ form, for these categories were not quite relevant to the socio-cultural world 
of this domain. I have, on the contrary, tried to trace how what happened in this rural 
domain created entirely new possibilities by which its consequences could be taken up in 
a variety of forms by the urban intelligentsia as well as the parties operating in the 
formalized political domain: these included forms of communalist appropriation just as 
they included forms of secular appropriation. The manner in which the imagination of the 
nation of Pakistan was realized from the bottom up, not just the top down, forms the 
subject of this dissertation. 
 My study is quite different from prevalent standard formulations, according to 
which, “it was for economic reasons, far more than because of any religious motivations, 
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that the Muslim peasantry finally threw in their lot with the Muslim League and its 
claims for an independent Pakistan.”24 In studying discursive representations of so-called 
economic phenomenon such as debt, articulations of demands thrown up in the early days 
of asserting praja identity, and the structure of patronage of the raiyat samitis (tenant 
associations) via which a peasant-tenant movement coalesced around such praja identity, 
I show that it is not possible to disaggregate economic reasons, demands, or categories 
from religious dispositions, charismatic religious figures, and prominent ethico-social 
ideological strands that shaped conceptions of cultivating self and community among 
Muslims in rural Bengal. How such conceptions of self and community were taken up 
and transformed by the urban Muslim intelligentsia and literati both in the sphere of 
formalized politics and in forging a domain of Bengali Muslim cultural autonomy also 
forms the subject of this dissertation.  
Chapter Summary 
Broadly speaking, in the following four chapters, organized thematically rather than 
chronologically, I examine key shifts in Islamic theological debates, Muslim forms of 
civil associations, assumptions about ethnic belonging, and Muslim literary cultures, to 
argue that by the inter-war period (in the late 1910s to the early 1940s) these altered the 
meaning of being Muslim, in the context of Bengal, in very critical ways by linking up 
notions of cultivation of self and community to ideas of cultivating land, thus valorizing 
labor as a positive repository of value, while positing markets, traders, and merchants – 
sites and actors engaged in the spheres of exchange and circulation – as full of deceit and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Willem Van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p. 93. 
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dubiousness. I also show that such transformations in theological, literary, and 
associational practices among the Muslims of Bengal were critical in instantiating 
subjectivities that could inhabit modalities of organized politics which, in an era of 
expanding franchise, had the effect of successfully bringing hitherto excluded sections of 
the Muslim populations into the domain of organized provincial politics, thereby making 
them available to mobilization and manipulation by political players and parties who 
championed the primacy of the producer in a claim to politically represent them. 
Following this introduction, my dissertation is divided as follows: 
Chapter One: Debt, Riba, and Muslim Self-Making in Bengal 
In this chapter I explore the issue of indebtedness through its discursive representations in 
sites as diverse as Muslim literary journals, pamphlets, religious tracts, and Muslim self-
improvement texts that circulated in early twentieth century Bengal. In early twentieth 
century Bengal, at a time of acute indebtedness among the peasantry, debt, far from 
simply being an economic category, took on the distinctive valence of being “the burden 
of the Muslim”. The problem of debt was often spoken of in relation to the Koranic 
injunction against riba, which, in popular understanding, prohibited transactions that 
generated profit as interest. This chapter looks at how in contested ways of thinking about 
circumventing the condition of indebtedness, the meaning of riba emerged as a matter of 
fierce debate among the Muslims of Bengal. Debt, whether as a problem or an experience 
– as it got more and more entangled with interpreting the injunction against riba in public 
discourse – became inextricably linked to the problem of defining a moral vision of the 
Muslim self and community. In attending to the ways in which the interpretation of the 
riba prohibition by urban Muslim rationalists and reformers differed very significantly 
	   22	  
from their rural co-religionists, I show that such differing interpretations dramatized 
fundamentally different conceptions of what it meant to be a Muslim for these two 
constituencies. Also, I show how the ethico-social discourse of ‘Improvement’ (unnati) 
circulating among the Muslims in the Bengal countryside during the 1910s and 1920s, in 
positing labor as the highest form of worship to Allah, structured the meaning of interest 
(or riba) as a mode of making wealth without expending labor as well as a manner of 
prospering bereft of Islamic piety. Upholding the prohibition on interest by citing the 
absence of expenditure of labor, as the intent behind a Koranic prohibition was a 
stunningly novel spin introduced by Muslim ‘Improvement’ ethical discourse, and had no 
precedence in the Islamic theological discourse on riba. I track how this innovation was 
successfully taken up by left-minded members of the urban Bengali Muslim intelligentsia 
and introduced into the domain of formal politics to establish relationships of affinity 
between Islam and communism. Finally, I point to how this development shaped the 
course of Muslim politics through the 1930s and informed the Pakistan movement in the 
subsequent decade.  
Chapter Two: Changing conceptions of Muslim Political Representation 
This chapter explores the shifting presuppositions about political representation among 
the Muslims of colonial Bengal. Focusing on prominent Muslim public personalities of 
late nineteenth century Bengal and institutions such as the National Mohammedan 
Association (1878) and Mohammedan Literary Society (1863) to which they were 
attached and through which they conducted the business of representing the Muslim 
community of Bengal to the British Government, I show how for such figures and 
institutions the matter of representing was based on a principle of distinction – rooted in 
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wealth, social rank, influence, and a fundamental non-identification with the constituency 
one acted for. Even as those who considered themselves leaders of the Muslim 
community in Bengal became signatories on the Shimla Memorial led by an all India-
level Muslim deputation, which marked a move from a politics of nomination to a 
politics of election, the demand for separate electorates was mooted in terms of receiving 
state patronage for a community, which as they put it, “enjoyed status and influence” up 
until a not-so-distant past and protecting the interests of the propertied Muslim tax-payer.  
Then I shift the lens of scrutiny to the plea for retaining separate electorates for Muslims 
as it was raised by a prominent Bengal Muslim public personality, Azizul Haque in 1931. 
In so doing, I study how within less than two decades, Muslim conceptions about 
representing the community had changed so dramatically that the need for retaining 
separate electorates was now being argued in terms of preventing men of wealth, rank, 
and influence – attributes that Haque’s nineteenth century predecessors had deemed 
essential for representing the community – from posing as the community’s 
representatives. If the transformed nature of the terms in which the demand for separate 
electorates was being raised provides clues to the changing self-definitions of the Muslim 
community in Bengal, which was now loath to accept a wealthy ashraf as its true 
representative, what transformations in the moral vision of self and community, I ask, 
could account for this change? Focusing on the Anjuman-e-Ulema-e-Bangla (founded in 
1913), and to some extent, on a rural chapter of the Anjuman-e-Islamia in Bengal, I 
demonstrate how such anjumans, distinctively Muslim forms of civil association which 
were spread out across rural Bengal were crucial sites within which subjectivities 
oriented to democratic practice and politics were being worked out in the early decades of 
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twentieth century Bengal and were crucial to the dissemination of a certain vision of 
Muslim community, which enabled habitations in an idea of political sovereignty rooted 
in popular mandate.  I suggest that rather than focusing exclusively on political parties 
and elections (with severely restricted franchise up until the Government of India Act of 
1935), a more systematic study (than what I have been able to undertake here) of the 
activities of anjumans in Bengal could prove profitable in understanding how practices in 
democracy historically evolved within Bengal’s Muslim society in a manner such that 
progressive Bengali Muslim activists, in making the demand for Pakistan in 1940s, could 
justify the demand in terms that an Islamic state embodied true democracy, of which 
western imperialism and Indian nationalism – ridden with imperialist tendencies, as it 
were – only offered corrupted and constricted versions.  
Chapter Three: From Respect to Redistribution: The Hegemony of Praja Identity 
Using praja pamphlets in prose and verse, autobiography, newspapers, and other 
pertinent material, this chapter traces how the early assertions of the praja movement in 
the second decade of the twentieth century – which were non-violent and involved 
methods of collectivization and negotiation similar to the modalities of the domain of 
organized politics involving associations, deputations, memoranda, conferences, and 
press releases – were responses to experiences of social discrimination as Muslim qua 
Muslim and infused with dispositions shaped by a longer history of Islamic revivalisms, 
which surged through rural Bengal in the nineteenth century. In following my line of 
inquiry into the mutual imbrication of Islam and praja assertions, I study social actors 
who pioneered local-level raiyat samitis in far-flung villages, the rhetoric used to 
mobilize the local populace, and the larger networks to which such raiyat associations 
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were connected. I show how raiyat samitis were often pioneered by locally influential, 
charismatic, Muslim religious leaders who were connected to pirs wielding influence 
over several districts of Bengal through them; such pirs were often themselves landed, or 
at least patronized by the landed Muslim gentry. In tracing the nature of raiyat samiti 
patronage in the 1910s and 1920s, this chapter shows how potentially conflicting class 
interests between Muslim landed interests and the Muslim raiyat were simultaneously 
produced and contained.  I also study how the language of praja mobilization tied visions 
of a better social order to the restoration of a religio-moral Islamic order so effectively 
that the issue of garnering religious legitimacy in the eyes of large populations of 
Muslims in Bengal got inextricably connected to the support of the praja movement, and 
religious figures, irrespective of bitter sectarian differences, started patronizing the 
movement. Furthermore, I study how the rhetoric of the praja movement, as evinced in 
the praja pamphlets, enlisted the support of the bargadars even though the demands of 
the movement were not in their interest. I show how the movement’s discourse made this 
possible by: at one level, propagating acute xenophobia directed not only against the 
Marwari moneylenders but also the Bihari coolies and the wage laborers from Orissa; at 
another level, by setting up Bengal as a sedentarized realm of bounty vis-à-vis the 
“uncivilized” wilderness of Assam, and finally, by latching on to the religiosity-infused 
ideology of labor popularized by the Muslim improvement texts, while extending and 
expanding its meaning – of a moral cultivation of self equated with diligence in 
cultivating land – to a conception of  moral cultivation of self connected not only to 
labor, and the piece of land one toiled on, but to land of Bengal at large. Thus, I show 
how the rhetoric of the praja movement generated energies by which Bengali Muslim 
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identity was formed at a grassroots levels and entirely new kinds of assertions of ethnic 
belonging rooted in acts of cultivating the land of Bengal could be made. Finally, I turn to 
the manner in which in the domain of organized provincial politics in the 1930s, where 
both the League and the KPP were vying to represent the Muslims, questions of which of 
them was the real praja party, and issues of Bengali Muslim-ness vs. non-Bengali 
Muslim-ness, made their way into claims of who could more authentically represent the 
Muslims of Bengal. Also, I evince how Bengali Muslim identity forged, as it were, in the 
discursive terrain of the praja movement informed the cultural politics of the literary elite 
and intelligentsia located in Calcutta or Dhaka, as they stove to carve out a space of 
literary-cultural autonomy for the Muslims of Bengal through the establishment of 
literary societies, journals, and conferences. 
Chapter Four: The Cultural Politics of the Pakistan Demand in Bengal: Islam, 
Egalitarianism, and the Individual in Bengali Muslim Literary Praxis 
It is to the literary domain of late colonial Bengal that I now turn, to study how that 
crucial connection between labor and Islamic moral cultivation forged in the crucible of 
the improvement ethic, and taken up by left-minded members of the Muslim 
intelligentsia in Bengal to establish relationships of congruity between Islam and 
socialism, or communism, was explored and experimented with in literary imagination. 
By focusing on the figure of Nazrul Islam, who rose like a meteor in the literary world of 
Bengal in the 1920s, I show how his works and life choices, the body of criticism they 
generated, and the following that grew up around his literary style was key to the 
development of a subjectivity where Islam, redistributive justice, as well as forceful 
individualism could seamlessly co-exist. I show how this heady mix of Islam, socialism, 
and individualism brewing among sections of the Bengali Muslim literati from the 1920s 
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onward, informed the politics of cultural-literary organizations, such as the East Pakistan 
Renaissance Society (Calcutta) and the Purba Pakistan Sahitya Samsad  (Dhaka), which 
came into being in the early 1940s with the express purpose of acting as cultural fronts of 
the Pakistan movement in Bengal. Records of the literary-cultural activism of such 
organizations show that the demand for Pakistan was hailed as a revolutionary 
movement, a people’s movement which, far from being parochial, sectional, or 
communal, was seen to be a blow to imperialist tendencies that inhered within 
nationalism.  Indeed, for the cultural activists of the East Pakistan Renaissance Society 
(EPRS), the idea of the  “people” as the touchstone of political sovereignty was 
envisaged as a collective formed by the equal capacity of each individual for autonomy 
and free choice. Thus the EPRS was welcoming of all members irrespective of caste, 
creed, and religion. Several non-Muslims were members; many of them chaired sessions 
at the organization’s major conferences. For organizations such as the EPRS, 
membership, and in a larger sense, investment in the Pakistan movement, were matters of 
inner commitment and autonomous choice, abstracted from, in some ways, society and its 
constraints. This chapter attempts to show how a subjectivity that could inhabit the 
Pakistan movement as a non-sectarian, “people’s movement” in the 1940s was 
historically instantiated, and explores the manner in which this subjectivity was 
connected to a historically specific understanding of Muslim culture.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Debt, Riba, and Muslim Self-making in Bengal 
 
Introduction: 
The figure of the debt-ridden Muslim peasant of the Bengal countryside – mostly passive 
and emaciated, but occasionally insurgent and avenging the local Hindu moneylender – 
forms a staple in the histories of twentieth century colonial Bengal. Was the insurgent 
Muslim peasant “communally” motivated? Or was his act of rage propelled by the 
“economic fact” of his indebtedness?  Put simply, is it religion or economics that can 
most satisfactorily explain the widespread unrest among sections of the overwhelmingly 
Muslim peasantry of Bengal that sporadically erupted in collective acts of violence, 
throughout the 1920s and the early 1930s, in which the targets were inevitably 
moneylenders? These are questions that plague today’s historians, much in the manner in 
which they plagued colonial officials who set out to understand, control, and often 
brutally suppress such “riots” or “disturbances”. Today’s historians, in the manner of the 
British officers of colonial India, continue to adjudicate on these matters – religious or 
economic, Islam or debt, this way or that. My chapter is a stubborn refusal to partake in 
such adjudications by entertaining the possibility that this debate itself – “religious or 
economic? Islam or debt?” – is, in all likelihood, a misplaced one; it may not be possible 
to historically disentangle the religious from the economic. So I take another tack in 
asking a different set of questions, which are of this nature: what was the meaning of 
“debt” as it emerged in the discourses circulating among the Muslims of Bengal in the 
1920s and 30s?  In what terms did Bengali Muslims speak of the problem of “being in 
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debt”, and in what kinds of spaces was the meaning of “debt” being negotiated and 
determined?  
In attempting to answer these questions, this chapter will explore the issue of 
indebtedness in relation to discursive practices in sites as diverse as literary journals, 
pamphlets, religious tracts, and most importantly, the Muslim self-improvement texts that 
circulated in early twentieth century Bengal. It will do so by drawing on a wide array of 
writings dealing with the problem of debt by English-educated Muslim “progressive” 
intellectuals, journalists, social reformers, well-respected Islamic scholars based out of 
urban centers as well as the itinerant ulema preaching in the Bengal countryside. But 
before that, it would be in order to attend to the anatomy of one such peasant insurgency 
that shook the Eastern part of Bengal in late colonial India, in a district where the 
peasantry was reeling under massive debts, to observe the specific forms such acts of 
violence typically took. Using one rather typical instance of peasant insurgency in 
Eastern Bengal as an entry point, this chapter will then turn to the contested discursive 
field in which the meaning of “debt” was being negotiated in the Bengali Muslim public 
domain to account for the conditions of possibility for the specific forms in which such 
peasant insurgencies occurred.  
In 1930, reporting on the widespread disturbances in the Kishoreganj subdivision 
of East Bengal’s Mymensingh district the District Magistrate, L.B Burrows, gives an 
account of how Muslim peasant agitators were involved in acts of violence and 
intimidation that affected a total of ninety villages in the district. According to Burrows: 
The trouble began apparently during the last Mohurram when the then Naib  [an 
official] of the Atharabari Zamindari Kacheri  [the landlord’s estate] at 
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Hossainpur interfered with the usual procession and gave the local Muhammadans 
great offence. On Sunday the 7th July, a big Muhammadan meeting was held at 
Hosseinpur at which the Naib and all his works (including, besides the above, the 
alleged oppression of Muhammadan tenants and the active support of the 
Congress Party) were denounced and resolutions were passed against the payment 
of interest to moneylenders.25 
 
There were several instances of police firing to bring the situation under control; 
approximately 631 people were sent up for trial, and moneylenders were the principal 
targets of the rioting peasantry.  He describes how a “mob of 100 to 1000 men” would 
collectively threaten a moneylender, demanding back “all documents in his possession”. 
In instances where the moneylender could not produce mortgage and credit documents 
immediately, he was asked to have them ready for surrender within a stipulated time 
period, failing which  “his house was looted, and in some cases burnt.”26 A petition to the 
governor from the leading Hindu professionals of Kishoreganj alleged that “the ruffians 
entered the houses of Hindus” possessing themselves of “holy khargos reserved for 
sacrificing animals on special festivals” and described, at length, the manner in which 
these armed raiders held up such “weapons over the heads of the principal householders, 
until bonds, ornaments, and cash were forthcoming in abundance.”27 A very interesting 
feature of these raids in Mymensingh district emerges from reports and petitions that 
populate the colonial archive: during the disturbances, all raids on moneylenders were 
carried out during the day, since the raiders thought that to go out in the night was 
thieving, an act that was against the shariat, but was brave and laudable to commit loot 
and plunder by daytime.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 L.B Burrows, District Magistrate, Mymensingh to W.S Hopkins, Chief Secretary, 18 
July 1930. GB Poll. File 613/30. WBSA (West Bengal State Archives). 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. 
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Although admitting the presence of Muslim religious leaders goading the 
peasantry to act against moneylenders, the District Magistrate opined that the 
Kishoreganj disturbances were not communal, notwithstanding “the necessary communal 
tinge” owing to the “fact” that “more than 90 percent of the debtors and tenants in the 
affected areas [were] Mohammedans”.  About the motives of the peasant agitators, the 
District Magistrate was categorical: 
I am of the opinion that the disturbances are fundamentally economic and many 
Hindu pleaders and others with whom I have discussed the matter agree with this 
view. Last year was a bad year for jute cultivation, and it is feared that this year 
will be as bad, if not worse, because the crop is likely to be a bumper one over an 
increased area, while the demand from the mills will be diminished. The present 
price of about Rs 5/8 a maund is hardly sufficient [for the cultivators] to cover 
their expenses.28 
 
The colonial bureaucrat’s judgment that the “disturbances” were fundamentally economic 
explains little about why peasant violence took specific forms such as raids carried on in 
broad daylight, instead of at night, which the raiders considered thieving and against the 
shariat. Or why, indeed, did the moneylenders emerge as principal targets, when 
according to the colonial archive, the discord in Kishoreganj “originated” with a 
grievance against the landlord’s (zamindar’s) official (the naib) who had allegedly 
interfered with the Mohurram procession?  
Sugata Bose’s influential work, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and 
Politics, 1919-1947, identifies early twentieth century Bengal as a time of generalized 
indebtedness – with debt replacing rent as the central mode of surplus extraction. This 
“economic fact” of indebtedness, according to Bose, holds the key to explaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 L.B Burrows. GB Poll. File 613/30.WBSA. 
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widespread unrest among the peasantry that erupted in collective acts of violence in the 
early 1930s, in which the targets were inevitably moneylenders.29 And yet, it is important 
to note that the burden of debt made its appearance on the discursive terrain of early 
twentieth century Bengal as a distinctive kind of burden – “the burden of the Muslim”. In 
Bengal, by the 1920s, exorbitant interest on loan was identified as the prime reason for 
indebtedness; newspapers and journals from the time are replete with reportage of how a 
relatively small sum loaned by an unsuspecting peasant transformed fantastically into an 
unbelievably huge and incomprehensible debt.  The monthly journal Mohammadi’s 
account of the plight of one Zeenat Ali Sheikh is typical of such reportage. According to 
a 1928 issue of the journal, Zeenat Ali Sheikh, a small peasant of Ilbari village in Bengal 
had borrowed a sum of Rs. 20 from one Mahendra Chandra Pal on a rate of interest 
charged at 200 per cent, with an additional clause that in the instance of default on annual 
interest payment, the interest would be added to the principal amount loaned on which, as 
per the principle of compound interest, interest would be further calculated. Within a 
brief period of time, Zeenat Ali Sheikh’s loan of Rs. 22 had transformed itself to a debt 
amounting to a mammoth sum of Rs.37721. In the same year, when this piece of news 
from the Mohammadi was quoted in a cheaply printed tract titled Krishaker Unnati 
(Improvement of the Peasant), directed primarily to Muslim peasants, the debt of Zeenat 
Ali Sheikh of Ilbari had come to be seen as a debt of the entire Muslim community in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, social structure and politics, 1919-1947, 
especially chapter 4 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
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Bengal, and was presented as the root cause of the economic and spiritual degeneration of 
the Bengali Muslims.30  
In the 1920s and 1930s, the condition of indebtedness was all too often spoken of 
in relation to the Koranic injunction forbidding Muslims from engaging in riba or 
usurious activity - more generally, understood as partaking in any transaction that 
involved the receiving or giving of interest on loans. Some argued that the Muslim’s 
burden of debt was an outcome of flouting the Islamic injunction against interest-related 
transactions, which jeopardized not only one’s worldly (duniyabi) condition but also 
one’s relationship to religion (deen). Yet loans were almost always available on interest 
and were needed, the opposing camp contended, for commercial and agricultural ventures 
and, therefore, urged the ulema  (the clergy) to rethink the prohibition on riba in light of 
practical necessities. Moreover, some Bengali Muslim reformers even argued that the 
Muslims in being forbidden from wealth-making activities that generated profit as 
interest, in fact, impoverished themselves both materially and spiritually, since the 
spiritual wellbeing of the community was inextricably tied to its material wellbeing. This 
chapter traces the terms in which the status of the riba prohibition was fiercely debated in 
the public domain of early twentieth century colonial Bengal – in literary journals, 
theological writings, as well as in the Muslim self-improvement texts which circulated in 
the Bengal countryside and were meant to teach the peasants how to be good Muslims 
and good peasants.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Khademol Islam, Krishaker Unnati (Mohammad Moyejjadin Hamidi, 1929). 
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 In the Muslim public sphere of Bengal, no consensus emerged regarding the 
manner in which this “traditional” injunction prohibiting riba had to be dealt with or 
indeed understood and, as my sources will attest, the diversity of opinions ranged from 
declarations of complete irrelevance of the sharia’s injunction, to a plea to re-interpret 
the shariat, to advocating a strict adherence to the injunction as the duty of every good 
Muslim. Yet the limits of the debates in the public domain, notwithstanding the multiple 
and contradictory positions on the issue, were structured by the near impossibility of any 
Muslim in Bengal of the time to speak of indebtedness without referring the implications 
of his position to his identity as a Muslim. In other words, the condition of indebtedness, 
whether as a problem or an experience - as it got more and more entangled with the status 
of the riba prohibition in public discourse - became inextricably linked to the problem of 
defining a moral vision of the Muslim self and community. 
Rationalist and Reformist Remedies for the burden of debt 
At the third annual session of the Muslim Sahitya Samiti, a literary association 
comprising primarily of Muslim teachers and students of varied ideological persuasions, 
that grew out of Dhaka University, Nazirul Islam, an important member of this influential 
Dhaka-based Bengali Muslim literary association, in his essay “Manab Pragati o Mukta 
Buddhi” (1929) or “Human Progress and the Liberated Intellect” attacked Islamic law for 
suppressing intellectual freedom (buddhir mukti) and attributed the Muslim community’s 
lack of economic development to this suppression of intellect.  
According to Nazirul Islam, although Islamic texts had taught Muslims social and 
economic egalitarianism by upholding the abolition of interest and the introduction of 
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zakat (obligatory payment to be made annually for religious and charitable purposes), 
such decrees suited the needs of people at the time they were introduced, but had 
gradually become oppressive and outmoded. Nazirul Islam saw the introduction of 
compound interest in Europe as the key economic innovation that fuelled and sustained 
the industrial revolution.  As per his largely distorted but tidy narrative of Europe’s 
“progress”, people deposited money in banks, and the principle of compound interest - by 
which money speedily begot money - enabled capital to be invested in building newer 
industries and infrastructure, thus leading Europe up the path of progress, as it were.31 
The Muslim, he lamented, could not accept this “creativity of humans” and Islamic 
societies remained resistant to change, economic innovation, and, ultimately, progress. 
To quote Nazirul Islam:  
He [the Muslim] opened the decaying pages of religious texts. He saw in there 
that it is an act of haram (sinful) to take interest… what happened, as a result, is 
that egalitarianism within Muslim society continued according to the rules of 
Islamic texts. But, between the Christians of the West and the Muslims, the 
inequity in material conditions assumed the vast distance between the sky and the 
earth…Applying mukta buddhi (freedom of intellect) will equip [the Muslim] to 
adjust and achieve victory in the changing circumstances of the world.32 
The economic development of the Muslims, for Nazirul Islam, would require the 
application of emancipated intellect (mukta buddhi).  To the question of what the intellect 
would have to emancipate itself from, his answer was unequivocal: from the coercive 
forces of religious injunctions that did not serve the economic/material needs of the time.  
According to his formulation, the soundness of intellectual judgment was to be based on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mohammad Nazirul Islam,‘Manab Pragati o Mukti Buddhi’ in Kazi Mutahar Hussain 
(ed.) Sikha,Vol. III (Dhaka, 1929), pp. 85-92. 
32 Ibid., p. 90. (All translation from Bengali sources are mine unless otherwise indicated). 
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the condition of “freedom” and “autonomy” under which it operates - freedom from the 
bindings of religion and an autonomy vis-à-vis religion.  Significantly, and indeed 
ironically, this secularized “emancipated intellect” (mukta buddhi) on which an 
influential group of Dhaka-based Muslim rationalist humanists placed premium, even as 
it freed itself from religion, could not free itself from the realm of “economic needs” to 
the satisfaction of which every intellectual judgment had to be, ultimately, directed.  
I will briefly focus on three other vocal participants in the riba debate, who were 
based out of the urban centers of Dhaka or Calcutta, and were men in positions of 
considerably influencing public opinion by virtue of being prominent public personalities 
or renowned Islamic scholars who held key editorial positions in popular Bengali Muslim 
(and Urdu) newspapers and journals.   
Mohammad Abdur Rashid, the editor of a well-known Bengali weekly called 
Moslem Jagat (Muslim World) and a short-lived literary journal Raktasetu (Bridge of 
Blood), was also a prominent member of the Muslim Sahitya Samiti, a literary 
association that grew out of Dhaka University and comprised of Muslim teachers and 
students of the University. From a reformed religious stance, Rashid argued that even 
though “the Koran has forbidden interest”, for Muslims to successfully compete with 
other jatis (communities) in the “economic sphere”, the giving and taking of loans on 
interest was a necessary economic activity. According to Rashid, an engagement in such 
interest-related economic activities was not to be considered un-Islamic, since a 
necessary adjustment to the requirements of the present was in consonance with “the 
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spirit of Islam”.33  In his view, it was through the application of proper judgment that 
such adjustments were to be made. But unlike the radical humanists in the Muslim 
Sahitya Samaj, such as Nazirul Islam, for whom the application of judgment would first 
require the intellect to be freed from the constraining forces of religion, Rashid drew on 
the Islamic tradition of ijtihad, or independent judgment of original Islamic sources, 
emphasized in the theological writings of Shah Waliullah, a noted Islamic scholar of 
eighteenth century South Asia. Rashid saw the exercise of ijtihad as key to resolving the 
problem posed by the riba prohibition, and argued that it was only via the exercise of 
ijtihad that “the continuity of the inner meanings of Shariat” could be maintained to meet 
“the new necessities…of time and age.”  To quote him, “this adjustment would not mean 
a change of inner thought and meaning of the Shariah, but only a rational change of their 
exterior form.”34 
The essay “Sudh Samasya” (The Problem of Interest) published in 1930, and 
written by noted journalist, political activist, and a religious scholar theologically close to 
the Alh-i Hadis, Maulana Mohammad Akram Khan, was precisely such an exercise in 
ijtihad.35 In attempting to grapple with the issue of riba or interest, his first attack, in the 
tradition recognizable as the Ahl-i Hadis’s aversion to dissention within Muslim society, 
was on the multiplicity of arguments from different camps on the question of riba and the 
utter chaos that resulted from such diversity of opinions. He identified the views and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Mohammad Abdur Rashid, ‘Amader Nabajagaran o Shariat’, Shikha, Vol. I (Dhaka, 
1927), pp. 85-99. 
34 Ibid., p. 93. 
35 See Maulana Akram Khan, “Sudh Samasya” from Samasya O Samadhan (Calcutta, 
1930). Khan was a prominent jounrnalist who edited the bilingual (Urdu and Bengali) 
weekly paper of the Ahl-i Hadis, the popular Bengali monthly Masik Mohammadi and the 
Urdu newspaper Zamana. 
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modes of argumentation of the key camps in the riba debate – the reformist, the Hanafis, 
and the secularists. He pointed out that the reformists, in reading the Koran and the 
hadith had ascertained that according to the Koran, riba is forbidden, but made a 
distinction between riba of the Koran and modern day interest, thus refusing to equate 
riba and interest.  According to this group, though riba was haram (unlawful), interest 
was halal (permissible) because modern day interest, they averred, could not be included 
within the Koranic category of riba. The ulema of the Hanafi madhab were of the opinion 
that the injunction against riba could be effective only in Dar-ul-Islam (the land of 
Islam), but since Muslims were living in Dar-ul-Harb, the land ruled by infidels – 
namely, the British colonizers – it was permissible to receive interests from non-Muslims. 
However Akram Khan reserved his most disparaging comments for the so-called 
secularized Muslims, who he alleged, “were generally least concerned with the well-
being of the Mussalman, but when it came to the issue of interest made a big noise.” 
According to him, the so called progressive Muslim secularists were on a mission to 
prove that as a religion, Islam was not fit for “our [sic] times” and to support this they 
used the injunction against interest as a stick with which to beat Islam. The problem, 
according to Akram Khan, lay not in the Koranic injunction against riba, but in the 
failure of all parties invested in the debate – the ulema, the reformists, and so called 
“progressive” scholars – to attend closely to the Koran and the hadith. According to him, 
even the religious scholars took a partial view in their reading of the prohibition on riba, 
and thus missed the most basic principle that should guide the reading of the Koran – this 
principle, for him, was the recognition that in the Koran and the hadith, every prohibition 
was complemented by a direction, and alongside every renunciation was an acquisition. 
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Thus, for Akram Khan, the denial implied in the injunction prohibiting riba could only be 
fully understood in relation to the positive duty of zakat. Loans on interest became a 
necessity only in conditions of extreme economic desperation and the farz (religious 
duty) of zakat  (charity) worked toward eliminating such economic desperation in society 
in the first place. Therefore, he argued, until the institution of zakat was not well 
entrenched in society, riba or interest could not be prohibited. He concluded that the riba 
prohibition was not a problem of Islam that had to be confronted and solved, but a 
problem that arose from partial readings of the Koran, which resulted from failing to 
exercise proper judgment. The lack of proper judgment led to mistaking the part for the 
whole and prevented a grasp over the basic principles of Islam. 36 
In 1925, in addressing a large gathering at the Islamia Jila Conference in 
Chattagram, Abdus Sattar - a social reformer, lawyer, and at the time a young, promising 
member of Calcutta Bar Association - expressed concern that the  “maintenance of a 
stable economic life” for the Muslim community had become increasingly difficult 
because Muslims were entrapped in the web of debt. Insurmountable debts, which kept 
growing with high rates of interest charged by non-Muslim communities, resulted in the 
loss of land and property of several hundred Muslims who could barely prevent their 
ancestral homes from being auctioned off by moneylenders.37 In addition, he claimed, the 
profit-making activity of lending out money on interest in being forbidden by Islam, 
aggravated the Muslims’ condition of indebtedness - they turned into perpetual debtors, 
handicapped by not being able to benefit from the profits that interest -- as the money-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Akram Khan, ‘Sudh Samasya’ in Samasya O Samadhan (Calcutta, 1930). 
37 See Abdus Sattar, Presidential Address of the Chattagram Islamia Jila Conference, 
1925. 
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value of passing time -- generated. “In these circumstances”, Sattar urged, “the respected 
Maulavis must consider whether it is possible to think of any special procedures 
regarding the injunction against the giving and taking of interest.”38 Sattar argued that his 
plea was in consonance with the express agenda of the conference, which was, “to 
deliberate on the ways in which the [Muslim] community, in its current state of religious 
degeneration, could improve itself in the sphere of both din (faith) and duniya (worldly 
matters)”.   
An accurate understanding of din, according to him, would require that inessential 
customary practices be stripped away from the essential “core” of religion, for the 
“present” economic condition of backwardness of Muslim society was a result of this 
society’s slavery to “customs”. Only in stripping away “superstitions” and “customs” 
could one arrive at the “rational core of Islam”. To help the ulema identify religion’s 
“rational” core, Sattar suggested some concrete measures to the gathering, key among 
which was an initiative, undertaken under the supervision of the conference committee, to 
modernize the district madrasa by the inclusion of Economics (arthakari bidya) in its 
curriculum while turning all other local village-level madrasas, modeled on the district 
madrasa, into its branches. Economics, he believed, would help the ulema grasp the 
material, “economic needs” of the present, and in light of these economic needs, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Abdus Sattar, Presidential Address of the Chattagram Islamia Jila Conference, 
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deliberate on separating inessential religious practices (such as the injunction against 
usury) from the core/inner meaning of Islam.39 
In the writings of these urban social and religious reformists, the meaning of 
sharia was to be grasped through an interiorized process of intellection, not through 
outward practice. In their formulations, the exercise of intellectual judgment held 
primacy – it was the basis on which the distinction between the “inner meaning” of the 
sharia and its mere “exterior forms” could be made in the first place. The application of 
judgment, which for religious reformers such as Akram Khan and Abdur Rashid was 
itself sanctioned by religion, thus took precedence over religious practice and determined 
what outward practice ought to be.  For Muslim social reformers such as Nazirul Islam 
and Abdus Sattar the relevance of religious practice was contingent on whether or not 
they were rational. The ability of religious practice to be able to adequately fit the 
“economic needs of the time” was seen as the touchstone of rationality. In other words, 
for them, the needs of the economic sphere as the final determinants of material 
conditions were absolute givens, whereas the requirements of religion (understood as an 
organizing principle of the social structure) could be molded and constituted in 
accordance with the absolute given of ‘economic’ needs.   
The Muslim Improvement Texts: How to prosper in this world and beyond? 
The emphasis on the need to improve the duniyabi (worldly) condition as a 
precondition for the successful upholding of din (religion) that we find in speeches and 
writings of Muslim reformists such as Abdu’s Sattar was also to be found in cheaply-	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printed Muslim improvement texts in verse and prose which proliferated from the 1920s 
onward and circulated in the Bengal countryside. Unified by the theme of the Muslim 
peasant’s self-improvement, these texts were written in country dialects and oriented 
primarily toward rural, barely literate or even non-literate, peasant audiences of the 
Bengal countryside. Such tracts, frequently composed in rhyming couplets, lend 
themselves more readily to be learned by rote and were, in all likelihood, read out to 
audiences of eager listeners more frequently than they were read in silent contemplation. 
One such tract repeatedly emphasized the need for material stability as the key to 
upholding religion, by drawing on the example of the Malkana Rajputs who, because 
they were materially impoverished, in the 1920s, became easy targets for the Arya 
Samaj’s aggressive “suddhi  (purification) movement”, by which this controversial socio-
religious reformist Hindu movement claimed to “reconvert” certain populations back into 
the Hindu fold. The Muslim self-improvement text pointed to the dangers of poverty: 
Listen, my Muslim brothers, 
The one who dwells in daily poverty, 
Finds it hard to maintain his imaan [religious integrity] 
 Have you heard of the happenings in Rajputana? 
Several Muslims have become Hindus, 
Compelled by poverty, 
They parted with din Islam. 
Helped by the Arya [Samajis] who provided succor, 
They became Hindus… 
Listen, O Muslims brothers, if you’re keen  
To uphold din Islam, 
Then come together 
To alleviate the poverty (deen)  
Of your jati. 
Look at other jatis 
Who loot our money 
And by engaging in business 
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Become masters, as we become impoverished.40 
 
Typical of such verses was an interesting word play on the very different meanings of 
deen, which, in Bengali, could mean one’s faith (din or deen) but also helplessness 
(deen). Muslim improvement texts typically spoke of how difficult it was for the 
economically helpless (deen) to be faithful to an Islamic way of life (deen). The condition 
of impoverishment (deenata) was therefore understood as both a material and a spiritual 
condition, and spiritual poverty (deenhinata) could both be the effect of material poverty 
or its cause. But interestingly in most self-improvement tracts, both material and spiritual 
poverty resulted from incorrect/ irreligious practice. Such texts, in general, evinced a 
marked difference from the urban, Muslim reformists’ take on the question of interest-
related financial transactions. By and large, the Muslim self-improvement texts did not 
advocate a repeal of the “traditional” injunction against the giving and taking of interest, 
but asked for a strict adherence to the practice of refraining from participating in usurious 
activities. In other words, practice, in the case of improvement texts, was not deemed 
secondary to the material wellbeing of a Muslim. Indeed, such texts worked to delineate 
how it was through correct religious practice that both material and spiritual wellbeing 
could be best maintained.  
The self-improvement text in verse titled “Duniya O Akherat Do Jahan-er Najat” 
(Prosperity in this World and Beyond), composed by Abdul Aziz, and published from 
Noakhali in 1925, identified the condition of indebtedness as the cause of the Muslim’s 
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religious as well as economic impoverishment. In the manner characteristic of such self-
improvement verses, the point was illustrated by example. Here, it was a supposedly 
“true” story of two Muslim brothers from Noakhali district who got into a quarrel with 
each other over a petty domestic matter, as the quarrel spiraled out of control, they turned 
violent and broke each other’s heads. Egged on by other villagers, they dragged each 
other to the court of law. The protracted legal battle that ensued between the two brothers 
proved too expensive and resulted in a total depletion of their cash funds. This only 
served to aggravate their anger against each other, leading them, ultimately, to the door of 
the village mahajan (moneylender) who lend money to both brothers on exorbitant rates 
of interest to meet the legal expenses of fighting one another in the court of law. Finally 
the legal case was dismissed in court as too trivial. Neck-deep in debt, both brothers were 
driven out of their ancestral home by the moneylender who usurped their house and the 
plots of land they had mortgaged. In this Muslim improvement text, the plight of the 
brothers was shown to be the outcome of flouting the religious injunction prohibiting 
riba. According to this text, in taking loans given out on interest, the brothers not only 
reduced themselves to a state of penury but also committed a grave sin (gunah) that Allah 
would never forgive. The consequences of this irreligious act, it was said, would last 
beyond their life in this world (duniya) and condemn them to burn in the fires of hell 
(jahannum). 41 
 Another self-improvement text, in prose, titled Krishaker Unnati (Improvement 
of the Peasant), by Khademol Islam, an itinerant preacher who had traveled extensively 
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in the countryside of Bengal and Assam and was associated with the Anjuman-e Wazin-i-
Bangla, founded by Mualana Abu Bakr Siddiqui, the Pir of Furfura, depicts debt as both a 
material problem and an irreligious act. To quote from Krishaker Unnati: 
Incurring a debt (rin), even in performing a good deed (punya), is not in 
accordance with the shariat. If the ignorant peasants could understand this simple 
matter, then they would not jeopardize their existence in this life and after. 
Incurring a debt is a grave sin (maha paap) – for the debtor can never enter the 
house of behesht (heaven) until he frees himself from the web of debt. For those 
that are suspicious of what I say, I have quoted a saying of the Prophet. Readers, 
from this you will understand the gravity of the sin of debt. Hazrat says –  
In the hour of qayamat, a debtor will be imprisoned for not paying off his debt.  
According to the hadith collection, Chahi Mocholman:  
“O inspired Prophet, if in receiving the blessing of Allah, I move ever forward 
and die in jihad, in exchange will Allah forgive all the sins I have accumulated in 
the course of my lifetime?” The Prophet replied, “Yes”. But as soon the man 
turned to proceed homeward, Prophet addressed him and said, “All your sins will 
be forgiven, but not the sin of debt. This had been told to me by Jibrail.” 42 
 
But if debt was such a grave sin, how could the peasants circumvent the condition of 
indebtedness? In the manner characteristic of Muslim self-improvement texts, Krishaker 
Unnati, advocated a spirit of diligence, hard work, avoidance of extravagance, and an 
inculcation of the virtue of thriftiness.  The disciplines of diligence and thriftiness, it was 
said, could lead to self-sufficiency of the individual Muslim peasant and the betterment of 
the Muslim community as a whole. Again in a manner typical of self-improvement tracts, 
Krishaker Unnati maintained that for the peasant, diligence was warranted because 
cultivation held a special place “among all the occupations that Allah has created for 
man” and iterated that many prophets of Islam - those that came before Mohammad - 
were cultivators. According to the text:  
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Hazrat Adam and Lut were both cultivators. So were Hazrat Ali and Hazrat 
Maksud. The problem is that the educated look down upon those that feed them 
by calling them chasha [literally meaning a peasant but also derogatorily used to 
refer to an uncouth and uneducated country bumpkin.]43 
That tilling the earth was not a simple act of labor but an act laden with a religio-
moral valence was a theme that pervaded the Muslim self-improvement texts. To 
quote from the verse tract, Najat: 
O brothers, listen to what the shariat says, 
Labor in this world (duniya) 
For it is your action in the world, that will determine your end (akher) 
According to the sharia, 
Allah says, “I have created man and animal 
Only so they can worship me” 
Now listen, only for worship (ibadat) 
If Allah had created us 
Why did he create work in the world? 
Listen O Muslim brothers, 
The truth (haqiqat) is 
All work is worship 
… And agriculture is the original work 44 
 
Another popular tract from the 1920s than went into several reprints, titled “Adarsha 
Krishak” (The Ideal Peasant) re-iterated that the labor of cultivation was the man’s 
original work: 
Adam and Eve lived in the world 
And tilled the earth 
We who are alive, 
Bear their ancestry,  
Whether we are beggars or kings. 
(Adam o Hawa thake duniya-e, Karen chasher kaj/ tar-I bangsha bhabe, achi 
mora shobe/ kangal ki maharaj)45 
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In the Muslim self-improvement tracts the ability to perform labor, especially the 
physical labor of cultivation, was depicted as the highest from of worship to Allah and 
tilling the earth acquired the status of man’s original work. The relationship between land 
and labor was posited as a religiously sanctioned one - to respect this relationship was 
shown to be the duty of a good Muslim and the proof of his religiosity. Of course, the 
belief that to be a good Muslim, one had to cultivate the earth as Adam did was not an 
invention of the self-improvement texts. As far back as the sixteenth century, as Richard 
Eaton notes, this idea found expression in Sufi texts such as Nabi Bamsa, in which, the 
messenger Gabriel after giving Adam a plough, a yoke, two bulls and seeds, addressed 
him with the words, “God has commanded that agriculture will be your destiny”.46 
Though Adam’s career as a tiller of the soil is also found in the Book of Genesis, such an 
association is not made in the Quran. In the Muslim world, the perception of Adam as the 
first cultivator, and of his cultivating the earth at the command of God, was possibly a 
unique variant of Bengali Islam.47 
And yet even in using these ideas that already held a place in the Islamic cultural 
repertoire of Bengal - of Adam as the cultivator, and cultivation as man’s oldest and 
original work  - the early twentieth century self- improvement texts actually achieved 
something quite new.  They created a religio-moral vision of the Muslim self and 
community, where value lay in the act of cultivating, i.e. in production, while consistently 
depicting the realm of exchange, in this case, the market (bazaar) as a morally bankrupt 
realm of deception, duplicity, and lies. This deep suspicion of the market that 	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characterized Muslim improvement texts of the first two decades of the 20th century is 
significant. Traditionally, at markets and fairs lying on the path of pilgrimage, 
consumption and redistribution went hand in hand with the acquisition of religious merit. 
Some of the largest fairs followed the urs of distinguished Sufi saints, as market 
transactions on those days were considered particularly propitious. In Bengal, market 
fairs on the urs of Yakdil Shah in Barasat, of Pir Gorachand in Balanda, and 
Patharchapuri in Birbhum, among countless other dargahs and nazargahs, urged peasants, 
herders, artisans, and boatmen to travel to the market on specific days.48 As Sudipta Sen 
has pointed out, in Bengal of the eighteenth century, idioms of the marketplace were 
pervasive in devotional as well as eulogic poetry, where authority over marketplaces 
could be invoked as an earthly sign of spiritual eminence.49  But in the Muslim self-
improvement tracts that began proliferating the Bengal countryside in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century this was far from the case – peasants were consistently 
warned that the market was the domain of misrepresentation and deceit. 
  In highlighting the dubiousness of the domain of exchange, the regime of value – 
both economic and moral – that was being forged in the early twentieth century in the 
countryside, far from the urban centers of Calcutta and Dhaka, and emerged with startling 
clarity in the self-improvement texts directed to Muslim peasants, unambiguously 
accorded primacy to the site of production. The widely read tract Adarsha Krishak (The 
Ideal Peasant), authored by Abdul Hai and published from Mymensingh in 1920 provides 
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a telling example of the manner in which this regime of value was discursively 
instantiated. According to this tract: 
It could be said, “I buy food grains in the market with money, so why should I 
care about the peasant?” But imagine a time of famine…when food grains are not 
available. During a famine, it is a fistful of rice that can save a man, not bags full 
of wealth. He could be sitting on a pile of gold (coins), but he would be loath to 
even touch it. Instead if a fistful of rice is brought to him, he would devour it like 
a lion and regain life. Then, if we pose the same question, “what is of greater 
value? Money or a fistful of rice?” He will most definitely answer, “rice”. If it is 
asked, “Is a wealthy man your friend? Or is a peasant your friend?” “A peasant”, 
he will answer. So if a person believes that I buy with money, why should I be 
grateful to the peasant, such an opinion will be foolish indeed. 50 
Here, the labor of cultivation occupied a depth, a profundity, and a potential which 
money as a medium of exchange could only represent at a surface level or, potentially 
misrepresent. Thus, the hypothetical buyer in Adrasha Krishak was said to confound the 
source of rice to be the market (instead of properly identifying it in the labor of the 
peasant) and mistakenly locate value in money (instead of the productive activity of 
labor). Value was represented as emanating from a depth – the potential for productive 
activity or labor – that the surface realm of exchange, namely the market, could only ever 
misrepresent.  
It is also important to note that this value expressed in the relationship between 
labor and land was to be maintained through the centrality of practices – practices which, 
according to the self-improvement texts, constituted a good Muslim. The daily offerings 
of namaz and teaching one’s children how to offer prayer were as important as the daily 
activity of tending to one’s land with meticulous care – which was also a practice in 
ibadat (worship). When addressing the issue of how indebtedness was to be overcome, in 	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the manner of urban reformers such as Abdus Sattar or Abur Rashid, the improvement 
texts did not advocate a repeal of the scriptural prohibition on riba by arguing that such 
practices were secondary to the inner essence of Islam, and therefore could be adjusted to 
the “needs of the present” so long as they were “in continuity with the inner essence” of 
Islam. The problem of indebtedness, according to improvement texts, was to be 
countered through everyday practices of frugality and thriftiness that were depicted as 
being enjoined by Islam. As Krishaker Unnati noted: “The plight of Bengal’s peasantry is 
largely caused by extravagance. In the Koran, Allah has said that extravagance is the 
brother of shaitan (the devil).”51 This emphasis on practice, which dictated that the 
problem of indebtedness could be solved through the correct practice of thriftiness, also 
posited the problem of indebtedness as a matter of incorrect and un-Islamic practices of 
the Muslim peasant. Extravagance at weddings and an over-enthusiasm for litigation 
were identified, among others, as incorrect/ un-Islamic practices that resulted in debt.   
As the subaltern domain of the rural peasantry, comprising the overwhelming 
numbers of Muslims, came to be marked by the rapid circulation of a specific kind of 
cultural production in Bengali, namely, the Muslim improvement texts, such texts in 
performing the pedagogic function of teaching peasants how to be a self-sufficient 
peasant and good Muslim stressed on the centrality of practice. It was through the 
practices of labor and worship that the good Muslim/ good peasant’s relationship to land 
was established.  Again, it was through correct practices that the Muslim peasant’s 
burden of debt could be mitigated. Via concrete practices prescribed by the such self-
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improvement texts such as tilling, weeding, and pruning – in short, a meticulous regime 
of care for the land - which were also practices of worship to Allah, one’s relationship to 
the land one occupied as a tenant and worked on as a share-cropper could be morally and 
legitimately maintained. The zamindars and mahajans (moneylenders) were non-
cultivators who did not produce value. Land that accrued to such non-cultivators could be 
de-legitimized on the basis of the concept of the economic that the improvement texts had 
produced – where cultivation was the essential and enduring source of value. The land of 
the zamindars, and the landlord-moneylenders, and the wealth that accrued from such 
land was nothing short of deceit through which non-cultivators had usurped the land of 
the tenant-cultivators.  Thus another Muslim self-improvement text lamented:  
Not only is the raiyat (tenant-cultivator) not the owner of wealth, as a matter of 
fact, in the eyes of law, he is not even the owner of land.  Those that have 
accumulated wealth through deceit and force, those whose ancestors had endeared 
themselves to Lord Cornwallis’ Company agents and those who in broad daylight 
committed theft through usury are today the owners of land. But those poor 
creatures who turned their lifeblood to sweat – clearing dense jungles or by 
ceaseless toil, ploughed deeper and deeper into the earth to bring out ambrosia 
(amrita) – have no claims on the land today; they are merely hired hands.52 
In trying to understand the condition of possibility of the violent acts of peasant self-
assertions that mark the history of 1920s and early 1930s Bengal – insurrections of the 
kind that the “disturbances” in Mymensingh in the 1930 bear testimony to – the regime of 
value that emerged as an effect of the discursive practices of representation of the 
improvement texts has to be taken into account.  A concept of the economic where 
laboring-activity was seen as the sole fount of value was the condition of possibility of 
acts of peasant self-assertions. The discursive practices of the Muslim self -improvement 	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texts, with the emphasis on labor and the correctness of practice, rendered the 
moneylender illegitimate on two principal counts. Firstly, he was guilty of incorrect 
/irreligious practice, namely, partaking in usurious activity. Secondly, his relationship to 
his wealth was morally illegitimate because it was acquired by deceit, not the correct and 
value-generating practice of labor.  The manner in which raids on the moneylenders were 
carried out in Mymensingh – before sunset, in deference to the shariat which, it was 
thought, considers it cowardly to steal at night – attests to the premium placed on correct 
religious practice even during instances that were recorded by the colonizers as extreme 
unruly behavior.  
Conclusion 
As I have mentioned before for historians such as Sugata Bose, such acts of violence by a 
predominantly Muslim peasantry had an essentially economic basis and arose from the 
real economic condition of indebtedness. I have tried to suggest that it is hasty to attribute 
such causality to indebtedness as an “economic fact” without paying attention to the ways 
in which the meaning of debt was being historically determined by specific discursive 
practices of representation. For the urban, Muslim rationalists and reformers, interest 
(which resulted in massive debts), as the money-value of passing time, increased 
incrementally all along the linear infinity of time, irrespective of practice. Time itself 
could generate value. It was this understanding of interest which necessitated that 
practice be maneuvered –the prohibition on riba be repealed or reinterpreted – to remedy 
the “Muslim burden” of debt and meet the needs of (value-generating) time. But in the 
Muslim improvement texts directed to the semi-literate and even non-literate peasants, 
debt was a problem that accrued from incorrect/ irreligious practice and could be 
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remedied through correct religious practice alone. The time of debt was made contingent 
upon practice, and was not, in principle, either infinite or independent of it. In other 
words, time itself was no guarantor of value. As I have elaborated at length, the 
“economic” as an object of knowledge that emerged in improvement texts attributed 
value to the practice of labor, not to the realm of exchange (of money-interest for time). 
Therefore, the Muslim burden of debt, as it was understood, could be remedied through 
correct practices - foremost among which was the activity of labor.  
Increasingly, a principled refusal to repay their debts to the landlord-moneylender 
was becoming a matter of resolve among sections of the peasantry in eastern Bengal.  In 
1931, a colonial official from Comilla reports how “the zamindar-mahajans (the 
landlord-moneylenders) have become very unpopular…There have been meetings in 
which it was resolved not to pay interest to the moneylender; the zamindars and their 
families have removed themselves to Brahmanbaria for safety.”53 To explain such a 
scenario, I am proposing that we understand these refusals to pay interest not simply 
through the dominant concept of the economic where interest is legitimately posited as 
the money-value of passing time, but through the possibilities opened up by the 
discursive practices of Muslim self-improvement texts as they proliferated and circulated 
in the first two decades in twentieth century Bengal, where the concept of the economic 
dictated that value accrued to the practice of labor alone. Here, value could not be 
legitimately generated through a process where money could beget money, because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 As quoted in Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and Politics, 
1919-1947 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 195. 
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money (as a medium of exchange) was already the misrepresentation of labor, for labor 
alone was the guarantor of value and the site of its genesis.  
It was in fact, a Bengali journal called Langal (The Plough), a mouthpiece of the 
Labour Swaraj Party, which for the first time made explicit the relationship between the 
Islamic prohibition on riba, the concept of labor, and communism. The Labour Swaraj 
Party founded in Bengal in November 1925, was a congregation of left-minded 
individuals and communists who worked within the umbrella of the Indian National 
Congress. It had links with the peasant-tenant movements developing locally across 
Bengal, and soon, within a year, changed its name to “The Workers and Peasants Party of 
Bengal”.  Kazi Nazrul Islam - a revered Bengali Muslim poet, a champion of the 
underclass, and a dear friend of Muzaffar Ahmed a founder-member of the Communist 
Party of India - was given the task of editing Langal, the mouthpiece journal of Labor 
Swaraj Party. In the fifth issue of this short-lived journal, an essay titled “Samyavad ki?” 
(“What if Egalitarianism?”) was devoted to explaining the relationship between Islam 
and Communism and allay anxieties of there existing any contradiction between the two. 
To quote from this essay, published in January 1926: 
Some Muslim leaders have alleged that samyavad (egalitarianism) is the enemy of 
Islam. Quiet to the contrary, it is only Islam that is a greater oppositional force to 
dhaniktantra (plutocracy) than samyavad…Without labor, enjoying interests is 
forbidden, thus the taking of interest on loans is forbidden among Muslims. 
Because earnings from such interests are earning without expending labor, Islam 
does not tolerate those who make money from interests on loans. Communism has 
also declared the taking of interest to be illegal.54 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  Langal, vol. 1, issue 5 (Calcutta, January 21, 1926) as quoted in Sunil Kanti De (ed.) 
Nazruler ‘Langal’ Patrika-e Krishak Sramik Prasanga (Dhaka: Nazrul Institute, 2010), 
pp. 91-92. My italicization. 
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Here, the authoritative manner in which riba prohibition was equated with interest is 
telling, not least because the precise elucidation of riba in Islamic theological and legal 
discourse was a matter historically ridden with several contradictions and complexities 
that were completely glossed over, but more significantly because in this essay, interest 
(understood as riba) was deemed to be prohibited in Islam because it was a form of profit 
that was earned “without expending labor”.  
The first statement of the Koran about riba is to be found in the Surah al Rum, 
which states: 
And whatever you invest by way of riba so that it may increase upon people’s 
wealth, increases not with God, but what you give away by way of zakah seeking 
the pleasure of God, those they receive recompense manifold.55 
And the again, these lines are found in the Sunah al-Imran of the Koran: “O you who 
believe, do not consume riba with continued redoubling and protect yourselves from 
God, perchance you may be blissful”. And finally in the Surah al Baquarah of the Koran, 
the prohibition on riba is asserted in the most emphatic terms, accompanied by a threat,“ 
Those who consume riba shall not rise except like the one who has been struck by the 
devil.”56 
In explicating the meaning of riba, historically there seemed to be a scholarly 
consensus that its most literal Koranic meaning was “in excess”; there was no consensus, 
however, on what constituted “excess” - what objects in excess, or what mode of giving 
the prohibition pointed to. The hadiths differed from one another, and complicated any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Fazlur Rahman, ‘Riba and Interest’ in Islamic Studies, vol. 3 (1) (Karachi, March 
1964), p. 3. 
56 Ibid., p. 4. 
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easy equation of riba with interest. For instance, in the Muwatta of Malik (the first major 
Islamic work combining hadith/ reports of sayings or actions of the prophet with fiqh/ 
jurisprudence) and the Sahih of Al Bukhari (900 A.D), excess was deemed to be 
permissible in a transaction of cattle, even on credit, and such excess could not be 
characterized as riba. 57According to the well-regarded Urdu scholar Fazlur Rahman, the 
Sahih of Muslim and other Sahih works contain hadiths (according to which credit 
transaction, not only of cattle, but also of slaves and copper coins, was permissible even 
when such transactions involve excess (in taking back what was given). 58In the words of 
the tenth century lexicographer and grammarian al- Zajjaj, riba was defined as follows: 
Riba is of two kinds, one of which is forbidden. This is the riba, which a person 
earns by taking from the debtor more than the principal sum which has been given 
to him on credit or any debt from which any profit might be obtained. The other 
riba which is permissible is a gift in exchange of which the giver demands a more 
valuable gift or in exchange of which he demands or receives a bigger gift.59 
Even the twentieth century Arab dictionary of the hadith titled “Kitab Al Nikayah fi 
Gharib al Hadith wa’l Athar” complied by Ibn al Athir says that in the terminology of the 
Shariah, riba means increase in principal without any contract of sale having taken 
place.60 
I have very schematically laid out some of the contradictions that had historically 
existed in the Islamic discourse on riba, across hadith, dictionaries, and works on 
jurisprudence, as well as among them. There were questions asked about what objects 
received in excess of giving would come under the purview of the riba prohibition – to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Fazlur Rahman, ‘Riba and Interest’, p. 21. 
58Ibid., p. 21. 
59 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
60 Fazlur Rahman, ‘Riba and Interest’ in Islamic Studies, vol. 3 (1) (Karachi, March 
1964), p. 24. 
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which we find varying answers; there were questions asked about the existence, or not, of 
contracts of sale in determining what constituted riba according to the Shariah; in some 
cases, there was even a distinction made between permissible and prohibited riba in 
terms of whether what was given was a gift or a debt.  But the criterion of the expenditure 
of labor, or the lack of it, in determining what constituted riba and what did not, was 
never posed in these discussions.   
  In the case of Bengal, by the late nineteenth century the equation between riba 
and interest had become commonplace, but even then theological arguments in favor of 
the prohibition of interest were never made in terms of labor.  In 1870, when Keramat Ali 
Jaunpuri, the renowned theologian and preacher of Sunni Islam, who had spend fifty 
years of his life preaching in the eastern districts of Bengal, issued his much publicized 
fatwa declaring that British India was Dar-ul-Islam (the land of Islam), not Dar-ul-Harb 
(the land of the infidels), and therefore it was “not lawful for Mahomedans of British 
India to make Jihad”, he spoke in favor of the riba prohibition in very different terms.61  
Issuing his fatwa verbally to the “learned” Muslims gathered for the annual meeting of 
the Mahomedan Literary Society, at the Calcutta Town Hall, he set out to answer the 
question of whether or not it was lawful for the Muslims to wage war against their British 
rulers who professed Christianity. His answer was that such jihad was not lawful, because 
British India was indeed the land of Islam. To bolster his argument he furnished the 
following example: 
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Writings and Related Documents (Dacca: Samudra Prokashani, 1968), pp. 75-110. 
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 From the commencement of British Rule, all learned Mohammedans of India 
have considered it unlawful to take Interest (on money lent) not only from 
Mohammedans, but also from Infidels….Had this country been Dar-ul-Harb, the 
very reverse would have been the case. For it is lawful to take Interest from 
infidels in Dar-ul-Harb.”62  
For Keramat Ali the prohibition on interest was unlawful because colonial India was still, 
according to him, the land of Islam. The status of the riba prohibition was determined in 
terms of the distinction between Dar-ul-Harb and Dar-ul-Islam, not in terms of the lack 
of expenditure of labor.  
Upholding the prohibition on interest by citing the absence of expenditure of labor 
as the intent behind a Koranic prohibition was a stunningly novel spin introduced by 
Muslim self-improvement texts, which proliferated in 1920s and 1930s Bengal. It was an 
innovation that was successfully taken up by left-minded members of the Bengali Muslim 
intelligentsia to show up relationships of affinity between Islam and communism. These 
developments were not without important ramifications for Muslim politics in the late 
colonial period. In the Bengal province of colonial India, the mid-1930s saw the meteoric 
rise of the Krishak Praja Party (KPP/ Peasant Tenant’s Party) - a party with an 
overwhelmingly Muslim mass base which came to power on the plank of legislating 
greater rights for tenant cultivators and abolishing unchecked proprietary claims 
bestowed on zamindars by the Permanent Settlement (1793). Though the KPP, in its 
ruling career, retracted on its electoral promises, its rise had formalized a shift toward a 
growing leftist populism that would henceforth become a distinctive character of Muslim 
politics in Bengal. So much so, that the Muslim League, on the eve of the 1946 elections, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Enamul Haque (ed.) Nawab Bahadur Abdul Latif: His Writings and Related Document, 
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raised slogans such as “land to the tiller” and “Pakistan belongs to the peasants”. In the 
same year, there would be curious convergences between the Tebhaga movement – a 
militant peasant movement organized by the Communist Party of India (CPI) – 
demanding the share of produce a share-cropper customarily owed to the landlord be 
reduced and the Muslim League-led Pakistan movement, where Muslim peasants chanted 
slogans in favor of both Pakistan and Tebhaga at meetings organized by CPI leaders.  
In analyzing this curious conjunction of leftist politics and religious nationalism 
and in accounting for the overwhelming participation of the peasantry in Bengal’s 
Pakistan movement, historians have typically remained within the framework of political 
economy, explaining them in terms of political assertions of the tenantry and share-
cropping peasantry in relation to factors such as debt, effects of larger forces such as the 
great depression on commodity prices in a colonial economy, or the relationship between 
landed interests and party politics.  Significant though such studies are, the terms of these 
arguments remain somewhat tautological, inasmuch as they see the political assertion of 
alienated labor as natural, without inquiring how a group or a community come to, in a 
phenomenological sense, inhabit the assumption that value inheres in the site of 
production, as a precondition for such assertions. But how did value come to reside in the 
realm of production, in an activity such as tilling the earth? How did the ability to labor/ 
to produce become the touchstone of measuring the worth of man, the tensile strength of 
an economy’s backbone, and the power of a community? That labor is the primary and 
authentic site of value is perhaps the most enduring presupposition of Political Economy 
and progressive politics alike; its axiomatic status has long resisted historicization and, by 
and large, escaped ideology critiques. In a methodologically conscious move away from 
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political economy, by focusing my lens of scrutiny on discourses about debt in the 
Bengali Muslim public domain of late colonial Bengal, I have shown how the realm of 
production came to be valorized thus, over and above circulation and exchange. 
I have focused on the ways in which debates on debt and interest played out 
among the Muslims in the public domain of early twentieth century colonial Bengal, not 
to simply show up the messy entanglements of putatively economic categories in the 
realm of religion. But more importantly, I have examined the manner in which these 
debates and contentions on the status of interest in the Muslim public domain of late 
colonial Bengal – in negotiating the relationships between the practical and the ethical, 
the essential and the inessential, the material and the spiritual, the man of need and the 
man of ideals – had the effect of historically instantiating labor or the realm of production 
as the positive repository of value. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Changing conceptions of Muslim Political Representation  
 
In this chapter, I trace transformations in ideas and practices of political sovereignty (and 
political representation) among the Muslims in Bengal, by focusing attention on the 
views of key political figures of nineteenth century Muslim politics in Bengal, and 
contrasting them to the views of Muslim political luminaries who rose to prominence in 
the early twentieth century. Moreover, it is the argument of this chapter that practices and 
organizational structures of distinctively Muslim forms of civil society institutions, such 
as the anjumans, were critical to transformations in conceptions of political sovereignty, 
and enabled large swathes of Muslims in colonial Bengal, still excluded from the 
privilege of franchise, to inhabit modes of representational practices oriented to the novel 
conception of political sovereignty based on people’s mandate.  
From Patronage to People’s Power 
In a letter to The Times, Ameer Ali, a Shia man of letters prominent in the public life of 
Calcutta who served as a High Court judge between 1894 and 1903, defended the Muslim 
League’s demand for separate electorates (self-contained legislative constituencies for 
Muslims) in arguing that: 
The importance of a nation cannot always be judged on numerical considerations. 
Whatever may be the view regarding the historical and political position of the 
Mohammedans, to which the government of India attaches some value, 
Mohammedan loyalty is an asset to the Empire which I venture to submit ought 
not to be lightly put aside.63  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 ‘From Moslem Representation and Indian Reforms’ (Letter to The Times, 14 January, 
1909) reprinted in K.K Aziz, Ameer Ali: His Life and Work (Lahore: Publishers United 
Ltd, 1968), p. 314. 
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Here the Muslim demand for separate electorates was justified not merely in terms of an 
institutional measure to offset the numerical disadvantage that would be suffered by 
Indian Muslims in the context of joint electorates (though that too was recognized). The 
demand for separate electorates, very significantly, was posited as a “just” and “fair” 
reward for loyalty displayed to “His Excellency” and articulated with the expectation that 
in return for loyalty, recognition and protection were due.64 
Ameer Ali saw himself as a leading man, a representative, and a spokesman of the 
Muslims in Bengal and wrote extensively about their plight.  “Perceiving the complete 
lack of political training among the Muslim inhabitants of India, and the immense 
advantage and preponderance the Hindu organizations gave to their community”, Amir 
Ali founded the National Mohammedan Association in Calcutta in 1877 and served as 
this organization’s secretary for over twenty-five years. He was born in Chinsura, a 
former Dutch settlement in the Hooghly district of Bengal in 1849. He received his early 
education from the Calcutta Madrasah, subsequently shifted to Mohsina College in 
Hooghly from where he graduated in 1867, and became the first student from the College 
to earn a Master’s degree in History and Political Economy. He advocated in favor of the 
Bengal Tenancy Bill, proposed by the Government in an effort to grant occupancy rights 
to tenant-cultivators, and argued that such a measure was a step in the right direction in 
being “the only means of promoting the agricultural prosperity of the country”.65 Yet 
Ameer Ali cared little to identify with Bengal; indeed like most ashraf, his greatest pride 	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65 K.K Aziz, Ameer Ali: His Life and Work (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd, 1968), p. 
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lay in his foreign origins – whether Persian ancestry or Arab Sayyid heritage. Nor did he 
ever assert that his claim to representing the Muslims of Bengal was founded on a 
genuine association with his Bengali domicile co-religionists.  
The claim to represent, to speak for, and act for the Muslims of Bengal was not, in 
the self-understanding of nineteenth century leaders such as Ameer Ali, based on a 
principle of likeness with the constituency they claimed to represent, but rather on a 
principle of distinction – on social rank and moral worth. His ‘Memoirs’ begins with an 
account of his family’s descent from the Prophet, followed by detailed descriptions of 
high offices held by his ancestors – one among whom was “a grand-chamberlain to the 
King who ruled over Persia shortly after the Afghan invasion”, another was the “Chief 
Mujtahid at Qum, a city in Persia famous for its scholars” and his grandfather, Mansur 
Ali Khan, was in the service of Nawab Asaf-ud-Daula of Oudh as a revenue collector and 
died in 1820 in a battle with a Raja “who had rebelled against his liege-lord”. Ameer Ali 
saw himself as part of the cosmopolitan ruling elite that flourished under the Mughals. He 
was brought up on such family lore as that of his grandfather’s loyalty to the Nawab 
exemplified by his death in the battlefield fighting a rebel.66 It is in this context that his 
premium on Muslim loyalty as an asset to the British Empire has to be understood. For 
men such as Ameer Ali, loyalty to the state was not a question of pragmatism alone, it 
was equally, and perhaps more significantly an Islamicate code of behavior that governed 
those who partook in political governance and a desirable moral attribute of men of rank 
and influence worthy of official recognition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See Memoirs by Ameer Ali as reprinted in K.K Aziz, Ameer Ali: His Life and Work 
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It is well-known that high Perso-Islamicate culture had evolved elaborate political 
rituals for the exchange of protection and loyalty which, in Mughal India and in the 
courts of Murshidabad and Awadh that emerged following the decline of the Mughals, 
bound the officers and their subordinates horizontally to one another, and vertically to the 
emperor. A seventeenth century chronicler, Mirza Nathan, described how after defeating 
the last Afghan chieftain resisting Mughal authority in Bengal, the Mughal general, Islam 
Khan, and his men when confronted with the question of how to deal with their defeated 
Muslim foes, “decided to extend hospitality to all Afghans in the first halting place and 
distribute salt of the emperor according to their status, because there was no heavier 
burden on the neck than the burden of salt.”67 According to Richard Eaton, salt appeared 
in such instances as a metaphor for socio-political loyalty and dependence. Within the 
corps of Mughal officers, salt was understood as a substance either ceremonially or 
metaphorically accepted or eaten at the hands of the emperor, which in binding members 
of the imperial corps vertically to the emperor via exchanges of loyalty for patronage 
gave expression to corporate solidarity, especially at times when the group felt itself 
mortally endangered.68 Such ritual exchanges of loyalty for patronage through “the 
ideology of the salt” thoroughly permeated the ruling elite of Mughal Bengal, and similar 
rituals of forging loyalty through the gifting of robes, betel, and titles to the client 
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 160.  
68 Ibid., pp. 162-167. 
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persisted through the eighteenth century and, indeed, lasted well into the late nineteenth 
century.69  
From the time of their arrival in India, the British entered networks of such gift 
exchange which were key to the political culture of the state. As ambassadors and traders, 
Company employees traveled inland to the imperial courts, gave nazrs, and obtained 
farmans that allowed them to trade duty-free. As John McLane points out, both before 
and after Nazim Siraj-ud-Daulah’s capture of Fort William in 1756, British and Dutch 
officers utilized signifiers of political fidelity in establishing relationships with Siraj-ud-
Daulah, which included the gift of nazr, acceptance of robes of honor, and the exchange 
of betel (a customary pledge of honor). Even after the Company assumed Diwani rights 
(the right to collect revenue) of Bengal, Company officials continued to confer khil’ats 
(robes of honor) on zamindars and other persons of importance in order to ensure that 
vertical relations of political fidelity were forged via rituals that were central to the 
performance and instantiation of political sovereignty in pre-colonial Bengal.70 
A contemporary of Ameer Ali, Abdul Latif (1828-1893) was appointed a Deputy 
Magistrate by Sir Herbert Maddock (the Deputy Governor of Bengal) in 1848. Later he 
rose to the rank of the Presidency Magistrate and was posted in Alipore, Calcutta. After 
the passage of the Indian Councils Act in 1861, Abdul Latif was also the first Muslim 
who was appointed to a seat in the Indian Legislative Council. When a Municipal 
Corporation was first created in 1863 for the town of Calcutta, he was nominated to serve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Sudipta Sen, Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of The 
Colonial Marketplace (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 183. 
70John R. McLane, Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth Century Bengal (Cambridge: 
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in the civic body called the “Justices of Peace”, a component of the Calcutta Corporation. 
He was a prominent official and a distinguished man of letters, who was nominated as a 
Fellow of the Calcutta University, and remained so until his retirement.71  In 1880, the 
Viceroy and Governor General of Bengal conferred upon him the title of Nawab “as a 
personal distinction” in “recognition of the public services rendered by the distinguished 
Moulavie, chiefly in the cause of Education and improvement of the Mohamedan 
community”; it was an event widely reported in the English Press.72  
The Indian Mirror provides an interesting glimpse into the details of the 
ceremony of conferring the title that took place on June 4, 1880, at Alipore, in the upper 
flat of the Office of Mr. J. Monro, the commissioner of the Presidency Division. It 
mentions how the Alipore flat was made appropriate for the occasion, how the room 
where the ceremony was to be held was covered with the Durbar carpet with the Royal 
Arms embroidered in gold at the centre, fringes of gold running through the whole length 
of the four sides of the room, and the display of red cloth fitting for a place where a 
Durbar was to be held. In short, the Alipore upper flat was converted into a “Public 
Durbar”, where “a select gathering of European and Native Officials of the District of 24 
Pergunnahs and a few Native Gentlemen assembled to witness the ceremony”.73 
Every part of the event was reported in the English press with ceremonial 
precision and attention to details: we learn that the Commissioner of the Division entered 	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the Durbar room and took his seat on a State Chair at the south end of the room, on the 
left of which the Officials were seated and to the right of which were the Non-Official 
attendees. Then Abdul Latif was brought before the Commissioner by his personal 
assistant and Mir Monshee. After a brief conversation with the Commissioner, Abdul 
Latif was taken to the robing room. There he was invested with the “khillut”, which 
consisted of “a diamond ring, a Surpech with Kulghi, and a Sword with richly 
embroidered Belt and Shield”. Latif was then brought back before the Commissioner, 
where the Collector of the 24 Pergunnahs handed over to him a valuable gold watch with 
an engraved inscription. The inscription read “Presented to Moulavie Abdool Luteef 
Khan Bahadoor, with the title of Nawab, conferred upon him by his Excellency the 
Viceroy and the Governor General of India. Calcutta, 12th April, 1880”. This was 
followed by the Commissioner presenting Latif with a “Sunnad of the title of the 
Nawab”. Abdul Latif presented the usual “Nuzzarana” and thanked the government for 
recognizing his humble service to the “cause of Muhammadan improvement” and iterated 
that this recognition would go a long way in convincing his “co-religionists of the 
interests which the government takes in their progress”. The Commissioner then 
presented pan or betel and conversed with the Nawab. At the close of the proceedings, 
Nawab Abdul Latif was led to his carriage by the same officials who had escorted him to 
the Durbar at the start of the ceremony.74 The conferment of title in such elaborate 
ceremonial fashion, with the bestowal of the khil’at (robe of honor), the sanad (title deed 
which in pre-colonial Mughal and Nizamat Bengal were often accompanied by grants of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74  See ‘Title of “Nawab” Conferred Upon Moulavie Abdool Luteef Khan Bahadoor’ in 
The Gazette of India, May 29, 1880, as reproduced in Md. Mohar Ali, Nawab Abdul 
Latif: Autobiography and Other Writing (ed.) (Chittagong: The Mehrub Publication, 
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tax-free land, though no such grant was made to Abdul Latif), and the exchange of betel 
as a pledge of protection point to the ways in which such pre-colonial rituals of 
sovereignty were performed not only by the Company, but as the case of Abdul Latif 
indicates, by the Raj too.  
The khil’at that the Raj conferred upon Abdul Latif, alongside the title or sanad, 
was a common ritual in Bengal during the Mughals and the Nizamat. By conferring a 
khil’at, a ruler proclaimed his sovereignty and incorporated the recipient into the 
governing class; by accepting the khil’at, the recipient acknowledged his donor’s 
overlordship and pledged loyal service. According to F.W Buckler, part of the ritual’s 
meaning derived from the fact that robes came from the personal wardrobe, and in theory, 
if rarely in reality, might have been worn by the donor. F.W Buckler argues that the 
khil’at was a symbol of “continuity of succession” and that “continuity rested on a 
physical basis, depending on the contact of the body of the recipient with the body of the 
donor through the medium of clothing.”75 In other words, the donor incorporated the 
recipient within his own person through the medium of his wardrobe. Via such rituals, 
Mughal sovereignty operated by the parceling out of patronage, protection, and 
recognition passed on from the superior to the inferior in rank and status, and instantiated 
a web of relationships of protections and loyalty through institutions such as gift-giving, 
which were simultaneously rituals of incorporation which consolidated relationships 
between the patron and the client.  For over a century, the British continued to partake in 
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traditions of political sovereignty that were familiar to the Mughal and Nizami ruling 
elites.  
Thus when decisive moves by the colonial government and the Congress towards 
electoral representation were made in the late nineteenth century, it is in the context of 
such patronage-based understanding of political power and state, that the initial unease of 
the Muslim leadership in Bengal, and indeed elsewhere in India, needs to be understood. 
By 1890, Sayyid Ahmad Khan had gathered 40,000 signatures on a petition appealing to 
the House of Commons to restrain any extension of the elective principle. The petition 
stressed on the dangers inherent in elections and upheld the importance of retaining the 
system of nomination as the only means of guaranteeing the interest of groups unable or 
unwilling to participate in the new system.76 But in 1896 the Indian Defense Association, 
founded by Sayyid Ahmad Khan as an alternative to Indian National Congress, called for 
the system of nomination to be replaced by the institution of separate electorates.77 The 
Shimla Memorial presented by a “Mohamedan Deputation” to Lord Minto in Shimla in 
October 1906 is the first document formally mooted before the British government that 
elaborated a systematic defense of separate electorates or self-contained legislative 
constituencies for Muslims as key to adequate political representation for the Indian 
Muslims. At one level, the Shimla Memorial marked a shift from the politics of 
nomination to a politics of elections – an idea they had previously rejected. And its 
demand for separate electorates accepted the principle of popular representation, but 
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denied that it involved the representation of individual interests; it endorsed elections but 
only on condition that electorates were organized on religious lines. 
  Yet it is important to note that the Shimla Memorial, while it recognized 
numerical considerations as important to the distribution of political power, held that they 
were essentially secondary to the questions of social status and moral virtue. Political 
representation, in this scheme of things, was still a function of official patronage 
accorded to communities with “status and influence” and thus the memorial proposed that 
due weight be given to the position Muslims “occupied in India a little more than 
hundred years ago, and of which the traditions have naturally not faded from their 
minds”.78 Political representation, in the understanding of the memorialists, was not a 
function of popular sovereignty or the will of the people. The “people” as the fount of 
political sovereignty had not yet emerged as the protagonist in the arena of Muslim 
politics in India, since the signatories of the Shimla Memorial, even as they demanded 
separate electorates for the Muslim, remained firmly grounded in an understanding of 
political sovereignty where political power or the business of political representation was 
an outcome of official recognition. In other words, in the understanding of the “Nobles, 
Jagirdars, Talukdars, Lawyers, Zemindars, Merchants” who were the signatories on this 
document, political sovereignty lay in “the dispensation of State patronage”, not in the 
mandate of the people. Thus, the demand for separate electorates was justified as a plea 
for protection from the state in exchange for loyalty displayed by such men who were 
recognized by the government to be representing “Muslim interest”. And since the 
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dispensation of state patronage at the local level, in “the representative institutions of the 
European type”, translated into the number of seats on Municipal and District boards, the 
memorialists urged that the proportions of such seats be determined “in accordance with 
the numerical strength, social status, and local influence of either (the Muslim or the 
Hindu) Community – in consultation, if necessary, with their leading men.”79 The 
primary aim of this modality of distribution of state patronage, suggested by the Shimla 
Memorial, was to ensure the adequate representation of the “Mosulman tax-payers”.80 
Since taxation was measured by property, it was the Muslim property-holder, 
synonymous with men of rank and influence, who were required to be adequately 
represented via protected constituencies, namely, the separate electorates. The 
memorialists pleaded with the Government that in allocating the balance of patronage to 
various communities, the leaders of such communities be consulted. What criterion 
would be used to determine who the leaders of communities were? Of course here again, 
popular mandate or the will of the people had little to do with notions of leadership.  The 
Shimla Memorial is silent on the issue, but from the tenor of the text – its emphasis on 
according patronage and protection to the loyal subjects – it is fairly clear that the leaders 
were those of who had historically cultivated, at least in theory, the moral quality of 
loyalty. In this sense, the Shimla Memorial had a forerunner in the memorial presented to 
the Government by the National Mohammedan Association in 1882. I quote parts from 
this memorial to evince the manner in which the rules for dispensation of patronage were 
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understood by men such as Ameer Ali and Abdul Latif as being essentially in 
contradistinction to procedural standardization entailed by the British education system:  
Your memorialists would humbly suggest, in the first place, that the balance of 
State patronage should be restored between the Hindus and the Muhammadans. In 
the actual distribution and dispensation of State patronage, an undue importance is 
attached to University education. It happens frequently that when there are two 
candidates, one a Hindu, the other a Muhammadan, preference is given to the 
Hindu candidate, on the sole ground that he possesses a University certificate, 
although, as regards general education, the Muhammadan may possess superior 
qualification. As a matter of fact, owing to some extent to the declared policy of 
Government, University education did not take root among Mohammedans until 
very recently, the consequence of which is that, proportionately, there are fewer 
graduated and undergraduates among the Muhammadans than among the Hindus. 
At the same time there are many Muhammadans who, without having graduated 
at the Calcutta University, possess as thorough an acquaintance with the English 
language as an ordinary B.A. Your memorialists would, therefore, humbly suggest 
that in the dispensation of State patronage no regard should be paid to mere 
University degrees, but the qualifications of candidates should be judged by an 
independent standard. It will not be considered presumptuous on the 
memorialists’ part if they venture to submit that stamina and force of character 
are as necessary in the lower as in the higher walks of life; and these qualities 
can scarcely be tested by University examination.81 
 For the likes of Ameer Ali, since “stamina” and “force of character” were the criteria for 
the bestowal of official recognition, and therefore a measure of political power, the lower 
order of Muslims were not considered fit candidates for state patronage. The lower orders 
could be represented only by the ashraf class, which considered itself historically adept at 
cultivating virtues such as loyalty and force of character. Indeed, according to Delawar 
Hossain, another prominent member of Ameer Ali’s Central National Mohammedan 
Association, the root of the plight of the Muslims of Bengal lay in a crisis of leadership, 
and the ascendancy of village-based, low-born leaders such as Teetu Mir and Dudu 
Miyan who were influencing the masses of Muslims in Bengal’s villages and 	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disseminating an interpretation of Islam that was bigoted, ignorant, and inherent with 
“decidedly democratic tendencies”.82 The other major problem, according to Hossain, 
was the practice of ashraf marriages into the inferior classes, a problem that supposedly 
emerged out of necessities spawned by colonialism itself. To quote him: 
But, as has been the case with us, the higher classes are obliged to intermarry with 
the inferior – not because the latter classes have won for themselves a 
conspicuous position, but merely because the number of the former is small – the 
blood is diluted, the high resolves, the noble aspirations, the feeling of pride, the 
self-respect which have belonged to the immigrant blood, diminished in strength 
with each successive intermixture until every characteristic is lost. 
It is this intermarriage between the immigrant families and the convert families 
that has gradually enfeebled our physical powers, our intellectual faculties, and 
our moral constitution and nature, and will in the course of time, unless this 
process is checked, bring us down to the level of jolahas or weavers, darzis or 
tailors, kasabs or butchers, and kunjras or sellers of garden produce.  
So long as the Government was in our hands, there was a constant immigration of 
new blood which, aided by the use of Perso-Arabic alphabet, preserved us from 
rapidly deteriorating in character and position; as the necessity of our 
intermarriage with convert-descended families did not arise – did not in fact 
seriously affect us. But with the firm establishment of British Government 
immigration entirely ceased – there does not exist a single circumstance tending 
to arrest the constant action of the depressing influences, which the presence of a 
large body of converts has on our social wellbeing.   
It is clear then that the system of intermarriage has been a thorough evil, and has 
caused us to deteriorate in character, intellect, and the constitution – and thus the 
social degradation of the Bengali Mohammedans has been as rapid as it is 
unchecked. This is a most serious state of things and must at once be confronted. 
The social misery of the Bengali Muhammadans is daily becoming more intense, 
and the question of the best means of finding an elevating tendency out of the 
materials we have – of raising the lower classes with the materials we have – of 
raising the lower classes without allowing the higher to descend – can no longer 
be shirked and must no longer be postponed. 83 	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For prominent Muslim men of Bengal who represented the community to the British 
government in the nineteenth century, so important was the principle of distinction with 
the mass of the co-religionists they represented, that intermarriage with such people 
would, in their view, in fact undercut their ability to represent by weakening their 
“physical powers”, “intellectual faculties” and “moral constitution” – qualities that, as 
Ameer Ali and his fellow memorialists had stated, were essential to leadership. Calcutta-
based associations such as the Mohammedan Literary Society started by Abdul Latif in 
1863 and Ameer Ali’s National Mohammedan Association that was founded in 1878 
conducted all their proceedings in Persian, Urdu, and English, but never in Bengali.  
Nawab Abdul Latif, though born and raised in the Faridpur District of East Bengal and a 
fluent speaker of Bengali, never used Bengali in public life and did not encourage it as a 
language of communication in the conversaziones, which constituted the public activity 
of the Mohammedan Literary Association.84 Delawar Hossain advocated the use of 
Bengali for the ashraf in Bengal only because: 
[T]he difference of language between the higher and the lower Moslems has 
placed the Feraizis of Eastern Bengal under the influence and leadership of men 
like Teetu Mir and Dudu Miyan. The higher Musalmans, disdaining or neglecting 
to learn Bengali – the only language that the great majority, if not the entire body, 
of the Mohammadans understand – gradually forfeited their claim to the guidance 
of these people. The educated continued to compile in Persian and declaim in 
Urdu, but the position vacated by them was adroitly occupied by men who are the 
founders of what is called Mosalmani Bengali, men generally ignorant and 
bigoted but with decidedly democratic tendencies.85  
According to Hossain, the vernacular was a means “for the advancement in broad views 
and liberal ideas” among the bigoted lower orders of Muslims and a vehicle of translating 	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the rational impulse of Islam and the science and literature of the West to those whose 
poverty prevented them from devoting part of their time to English or Persian 
education.86 For Hossain, Bengali was to be adopted by the ashraf in Bengal only as a 
means of communicating ideals rooted in Persianate cultural productions and Western 
education to the lower orders; it was not a basis for identity.  
In contrast to the basis for representing the Muslim community that undergirded 
the memorial of the National Mohammedan Association and the Shimla deputation’s plea 
for separate electorates, it is interesting to note the presuppostions about representation 
and political sovereignty that underlay Azizul Haque’s “Plea for Separate Electorates”, 
which he placed before the government in 1931, in response to the recommendations of 
the Nehru Committee Report.87 In 1929, the Nehru Committee recommended that the 
institution of separate electorates (self-contained legislative constituencies for Muslims) 
put in place by the colonial state, ostensibly to protect the political interests of the 
Muslim minority, be abolished in the Bengal Presidency since “here the Moslems (had) 
nothing to fear.”  In response, Azizul Haque, a prominent Bengal Muslim public 
personality and member of the Bengal Legislative Council, put forth a compelling 
counter-argument. He argued that the numerical majority of the Muslims in Bengal did 
not obviate their minority status in the electoral arena, as the right to vote was determined 
by property qualifications that ensured that the voting strength of the economically 
weaker Muslim community could never be in proportion to the Bengali Muslim 
population. Furthermore, he argued that abolition of separate electorates could only, in 	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these circumstances, lead to the rule of the numerically smaller Hindu minority, and 
would thus be contrary to the spirit of “democracy (which) is not the rule of the 
minority.”  Finally he asserted that contrary to widespread misconceptions about the 
unifying force of joint electorates, they fan communalism since in such electorates the 
Hindus and Muslims contesting against each other are forced to keep alive communal 
passions and are led astray from true nationalism. 88 
In Haque’s formulation, wealth or property (with their correlates in rank and 
influence), far from being the basis of representing the Muslim community was clearly an 
impediment to representing the community.  For Haque, wealth was a “great danger to 
the return of Moslem members in any joint electorate.” Drawing on data from the 
provincial elections in Bengal held in 1926, Haque showed that in the popular Hindu 
constituencies, no less than 26 out of 41 seats were captured by landholders, at least 15 of 
who were from renowned zamindari houses in Bengal. According to him, the land-owing 
classes had spent thousands of rupees to “gain election” and had succeeded by “sheer 
power of money”. By contrast, he stated, the elections in Muslim constituencies were run 
on comparatively lower costs, not exceeding Rs.2000-3000 per candidate. He thus 
concluded:  
It will not be possible to contest the elections in any scheme of joint electorate if 
they (Muslims) choose to run Muslim candidates on condition of their terms. 
Since the more ambitious among them may be tempted to barter their views in 
exchange for sure victory at the polls with no financial embarrassment on their 
own behalf. Thus the scheme of joint electorates, if introduced at this stage would 
in turn swell the number of such candidates, and the very expense of such 
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elections will have the effect of driving out those who have struggled to represent 
the real interest of the community. 89 
At one level, for Haque, the institution of separate electorate was to be maintained simply 
because the restricted franchise accorded to Indians by the colonial government was 
mediated by property qualifications, thus excluding those who did not pay above a certain 
amount in taxes, which in empirical terms meant that the Muslim population in Bengal, 
with far lesser numbers who would qualify for franchise, did not have voters in 
proportion to their actual numbers. But at a more fundamental conceptual level, by the 
1930s when Haque made his plea for separate electorates, the very premise on which the 
community could be represented had undergone a massive transformation. Clearly 
wealth, rank and influence, in short, attributes which hitherto marked the true 
representative of the community in as much as such attributes expressed the principle of 
distinction with the community one represented, were now not only inadequate, but 
deemed a real impediment to representation. The deployment of wealth in elections was 
now understood as the use of “undue influence” that had the effect of supposedly driving 
out those who were true representatives of the community. The premise of representation 
had transformed from a principle of distinction with the constituency one acted for, that 
was hitherto the mark of the true representative, to a principle of likeness with the 
constituency one acted for as the mark of a true representative. Unlike Delawar Hossain’s 
assertion that the crisis of leadership in Bengal’s Muslim community resulted from living 
in close social proximity and intermarriage with the lower orders of co-religionists, for 
Haque, the key to representation was to be one of them, or at least like one of them. How 
would this principle of likeness be achieved? 	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  If Haque’s plea provides a clue to changing self-definitions of the Bengali Muslim 
community itself, which by 1931 was loath to accept a wealthy ashraf Muslim of Bengal 
as its true representative – an attitude toward representing and leading the Muslim 
community in Bengal that veered sharply from the attitudes of Muslim leaders and public 
intellectuals in the latter half of the nineteenth century who often boasted about their 
ashraf/elite descent – what transformations in the moral vision of self and community 
could account for this change?  
In the following section I argue that new kinds of political institutions and 
practices, such as political parties and elections (with severely restricted franchise up 
until 1935), cannot adequately account for this transformation. I attempt to show how 
such transformations in the self-understanding of the Muslim community were, at least in 
part, the effect of very different kinds of institutional practices that took root among 
Muslims in Bengal in the domain which scholars would analytically identify as  
“religious”. To this purpose, I focus on the institution of the anjumans – distinctively 
Muslim forms of civil association. In paying attention to the history of the Anjuman-e-
Ulema-e-Bangla founded in 1913, I demonstrate how anjumans were crucial sites within 
which subjectivities oriented to democratic practice and politics were being worked out in 
early twentieth century Bengal. Such institutions had reaches far beyond the urban 
centers of Calcutta and Dhaka and were key to the dissemination of a certain vision of 
Muslim community.  
The Anjuman: Muslim civil associations and the practice of democracy 
Tamizuddin Khan, or Maulavi Tamizuddin Khan as is he was popularly known, was a 
prominent member of the Muslim League in undivided India. In 1926, he ran for a seat in 
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the Bengal Legislative Council from Sadar and Goalando divisions of Faridpur and 
emerged victorious. He won the Legislative Council elections again in 1930 and 1937. 
From 1937 until the partition of India in 1947, Maulavi Khan held portfolios in the 
Ministry of Health, Agriculture and Industry, and Education in the Bengal Cabinet.   
In his English biography, The Test of Time: My Life and Days, Maulavi Khan 
charts the beginning of his involvement with communitarian politics. Strikingly, his 
account of the beginnings of his involvement with Muslim politics had little to do with 
the Muslim League of which he was a member, by nomination as it were - a membership 
that, if his own account is to be believed, took him by surprise, even though he was elated 
at being “recognized” and was pleased by the “distinction” that accrued from it: 
While I was still fledgling in my profession (as a lawyer), in the autumn of 1915, I 
got a letter from the Secretary of the All India Muslim League informing me that I 
had been nominated as a member of the organization and that I should send as 
soon as possible the annual subscription of Rs.20. I felt elated at the distinction – 
there being no other member from the town of Faridpur and probably none in the 
entire district and send the subscription by money order though it was hard for me 
in those days to spare such a substantial amount. 
For many years however I was to all intents and purposes only a nominal member 
of the Muslim League, not having the means to attend its annual sessions. The 
only part I took was to express my opinion in writing about draft resolutions send 
to me for the purpose, from time to time. …The Muslim League had no district 
branches in those days. At least there was none in Faridpur. Local interests had to 
be looked after by other organizations. …The establishment of Muslim 
Associations (such as) Anjuman-i-Islamia almost in every district of the province 
even before the formation of the All India Muslim League was significant in this 
regard.90 
Although his membership to the Muslim League remained patently nominal for a long 
time until after the Khilafat movement was on the wane, he was very actively involved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Tamizzudin Khan, The Test of Time: My Life and Days by (Dhaka: University Press 
Ltd, 1989), p. 90. 
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with the Faridpur chapter of the Anjuman-i-Islamia. His account of his involvement is 
full of interesting details about his clashes with other personalities prominent in the local 
Anjuman. His tussle with the older and “ultra loyalist” Abdul Ghani sheds light on the 
kinds of struggles going on with such associations in the second decade of the twentieth 
century. To quote from his autobiography: 
Early in my career as a lawyer, I discussed with Abdul Ghani about the Anjuman-
i-Islamia, which had no constitution or rules of business. The office bearers were 
more or less permanent incumbents. Nor were there any registers or list of 
members. When necessary Moulavi Abdul Ghani used to ask a few prominent 
Muslims to assemble in his bungalow for passing resolutions on certain matters 
generally at telegraphic requests from Nawab Salimullah, who was a recognized 
leader of the Muslims. I pleaded with him unsuccessfully to bring about necessary 
reforms in the Anjuman so as to make it more representative and broad-based. He 
was extremely conservative in his views. He also rejected my suggestion that the 
prominent Muslim shopkeepers of the place should be taken into the organization, 
on the plea that the presence of such lowly people would lower the prestige of the 
organization. Within a couple of years, the reforms were carried out and the 
Anjuman gained in popularity. I was elected Secretary and Moulavi Abdul Ghani 
was President. The membership of the Anjuman spread over the entire district and 
in all four Subdivisions, branches of the Anjuman were established. Annual 
sessions were big shows, periodic public meetings were held in which prominent 
speakers of all Bengal reputation were invited to lecture.91 
Khan’s profound unease with the fact that the Anjuman’s members were permanent 
incumbents and decision-making was the privilege of “prominent people” who acted in 
obedience with the wishes of Nawab Salimullah of Dhaka, and his plea to include the 
shopkeepers of the locality into the organization indicate that gradual transformations in 
the principles of representation were being worked out in sites other than the official 
political parties, to which membership was still considered a matter of distinction and 
recognition. Maulavi Khan mentions an “unfortunate clash” with Abdul Ghani on another 
matter pertaining to the Anjuman when the British Government gave the body the 	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privilege of nominating candidates for the appointment of Muslim marriage registers or 
quazis. In favoring the nomination of a candidate from the weaver class for such a post, 
on the grounds that the person in question was adequately qualified, Khan locked horns 
with Abdul Ghani who vehemently opposed the nomination on the plea that such a 
nomination would mar the prestige of Muslim marriage registers as a class. Reminiscing 
on the incident, Khan wrote in his autobiography:  
It is an unfortunate fact that the shadow of the Hindu caste system overtook 
Muslim society in India, at least to the extent of ostracizing the weavers and a few 
other classes (of Muslims) with regard to the privilege of intermarriage. Since the 
weaver had adequate qualification I took up the stand (of supporting his 
nomination) to dispel any suspicion that he was discriminated against on account 
of his birth…I staked my position as Secretary (of the Anjuman) on this grave 
issue, and through the grace of Allah I succeeded.92  
Maulavi Khan’s struggle against the likes of Adbul Ghani within the Anjuman-i-Islamia 
was represented as a conflict between two visions of Muslim community – a vision and 
praxis of egalitarian community supposedly authorized by the Koran and the Hadith on 
the one hand, and an existing “corrupt” sabiqi order based on hierarchies, stratifications, 
and “misguided notions” of social-rank and prestige supposedly inimical to the spirit and 
praxis of Islam, on the other hand. In the 1910s and 1920s, the struggle between these 
two visions of community was being repeatedly dramatized in the rhetoric, agenda, and 
organizational structure of anjumans – a trend pioneered by the Anjuman-e-Ulema-e-
Bangla.   
Anjuma-e-Ulamae Bangla was founded in 1913. Among its founding members 
were prominent public personalities such as Akram Khan, Manisuzzaman Islamabadi, 
Maulavi Abdulahel Baki, and Maulavi Shahidullah. The anjuman’s headquarter was 	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located in Kolkata, though it delineated the whole of Bengal and Assam as within its 
ambit of influence and activity. It was an avowedly apolitical organization, which 
expressly stated a refusal to participate in any political activity. The stated objectives of 
the anjuman were to counter criticisms of Islam that were emerging from the Christian 
missionaries and the Arya Samajis, distribution of Islamic literature among the masses 
free of cost, and a consolidated and organized effort to check internal conflict and 
dissension among the ulema in Bengal, thus uniting them in the service of the 
community.  
Islam Mission was a branch of the anjuman that comprised of preachers who 
traveled to the remotest corners of Bengal and parts of Assam to “counter the influences 
of Christian missionaries, to eradicate shirk, bidat and superstitions from Muslim society 
and encourage non-Muslims to embrace Islam.” But according to the Anjuman’s Joint 
Secretary, Manisuzzaman Islamabadi, the chief purpose of Islam Mission was to 
emancipate society from the clutches of those “maulavis and mullahs who preached the 
religion of the murshids (discipleship), and in so doing served their own interests while 
destroying all possibilities of social advancement.” Islamabadi opined that the Mission’s 
aim was to save jatiyo jiban (the life of the community) from the influence of those 
religious charlatans who placed premium on the value of spiritual intercession in reaching 
God and bred dependence on human agents by claiming to possess higher spiritual 
authority.93 Al Islam, the mouthpiece Bengali journal of the Anjuman-e-Ulema-e-Bangla, 
relentlessly attacked all forms of social and spiritual hierarchies and distinctions. The 
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anjuman strongly opposed the division of Muslim society into ashraf and atrap. 
According to one Mohammad Moijur Rahman:  
In Bengal, creatures that call themselves sharif have done indescribable harm to 
the Muslims. Allah has made the high and the lowly from the same ingredients. 
The sense perception of the high is the same as that of the lowly. With the right 
opportunity, both communities can consolidate their strengths – there is no doubt 
about that.94 
The anjuman preached that since Islam has no respect for lineage, a sweeper or chandal, 
once they have been converted to Islam, could offer namaz alongside the Mughal and the 
Pathan. Another prominent member of the anjuman, Mohammad Rampuri rued that 
although Islam’s key attribute was samya (egalitarianism), Muslims of the day had no 
regard for an egalitarian ethic. He urged his fellow co-religionists: 
Open your eyes and see…Qutbuddin, Iltutmish, Ghiyasuddin were all Slaves. 
Ashraf, have your dignity, prosperity and influence surpassed theirs? …. In 
Bengal today, who is your slave? Is the atrap lower than a slave? There is still 
time to rectify the situation. Wake up from your slumber, announce the objective 
of the ulema! Spread the power of truth everywhere!95  
Mohammad Rampuri’s suggestion that the political power of the Slave Dynasty in India 
was the most compelling historical evidence of Islam’s egalitarianism would be echoed 
by Azizul Haque in his presidential speech at the 52nd session of the All India Muslim 
Education conference held in Calcutta.  Under the patronage of Nawab Kamal Yar Jung 
Bahadur of Hyderabad (Deccan), the 52nd session of the All India Muslim Educational 
Conference was held in Calcutta, in December 1939, where a committee was appointed 
to survey the problems of Muslim education all over the Indian States, with a view to 	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preparing a broad-based scheme of education, helpful to the preservation of Muslim 
culture. Accordingly, a committee was constituted with the Nawab as the Chairman and a 
few other members, including Azizul Haque, who at the time was the Speaker of the 
Bengal Legislative Assembly and held the post of Vice-Chancellor at Calcutta 
University. At the presidential address of the session on Dec 29, 1939, Haque, who was 
then struggling to establish the department of Islamic History and Culture at the 
University of Calcutta, amid great opposition, stated:  
In the welter of many small states, each divided against the other, with people still 
more hopelessly divided among themselves came the Musalmans with their 
teaching of brotherhood and fellowship. By a divine coincidence in history, the 
first dynasty of Muslims that ruled was the Slave Dynasty and the first King of 
Delhi was a slave himself to teach the eternal lesson that the Commonwealth of 
Islam, even as a slave has the fullest right of a man and can be a king, in a caste-
ridden, divided country…Let us remember that in the very threshold of modern 
civilization stand the distinctive marks of Islamic teaching and its cultural 
contributions to the history of modern thought. The recognitions and vindications 
of the principles of equality have been the very fundamental characteristics of 
Islamic ideal and outlook. It is a matter of history that from its very inception 
Islam has been a great democratizing process and Islam and its prophet preached 
the principles of equality and democracy as the basis of human relationships. To 
preserve and safeguard these principles, wars and revolutions have ranged loud 
and long in the world. The world has not yet seen the last of the struggles for the 
recognition of these vital pre-requisites of human freedom. And yet centuries back 
when it was totally unknown to contemporary thought, Islam proclaimed to the 
world the overwhelming sanctity of the principles of Equality. Islam declared that 
Muslims are not only equal among themselves, but also before God! “The white 
man is not above the black, nor the black above the yellow; all men are equal 
before their Maker”, declared the prophet of Islam, and the Kings and the 
monarchs, had to bend low in giving recognition to these principles. Equal before 
the eyes of God and equal before law, Moslems all over the world constitute a 
commonwealth of individuals over which the sovereignty of God is direct and 
absolute. I pause here for a moment to ask, if there is anywhere in this wide world 
of ours a greater and better definition of Equality, a more absolute and unreserved 
surrender to the ideal of human freedom?…Today the rule of democracy may 
have been temporarily eclipsed in some countries…but I have no doubt in my 
mind that this is merely a passing phase; the ultimate victory of the forces of 
democracy is certain–it is more so because democracy has behind it the genuine 
loyalty of millions of Muslims. The day is not far off when democracy, clad in the 
glorious mantle of Freedom and Equality–will once again break through the 
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clouds, which deepen the world gloom today, and when the great day comes, it is 
the spirit of Islam which will once again come to rescue the aggrieved world. And 
in this scheme of human affairs there is no place for steam-roller democracy 
which does not take into consideration, the cultural, political and social rights of 
minorities.96  
 I have quoted from Haque’s speech at some length to demonstrate the ways in which 
Anjuman-e-Ulema-e-Bangla’s rhetorical linking of a principle of egalitarianism and 
Islam had become widespread and commonsensical among sections of Bengal’s Muslim 
intelligentsia by the 1930s. And even though, this rhetorical linkage was by no means 
inaugurated by the anjuman, nor was it a discourse that was the anjuman’s exclusive 
preserve, the Anjuman-e-Ulema-Bangla certainly was the first Muslim organization in 
Bengal to have systematically advocated it in both rhetoric and organizational structure.  
Membership to the Anjuman-e-Ulema-e-Bangla was, least in theory, open to any 
man or woman committed to the anjuman’s agenda; it was an association based on 
voluntarist engagement and funded largely by the subscription of the members. 
Membership could be maintained by paying an annual fee of Rs.1. The anjuman had 
three types of members: the alem, knowledgeable in Arabic and Islamic jurisprudence, 
who would deliberate and adjudicate on all dini (religious) disputes; the well-wisher 
members which included all those who were sympathetic to the agenda of the anjuman, 
and finally, the life members, whose membership did not need to be renewed annually 
since they were required to make a one-time subscription payment of Rs.150. A working 
committee of 125 members, holding office for two years, was elected by the general 
assembly of members. The working committee was in charge of executing the anjuman’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 ‘Presidential Address of Azizul Haque’, reproduced in Shahanara Alam and Husainara 
Huq (eds.) Azizul Haque: Life Sketch and Selected Writings (Dhaka: Zaman Printers, 
1984), pp. 46-47. 
	   86	  
agenda, hiring and firing preachers, collecting subscription, and overseeing budgetary 
matters. Yet amendments in the anjuman’s rules and procedures of functioning, 
reconstitution of the Working Committee, approval of the anjuman’s annual budget, 
impeachment of a member of the Working Committee as well as defeating or passing a 
proposal put forth by the Working Committee were decided in the general assembly of 
members through the principle of voting. In the instance that a member from the mofussil 
could not be physically present at the general assembly meeting, the person could mail in 
a vote to the Calcutta headquarter.  And since the salaried and honorary preachers of the 
Islam Mission - a branch of the anjuman - were engaged in missionary activity over a 
wide-ranging area covering Hooghly, 24 Parganas, Rangpur, Medinipur, Pabna, Bogra, 
Mymensingh, Tripura, Shillong and Guwahati, they could recruit members from a fairly 
expansive geographical radius.97 The anjuman was thus a significant historical force at 
two levels – the monologic sermons of its preachers and the freely distributed literature 
advocating egalitarianism as a vision of Muslim society circulated far beyond the urban 
centers of Calcutta and Dhaka. More significantly, the anjuman played a role in the 
penetration of  “democratic” practices in wide-ranging mofussil areas, thus training 
Bengali Muslims in the novel principle of representation premised on people’s mandate 
well before the successive expansions of franchise following the constitutional reforms of 
1919 and 1935, and before political parties such as the Congress and the Muslim League 
became mass-based organizations. And yet the most important contribution of the 
Anjuman-e-Ulema-e-Bangla was this: in discursively positing Islam as a religion that had 
absolutely no regard for social distinctions and in working out an organizational structure 	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that so closely approximated parliamentary democracy, it had resolved the oppositional 
relationships between “modernity” and “tradition”, between the “West” and the “East” by 
positing the modern principle of political representation – “people’s mandate” – as both a 
continuation and a culmination of the egalitarian spirit of Islam. Thus in the late 1930s, it 
became possible for Azizul Haque to assert that the teaching of Islamic culture and 
history was necessary, not merely to maintain an identity that was under attack, but 
because Islam was the only true precursor of modern thought and ideas of democracy and 
equality were born in the crucible of Islamic civilization long before the West reinvented 
restricted and corrupted versions of political existence that could at best be called “steam-
roller democracy”, and at worst, dictatorships.  
The contrast between Haque’s articulation and that of the Shimla deputation seems 
stunning when we recall a few lines from the 1906 document presented to Lord Minto:  
We hope that Your Excellency will pardon our stating at the outset that 
representative institutions of the European type are entirely opposed to the genius 
and traditions of the Eastern Nations, and many of the most thoughtful members 
of our (Muslim) community look upon them as totally unsuitable to the social, 
religious, and political conditions obtaining in India.98   
As I have shown earlier, for Azizul Haque’s, the Muslim community needed 
separate electorates in order to ensure that political representation was an expression of 
people’s mandate (the touchstone of modern ideas of political sovereignty) - a mandate 
that could be insulated from the “corrupting” and “undue” influence of wealth and 
distinction. This was in stark contrast to the ideas about political sovereignty and 
representation that were held by the memorialists of the Shimla deputation in 1906, 
where “rank”, “influence” and “distinction” were key to the exercise of political 	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sovereignty – a form of sovereignty that was supposedly “the genius and traditions of the 
Eastern Nations”.  According to the older view, rank, hierarchy, and distinction were not, 
in principle, inimical to the true and proper expression of political sovereignty, in fact 
these were the requisites for proper governance. The idea of people’s mandate as a 
principle of political representation, though it was a stunningly novel idea in early 
twentieth century Bengal, became habitable for the Bengali Muslims precisely because 
this new presupposition of political representation sat well with, and drew its energies 
from reformist visions of Islam where the Muslim community was repeatedly being 
posited as a collection of equals, and Islam as a religion was understood to be 
fundamentally premised on an egalitarian ethos. This egalitarian ethos was the basis on 
which the Muslim community was meant to distinguish itself from other religious 
communities that were ridden with hierarchies, stratifications, and inequalities. Rank, 
distinction, and hierarchy were thus not only understood as “corruptions” of an idea of 
political sovereignty premised on people’s mandate, but also “corruptions” of what the 
reformist vision held up as the “true” vision of Islam and the basis of distinguishing the 
Muslims as a religious community from other religious communities with whom they co-
habited. The presence and influence of reformist anjumans in early twentieth century 
Bengal point to the critical coalescing of seemingly antinomic vectors – on the one hand, 
the practices and rhetoric engendered by the anjumans opened up possibilities for 
habitations within models of political sovereignty premised on people’s mandate, 
following a modular “universal” form, on the other hand, positing this universalism as the 
essential spirit of Islam worked to distinguish the Muslim community from other 
religious communities, and rooted “universalism” in a “particularity” that simultaneously 
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worked to protect  and delineate the boundaries of the Muslim community, thereby 
hardening identities based on religion. The relationships of such organizations with ideas 
of religious nationalism that took root in the Bengali Muslim public sphere and 
eventually translated into the demand for Pakistan need to be more systematically 
analyzed. Yet it is possible to make a considered conjecture that attention to the 
organizational structure, recruitment practices, and the rhetoric of distinctively Muslim 
civil society institutions such as the Anjuman-e-Ulema-e-Bangla provide critical 
windows into understanding the production of the Bengali Muslim public sphere as a 
mode of address whereby it became possible for Muslim leaders, often occupying class-
positions very different from that of the bulk of the Muslim population, to credibly 
represent – both discursively and politically – the (Muslim) nation, which as Benedict 
Anderson has pointed out, is a imagination predicated on the horizontality of the political 
community. 99  
Conclusion: 
The fact that separate electorates (self-contained legislative constituencies for Muslims) 
put in place by the colonial government led to the hardening of Muslim identity has 
almost acquired the status of historiographical commonsense. Yet little scholarly 
attention has been paid to how the premise upon which Muslims maintained the demand 
for separate electorates shifted considerably in the course of the colonial career of 
Muslim politics in the first four decades of the twentieth century. In 1906, if the Shimla 
deputation’s plea for separate electorates was made in terms of the need to maintain the 
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“status and influence” of the “Musalman community”, to give due recognition to “their 
political importance” and “due weight to the positions they occupied in India a little more 
than a hundred years ago, of which the traditions have naturally not faded from their 
minds”, the plea for separate electorates as articulated by Azizul Haque took on a 
radically different tone two decades down the line.  To recapitulate, for Haque, separate 
electorates were a necessity in Bengal (where Muslims were numerically larger but 
economically weaker) in order to secure a people’s mandate and to prevent the principle 
of popular sovereignty from being undermined by the “undue influence”/”corruption” of 
wealth and distinction, which he claimed “would have the effect of driving out those 
(Muslims) who have struggled to represent the real interest of the community.” In this 
chapter, I have attempted to suggest that focusing our lens of scrutiny on avowedly 
apolitical, civil society associations such as the Anjuman-e-Ulema-e- Bangla as well as 
the struggles that ensued within rural local chapters of the Anjuman-e-Islamia can 
provide clues to the manner in which the Muslim “community” was transformed in a way 
to become congruent with the conceptions of political sovereignty rooted in the “people” 
– a imagination predicated on horizontality.  
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CHAPTER 3 
From Respect to Redistribution: The Hegemony of Praja Identity  
 
Early Praja Assertions 
The first expressions of praja assertion in rural Eastern Bengal often took the form of 
self-respect movements, and did not necessarily dwell on economic issues, as would later 
become the case. Zamindars addressed Muslim tenants in the second person singular 
“tui” or “tumi” instead of the more respectful “apni”, which were reserved for upper 
caste Hindu tenants. While their svavarna Hindu counterparts were allowed to sit inside 
the kutcherry (the zamindar’s office), the Muslim tenants were not allowed to occupy 
seats. These discriminatory social attitudes percolated down to the amlas and failas – the 
zamindar’s petty officials, to the priests, lawyers and doctors on the zamindar’s estates, as 
well as to the low-caste talukdars and moneylenders who emulated their social 
superiors.100 For a whole generation of rural Muslim youth growing up in the 1910s and 
1920s, these social attitudes rankled. To them, it was clear that such derogatory modes of 
address or the customary spatial positioning of bodies inside the zamindar’s office were 
not, as Abul Mansur put it, “the natural relationship between the praja and the zamindar”, 
but a specific relationship between the zamindar and the Muslim praja.101 This was 
precisely why even as a nine-year old growing up in a village in Mymensingh district, 
when the amlas knocked on the door of his family home to intimate him that the 
zamindar, Jatindra Narayan Acharya Chowdhury, had summoned Abul Mansur to his 	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kutcherry to furnish clarifications about rumors of his participating in a praja meeting 
and addressed him in the less respectful second person “tui” (often used to address 
children as well), he irately responded that unless appropriately addressed he would not 
visit the kutcherry. Mansur recounted that his own outburst was a result of intense shame 
and anger that rose incrementally each time he heard the zamindar’s officials and the 
village chowkidars (guards) address the elders in his family as “tui”.102 
While still a schoolboy, Abul Mansur organized a praja meeting in 1909 in the 
Dhanikhola area of Mymensigh. Notices for the praja sabha (tenant meeting) were 
written in pencil on pages torn from a school exercise book and distributed to five 
mosques in the area. The meeting’s venue was carefully chosen – in a secluded spot on 
the riverbank, with no homestead within half a mile of the location. The village hat (bi-
weekly market), though a more convenient meeting spot where cultivators would go not 
only to buy and sell but also to meet friends and hear news of the neighborhood and 
nearby towns, was deliberately avoided for fear of the zamindar’s officials forcefully 
breaking up the meeting upon hearing about it. Zahriruddin Tarafdar, a man well 
regarded in the five neighboring villages, was appointed as the meeting’s president. The 
resolutions passed at the meeting included that a demand be raised for allowing prajas to 
sit inside his kutcherry and that a stop be put on the levying of abwabs (surcharges) for 
the purposes of Kali puja. When the zamindar, who lived in the city, arrived in 
Dhanikhola during the annual survey of his estate, the demands of the Muslim tenants 
were placed before him, and a few of them were approved. Henceforth it was decided, 
inside the kutcherry ordinary tenants would be seated on mats and tenants who were also 	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village headmen would be seated on “benchees”, which stood at half the height of 
benches reserved for the zamindar’s officials.103 Another praja conference in the area in 
1911, which received publicity in Mohammadi and Mihir o Sudhakar, passed resolutions 
demanding that all the zamindar’s officials be recruited from among local people so as to 
generate employment opportunities as well as facilitate realization of rents due to the 
zamindar.104  
That the praja movement first took root in areas where populations of Muslim 
tenant-cultivators were predominant is perhaps not surprising given the nature of these 
early demands, even though not a single demand was articulated in sectarian terms per se. 
But demands such as that of banning the practice of levying abwabs fed into distinctive 
religious dispositions cultivated since the mid-nineteenth century, particularly in areas of 
eastern Bengal, where cultivators had come under the influence of Faraidi leaders.  
James Taylor’s account gives us a sense of the early spread of the Faraidi 
movement by 1841; he writes, “within the last 10 years a Mohammedan sect has sprung 
up in this part of the country and has spread with rapidity in … Fureedpore, Backergunge 
and Mymensingh”. According to Taylor, by 1841, one-sixth of the population of these 
districts had already entered the Faraidi fold.105 The Faraidi religious reformer, Haji 
Shariatullah, first forbade Muslim cultivators to pay abwabs to the patnidars of 
Ramnagar in 1837, on the ground that such surcharges extracted from the Muslim 
peasantry for purposes of conducting local Hindu festivals such as Kali puja and Durga 	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puja were in contradistinction to the central Faraidi tenet of tauhid or the oneness of 
Allah and forced them to partake in shirk or the gunah of idolatry.106 Abwabs were 
surcharges extracted from cultivators in order to raise revenues without undertaking the 
official procedures of raising rent. But abwabs or surcharges had been made illegal under 
Permanent Settlement since the East India Company viewed them as capricious and 
unconstitutional extractions of despotic governements. Yet, despite their illegal status, the 
custom of collecting abwabs continued well into the twentieth century in Bengal and 
coercive tactics were used when the cultivator refused to pay them. As Kevin Downey 
points out, some abwabs were temporary and situation-specific such as those relating to 
births, deaths, and marriages in the zamindar’s family, to meet the expenses for building 
roads or markets; others were of a more permanent nature and were levied as expenses to 
cover the cost of rent collection or for the maintenance of chowkidars (guards) in an 
area.107 For Haji Shariatullah, the payment of abwabs – particularly those made toward 
Kalivritti and Durgavritti – was one of the most troublesome aspects of Muslim life in 
Bengal, as such payments betrayed a lack of spiritual discipline on the part of the Muslim 
peasants. In 1837, when the issue of abwab in Ramnagar sparked resistance among the 
Muslim peasantry, it created an important precedent for Faraidi communities.  
It is not surprising that for praja activists such as Abul Mansur who were from 
Faraidi families, distinctively Faraidi dispositions shaped their attitudes toward issues 
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such as the collection of abwabs for the zamindar’s Kali puja.  Mansur was born 1898. 
His earliest memories were of himself as a child singing a rhyme from a Faraidi punthi, 
which went like this: 
If Allah wills, I will go to Lahore 
There I will wage jihad against the Sikhs 
If I emerge victorious, I will become a Ghazi 
If I die, I will become a shahid (martyr) 
Instead of my living body, tauhid will live.108 
His uncle Samiruddin Faraidi was a man highly respected in Dhanikhola for his ability to 
recite Faraidi punthis in musical tones. Maulavis from far-flung areas would come to the 
village to conduct monologic waz-mehfils and stay at their house. Mansur’s grandfather’s 
older brother, who died in 1868, was still remembered in the area as “Ghazi sahib” or 
“brave warrior” who fought in the army of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi and waged jihad 
against the Sikh “infidels”.109 
Barelwi’s popularity in Bengal is well documented. When he returned from 
Mecca in 1823, he toured parts of India, including Bengal, to garner support for waging 
jihad against the Sikhs in Punjab. During his visit to Calcutta, Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi 
reportedly attracted such massive crowds of people desiring to become his disciples that 
rather than take the hand of each person to perform baiyah, he had to unroll his turban for 
the crowds to touch.110 Another account from 1843 also indicates that many converts he 
made in Calcutta were so strict about avoiding incorrect religious practices that they 
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refused to eat with any but members of their own sect.111. On hearing reports that Sikhs 
had prohibited the call to prayer (azan) for the Muslims in Punjab and had desecrated 
mosques within Ranjit Singh’s territory, Barelwi gathered an army of mujahidin to fight 
the Sikhs from the northwestern frontiers. The mujahidin suffered a series of setbacks at 
the hands of the forces of Ranjit Singh. In 1831, in a full-scale battle at Balakot, the Sikh 
army defeated the mujahidin and killed their two major leaders – Sayyid Ahmed Barelwi 
and Mohammad Ismail. But even after the debacle at Balakot, many of Sayyid Ahmad 
Barelwi’s supporters refused to believe that he was dead. In 1843, the Superintendent of 
Police in Bengal reported that many maulavis, including Inayat Ali, were preaching that 
Barelwi was still alive and leading the army against the Sikhs. Depositions from the 
Wahhabi trails reveal that some Muslim peasants from Bengal went to Afghanistan 
expecting to see Sayyid Ahmed Barelwi and fight under his leadership.112 In another 
case, one Muhammad Qasim led followers from Bengal to fight under Sayyid Ahmad 
after hearing reports that he had not been killed, only to be disabused of the lie after he 
reached the frontier.113 After the battle of Balakot, two major religious leaders from Patna 
– Wilayat Ali and his brother Inayat Ali, who had become Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi’s 
khalifahs (lieutenants) attempted to intensify the frontier jihad. From Patna, as itinerant 
preachers dispersed to gather recruits and material support, Bengal proved an especially 
receptive area for these emissaries. In 1852, according to the minutes of the Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal, Lord Dalhousie, he had himself seen a “sort of ballad”, 1000 copies 	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of which were printed and circulated in Calcutta, which appeared as a war cry invoking 
all true Muslims to join the standard of faith and rise against the infidels.114 Depositions 
from the Wahhabi trials reveal that at one time in the 1860s, more than 900 recruits from 
Bengal alone were on the frontier. Many Muslim peasants in Bengal supported the 
frontier jihad by contributing a handful of rice to a common fund.115 After the formal 
British annexation of Punjab in 1849, a dispute occurred between Wilayet Ali and Inayat 
Ali, which divided the mujahidin on the question of whether or not to confront British 
forces in the Punjab. But the dispute found a resolution after the death of Wilayat Ali at 
Sittana in 1852, which resulted in his brother Inayat Ali becoming the unquestioned 
leader of the mujahidin and deciding to attack the British border stations with the help of 
allies from the Pathan tribe.116 The frontier mujahidin were finally decimated in 1863, 
when the British led the Ambeyla campaign, followed by prolonged state trials and 
investigations called the “Wahhabi trials” in official parlance, which continued through 
the decade and slowly eroded the recruit and supply networks of the frontier jihadis.  
It is difficult to say if Abul Mansur’s borodada (grandfather’s brother), 
Ashequllah Faraidi, was fighting in the frontier under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad 
Barelwi or his successors, Inayat Ali and Wilayat Ali, since the belief that Barelwi was 
not actually killed in Balakot retained traction in parts of eastern Bengal for decades after 
his death. It is possible that even though he actually fought under the brothers from Patna, 
local memory had associated Ashequllah’s frontier exploits to a time before he had 
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actually reached the frontier. Many Bengal recruits of Inayat and Wilayat Ali from the 
rural areas, it has been noted, also nurtured the chiliastic belief that Sayyid Ahmad 
Barelwi was this Imam, who would soon reappear, and some even believed that he was 
the Imam Mahdi who would appear before the last day of judgment.117 The spread of 
such chiliastic belief in many districts of Bengal shaped memory of the frontier jihad 
post-facto and survived in local legends; this makes it difficult to ascertain the veracity of 
whether a recruit, such as Abul Mansur’s ancestor, actually fought during the lifetime of 
Sayyid Ahmad. In any case, as Mansur makes clear, Ashequllah Faraidi was under police 
surveillance up until the very last days of his life. According to village lore, Inayat Ali 
lived in Mansur’s ancestral home when he visited Dhanikhola for the purpose of tabligh. 
Legends about Mansur’s borodada were numerous and often fantastic – they celebrated 
his remarkable ability to train young boys in the village in lathi-wielding and 
swordsmanship; they transformed into stories about eggplants, which were propelled 
skyward from four corners, chopped up by the sword of Ashequllah Ghazi Sahib with 
astounding dexterity without letting a single eggplant hit the ground. Such legends about 
the Ghazi were passed down to the younger generation through family elders, ulema, 
mullahs, and mulavis in the area.  Mansur speaks of a degree of social distinction enjoyed 
by his family among fellow co-religionists on account of being good Faraidis and, most 
importantly, being related to the Ghazi who was the stuff of local legends.118 This sense 
of social distinction, which accrued from keeping up the pride of a Faraidi lineage in 	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maintaining strictures of religious life befitting to one who counts among his ancestors a 
legendary jihadi ghazi, contributed to a sense of self-worth that was wounded each time 
his family and community elders were addressed by the landlord’s petty officials in a 
condescending manner. It is true that not all Muslim young men growing up in 
Dhanikhola, Mymensingh, at the turn of the twentieth century could boast a bloodline 
that could be traced back to a “ghazi sahib”, but many such young men and boys 
belonged to Faraidi families, and grew up on lore that celebrated frontier-warriors who 
laid down their lives waging a war defending the principle of tauhid. Such local lore 
definitely contributed toward instilling a sense of self-esteem and social worth, which 
could be translated into demands that all tenants (including Muslims tenants) be treated 
with respect in the zamindar’s kutcherry.  
The collectivization of tenant-cultivators and the nature of praja demands in the 
early days reveal that such assertions were not based on economic issues such as the 
reduction of rent, amelioration of debt, occupancy rights and, the abolition of the 
zamindar’s rights to nazar or salami on the transfer of occupancy holdings, which would 
be included in the charter of demands of the praja movement from 1914 onward.119 Quite 
to the contrary, as the character of the Dhanikhola praja assertions indicates, the demand 
for the employment of local people in the zamindar’s kutcherry was made in terms of 
generation of employment in the locality, but also justified in terms of such a measure 
facilitating the collection of rent if local officials instead of non-locals went around the 
business of rent collection. This appears to be a far cry from the no-rent mentality of the 
tenant-cultivators that would plague landlords in eastern Bengal in the 1930s -- a 	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“mentality” conventionally attributed by historians to the intensification and spread of the 
praja movement, the institutionalization of the movement in the formation of the Krishak 
Praja Party (KPP), and KPP’s entry into the domain of formal provincial politics. The 
demand against illegal exaction of abwabs for Kali puja was not articulated in terms of 
the economic exploitation or distress of the tenants; it did not ask for a ban on abwabs per 
se – those relating to payments levied during events of births, marriages, or deaths in the 
zamindar’s family; to the construction of roads in the village or for the upkeep of a 
chowkidari force in the village – but only one specific kind of abwab that was deemed a 
threat to the maintenance of a specific kind of reformed spiritual disciple involved in 
protecting the tenet of tauhid (the Oneness of Allah). It is perhaps not surprising then, 
that at least two of the major leaders of the praja movement, Abul Mansur Ahmed, and 
the older Akram Khan, came from families who drew lines of descent from frontier 
jihadis who were locally revered as valiant warriors for the cause of tauhid. Akram 
Khan’s father, Maulana Abdul Bari, was also known to be part of the mujahidin of the 
Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya founded by Barelwi.120  
Religious Legitimacy and Patronage of Raiyat Sabhas 
Akram Khan was one of the founder members of a more organized praja 
movement which started in earnest with the Kamariarchar Praja Conference in Jamalpur 
subdivision of Mymensigh district in 1914 which, for the first time, forged links between 
localized, fragmented, and sporadic movements of praja assertions and urban Muslim 
professionals. Fazlul Huq, a lawyer from Bakarganj, Akram Khan from Calcutta, and 	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Maniruzzaman Islamabadi, a well-known editor of five reformist periodicals from 
Chittagong attended the conference.121 The resolutions passed at the conference included 
the following demands: abolition of the zamindar’s right to nazar and salami; reduction 
of rent; effective measures against illegal exactions by zamindars; occupancy right to 
tenants when the land is cultivated by them for 12 years, and the tenant’s right to plant 
trees on his land. This conference received great publicity in the weekly newspaper, 
Mohammadi, edited by Akram Khan, and in Muslim Hitaishi, patronized by Pir Abu Bakr 
of Furfura.122 That both Khan and the Pir of Furfura converged on the issue of supporting 
the cause of the tenant-cultivators is significant, since on several religious issues they did 
not see eye to eye. In fact, Akram Khan’s weekly Mohammadi was singularly responsible 
for publicizing fatwas issued against the Pir of Furfura, declaring him as “an enemy of 
Islam”. Khan was sympathetic to the Ahl-i Hadis variety of reformism, and had an 
acrimonious relationship with the Hanafi catholicism of Bakr. Abu Bakr was a hugely 
popular pir who wielded influence over 52 zillas in Bengal and Assam. He was 
associated with eighteen organizations throughout his life, including Anjuman-e Waizine 
Hanifiya, Anjuman e Islamia (Faridpur) and Anjumane Tabligh e Islam (Rangpur) in 
addition to having influence over twenty newspapers in Bengal.  At his seat in a village 
called Furfura in Hooghly, Isal-i-Sawab, a festival of offering prayers for the dead, was 
celebrated over a duration of three days annually with great pomp; he spend lavishly on 
the festival at which lakhs of Muslims from all over Bengal converged.123 The Ahl-i 
Hadis (also called Mohammadi) clerics were thoroughly opposed to practices such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Abul Mansur Ahmed, Amar Dekha, p. 21. 
122 Ibid.  
123  Pradip Kumar Datta, Carving Blocs: Communal Ideology in Early Twentieth Century 
Bengal (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 88-89.  
	   102	  
Isal-i-Sawab, which they deemed un-Islamic. Akram Khan’s Mohammadi not only 
carried reports of debates between the Bakris and the Mohammadis, but also published 
fatwas issued by other reformist sects that were active in attempting to delegitimize the 
Pir of Furfura.  
 One such fatwa issued by a Jaunpuri cleric – a follower of Keramat Ali Jaunpuri 
– Maulana Mohammad Hamid, declared that Abu Bakr of Furfura had invented kalimas 
which were not in the Koran, that such kalimas were polytheistic, and thus to be a murid 
of Bakr was equivalent to being a murid of a yogi or a sanyasi. The fatwa also forbade 
dining with Furfuris, entering into relationships of marriage with them, and reading the 
namaz in a mosque while being seated next to them.124 The fatwa, originally published in 
Urdu, was translated into Bengali and published in the weekly edited by Akram Khan.125 
The Jaunpuri clerics, who much like the Mohammadi ones, had fractious relationships 
with the Pir of Furfura, suffered from a disadvantage in Bengal since most of them wrote 
in Urdu, which was inaccessible to Muslim masses in the region.126 Publications such as 
Akram Khan’s Mohammadi performed the important function of translating and 
disseminating such anti-Bakr opinions. Bakr was also wealthy, and so were a lot of his 
followers, drawn as they were from ashraf landowning families from Hooghly. The 
Jaunpuris by contrast were not so well financed, their clerics poor and not connected to 
the English-educated Muslim intelligentsia quite in the manner that Bakr was.127 An 
entire panoply of organizations and print media over which Bakr commanded influence 	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via “beardless, English educated maulavis who were not sufficiently learned in religious 
matters” was a cause for great consternation among rival groups such as the Jaunpuri and 
the Mohammadi clerics.128 
  Given this general milieu of sectarian acrimony, that a newspaper such as the 
Muslim Hitaishi of the Bakr group (the Furfuris or the Bakris as they were called in 
popular tracts) would lend support to the cause of the tenant-cultivators by publicizing a 
meeting led by Akram Khan is not insignificant; it points to the necessity of tapping into 
the domain of praja grievances for the purpose of religious legitimacy. By the third 
decade of the twentieth century, contests over who represented  “Islam” and battles over 
who was acting in the interests of the Muslim community could not be fought without 
linking the issue of religious legitimacy to upholding the interest of tenant-cultivators.  
Raiyat samitis and Raiyat sabhas (peasant tenant associations) mushroomed rapidly all 
over rural Bengal. By the mid-1920s there were praja and raiyat associations in virtually 
every district in eastern and northern Bengal.  
 Such raiyat and praja samitis were often locally pioneered by followers of 
charismatic religious figures. The followers were also engaged in the production of a 
huge bulk of printed ephemera in the Bengali language – pamphlets, tracts, songs, open 
letters to government officials, and poems. For instance, a tract titled Desher Katha 
published in 1925 by the Jalangi Raiyat Samiti of Murshidabad, announced that one 
Munshi Tariqullah, a disciple of Pir Abu Bakr of Furfura, had set up a raiyat association 
in the village of Jalangi. The tract, much in the manner of many improvement texts, is a 
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long poem in colloquial Bengali.129 It opens with “Bismillah al Rahman al Rahim” and 
then goes on to list the innumerable sufferings of peasants in the hands of the zamindar 
and his officials. In verse, the tract speaks of the burden of paying nazar even when the 
peasant’s crop is destroyed by floods; it speaks of the humiliation of being dragged 
through dust by the naib’s men in the dead of the night; and of blood dripping down the 
peasant’s back from being flogged for late payment of rent. “Where is the justice of 
British rule?” – the text poses a question. In the second section, the verse announces the 
“stirrings of a new age” (navayug) now that Munshi Tariqullah had started a raiyat 
sabha. Tariqullah is introduced as a truthful and committed man, a haji, and a friend of 
the impoverished. The raiyat sabha over which he presides is set up in opposition to the 
kutcherry of the zamindar. Unlike the zamindar who is surrounded by sycophants, who 
cannot see through the lies of his officials and is hard-hearted, Tariqullah, we are told, is 
“a strong man who is not swayed by sycophants”, “when he hears the oppressed weep, he 
is ready to lay down his life for them”, and his sabha is a place where truth is spoken and 
heard, and justice delivered. Tariqullah, the text proclaims, “has drowned our (sic) 
sorrows in the high tide of the Padma” and made the naib fearful. It tells us that Hindu 
prajas have also joined the praja collective and warns “if you have any shame, do not 
break up the samiti, if you are weaned by the sweet words of the zamindar now, there 
will be no remedy later.” Desher Katha also warns the peasants against riding the 
swadeshi wave. Though the flags are flying high in all directions, Mahatma (Gandhi) is 
meditating, and Deshbandhu (C.R. Das) and the Ali brothers are busy popularizing the 
slogan of Swadeshi, the texts warns, prajas are nothing but goats to be sacrificed on the 	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alter of swadesh (home rule). It further warns that if the praja issues are not taken 
seriously, most peasants will go back to being indigo coolies. The tone is loyalist.  An 
entire section of the verse is dedicated to the British official,  “Magistrate W.A.D Sahib”, 
who is seen as a force for good. He is applauded as a “defender of the prajas”, as 
someone who has put the zamindar’s officials in place. He is also praised for dismissing 
the policemen and darogas who routinely refused to register complaints against the 
excesses of the zamindar’s officials. The final section of the verse-tract links the chaos 
wrecked upon the lives of the prajas by illegal and oppressive practices of zamindars, 
naibs, and darogas to the chaos or the theological concept of fitna or chaos prevailing in 
society in general. Wives, we are told, are not obedient to their husbands, adultery (zina) 
and gambling have spread like disease, the world is a web of lies and deceit, and people 
do not know haram from halal. There is a sense in which Tariqullah – Pir Abu Bakr’s 
disciple – and his raiyat sabha is understood to have arrived on the scene to bring peace 
in the social lives of the peasants as well as restore moral order in the world.  Figures 
such as Tariqullah were endowed with a certain charisma, surrounded in an aura of 
religio-moral worth; he was shown to have descended from a locally respected and 
virtuous lineage, and his charisma and moral worth were utilized in mobilizing peasants 
in the area to join the raiyat sabha.  
Extant historical scholarship has typically portrayed the praja movement as a 
secularized rubric of peasant mobilization, which recruited an overwhelming number of 
Muslim peasants only because they happened to be numerous.130 As readings of hitherto 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 P.K. Datta’s study is exemplary in this regard. He considers raiyat sabhas to be 
secular organizations where mobilization occurred under the rubric of class.  
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neglected cheaply printed ephemera produced by local raiyat associations reveal, this was 
far from the case. Links existed between pirs and maulavis who enjoyed popular 
following in wider circles and local village-level organizers of raiyat associations they 
patronized. The language of mobilization tied issues of social order and prosperity to the 
restoration of religio-moral order.  
Raiyat association leaders and Furfuri clerics, who were spread far and wide, 
encouraged praja-cultivators to attend Bakr’s Isal-i-Sawab.  In 1924, at the Isal-i-Sawab 
organized by Bakr in Furfura, a resolution was passed opposing any form of Swaraj that 
would not be governed by Islamic laws. Curiously, at the Isal-i-Sawab, Bakr’s status as a 
landlord was emphasized; his financial support of the festival was posited as an example 
of how a Muslim landlord could fruitfully deploy his wealth to create a community of 
Muslims occupying disparate class-positions. According to one account, an attendee of 
Bakr’s Isal-i-Sawab repeatedly stressed on how, unlike other ostentatious pirs, Bakr was 
simple and austere in dress and habits, how his children mingled with ordinary children at 
the festival.131 Interestingly, while it was in the name of personages such as Bakr that 
tenant-cultivators were being mobilized against landlords and organized in far-flung rural 
districts into raiyat associations, in a movement seemingly consolidating a class, or at 
least, a sectional interest, it was also under Bakr’s patronage that a larger Muslim 
community was instantiated during festivals such as Isal-i-Sawab, where antagonistic 
relationships between sectional interests within Muslims could be contained and the 
Muslim landlord’s wealth displayed in actively producing bonds of religious community. 
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It was as an effect of the braiding of such contradictory vectors, often traceable to one 
key personality (such as Bakr), that fault lines within the Muslim community 
simultaneously tended to be produced and sutured, underscored and effaced. That praja 
assertions in the 1920s and 1930s more frequently lashed out against Hindu zamindars 
than Muslim ones was perhaps as a result of such an effect, rather than an active process 
of communalization that singled out the Hindu zamindar as an enemy any more than 
rivals belonging to different madhabs.  
Winning over the Bargadar and the Production of Bengali Muslim identity at a Grass-
roots Level 
The term praja or tenant came to be commonly applied to all those who had 
property rights below the zamindars. It was, in a sense an umbrella term that included the 
intermediate tenure-holders, the raiyats and the under-raiyats. However, there were 
prajas without property rights such as the bargadar, the adhiar, bhag-chashi, khetmajur 
who were directly involved in production.132 Barga was a system of sharecropping in 
which the bargadar paid 50 per cent of produce rent to the landowner or tenure-holder. 
The bargadar himself supplied cattle, plough, seeds, and manure, but had no rights in 
occupancy.133 So in the building of the praja movement there were fault lines along the 
concept of property rights. How would the bargadars, for instance, be mobilized? What 
did they have to gain from joining the tenant associations, which were primarily 
demanding the strengthening of occupancy rights of peasants? How would they be 
recruited in protests and processions?   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See Sachin Sen, Banglar Raiyat O Zamindar (Calcutta: Visva Bharati, 1944).  
133 Bipasha Raha, The Plough and the Pen: Peasantry, Agriculture and the Literati in 
Colonial Bengal (New Delhi: Manohar, 2012), p. 220. 
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Praja unity had become urgent especially after 1923. There was a consensus in 
the upper echelons of the government that an amendment to the existing Bengal Tenancy 
Act was long overdue. In 1919, the matter was formally opened in the Bengal Legislative 
Council. Bishvamadhav Das, an Assembly member, moved a resolution in 1921 for the 
appointment of a special committee. The resolution was passed and a special committee, 
presided over by John Kerr, formed to suggest what amendments were necessary to the 
existing piece of legislation. Raja Bahadur Ban Behari Kapur, Rai Bahadur Surendra 
Chandra Sen, and Sir Ashutosh Choudhury, a well-known High Court judge, comprised 
the other members on the committee. The Kerr Committee’s report and a draft of the 
proposed Bill were published in the Calcutta Gazette in 1923 for public debate and 
deliberation.134 The committee’s recommendations spawned a massive controversy in the 
domain of print media and within the Assembly, with both landlords and pro-raiyat 
supporters expressing dissatisfactions with different provisions recommended in the Kerr 
Committee’s draft bill. Among other things, the Kerr Committee’s report recommended, 
for the first time in the history of land-related legislation in Bengal, that a bona fide 
cultivator paying a share of the produce to a proprietor or tenure-holder or occupancy 
raiyat be deemed a tenant, notwithstanding any future contracts to the contrary. A bona 
fide cultivator was defined as a person who himself supplied plough, cattle, and other 
implements of agriculture.135 This suggested provision threatened the large tenure-holders 
and other occupancy raiyats who often let out their lands on a barga (sharecropping) 
basis. Interestingly, the pamphlets issued by tenant associations, in calling for praja 
unity, did not exclude the bargadars, but included them in their address. In fact praja 	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samiti tracts from the 1920s reveal that a concerted effort was made by the praja leaders 
to convince the bargadars that the Kerr Committee’s recommendations was actually 
against their interest. Below, I quote from one such praja pamphlet, published in 1923, 
which appeared hot in the heels of the Kerr committee’s recommendations being put out 
in the public domain for deliberation.  This pamphlet titled Prajasattva Nuton Ain O 
Praja’r Kartavva, published from Mymensingh, takes the form of a dialogue between a 
jotedar (Bhuiya sahib) and a bargadar (Garibullah) that occurs when the bargadar comes 
looking to get on barga: 
Jotedar: Don’t you know that land will not be let out for sharecropping anymore? 
A new legislation is on its way, according to which, bargadars will be given 
occupancy rights. Should I starve myself by allowing you to sharecrop on my land 
holding? 
Bargadar: Bhuiya Sahib, I did not understand what this legislation is all about. 
Can you explain in greater detail? 
Jotedar: This plot of land has two levels of property rights – the proprietor’s and 
the occupancy raiyat’s, you know that. Starting this November, if I allow you to 
be a bargadar on my land holding, and, if you -- using your own plough, ox, and 
seeds -- grow crops on my land, then you will de deemed my praja. And I will not 
be able to get my land back from you. You will retain right to my land, and will 
be required to pay me rent ascertained by the courts of law – I will not be able to 
object to that. And Chandu Sheikh, my under-raiyat will have rights to my land as 
well. As in the past I cannot demand produce rent; I will be forced to accept rent 
in cash if he applies for commutation of produce rent to money, and if such an 
order is passed by the courts of law. Garibullah, do you understand? 
Bargadar: I do. But tell me, if such a piece of legislation is passed, what will be 
the condition of the bargadars? 
Jotedar: No one will be willing to give out land on barga. They will not be 
encouraged to settle korfa prajas on their lands. Since the Act stands to be 
amended, many have already wrested away their lands from bargadars and under-
raiyats. If I do not find wage-laborers, I will let my land stand fallow, but I will 
never give out land on a sharecropping basis. I might employ you as a wage-
laborer, but if you charge too much, I will be forced to replace you with coolies 
from Orissa. So either you will be forced to run away to the dense jungles of 
Assam, or be compelled to tie a noose around your neck and you family’s. But 
you will not get land on barga.  
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Bargadar: I had another question. A few days back Fateh Ali died; he left behind 
two widows and four minor children. If the widows give out their land on barga, 
will they also lose rights to their land? What will be the way out for them?  
             Jotedar: The way out? The beggar’s bowl!  Or perhaps the noose or the river!136 
According to the praja pamphlet, if the existing Act was amended along the lines 
recommended by the Kerr Committee, which proposed to endow all bona fide cultivators, 
including bargadars with occupancy rights, landowners, and other tenure-holders would 
be forced to replace bargadars with day laborers from outside the province to get their 
land cultivated. Local protagonists of the praja movement also played on the anxieties of 
widowed wives of jotedars and raiyats who were often left in charge of feeding 
households with no able-bodied adult male and depended on letting out their land 
holdings to bargadars for cultivation. The praja leaders, in mobilizing against the 
recommendations of the Kerr committee report, deployed a devious language of 
protectionism. The praja movement was putatively necessary to protect lives of 
bargadars, widowed women and their minor children, which the proposed amendments 
had supposedly rendered precarious. And finally, in the pamphlet, the bargadar is won 
over; he is successfully recruited to the praja cause to protest against the proposed 
legislation: 
Bargadar: Bhuiya Sahib, what are we to do now? What is the responsibility of the 
praja?  
Jotedar: There is little time. The government has published a draft of the Act to 
seek our opinions. We have to hold protest meetings. We have two months to 
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express our grievances. A mother does not feed her child unless it cries! Take the 
name of Allah and plunge into action.137 
It is a clarion call for the prajas to collectivize, to stop paying illegal cesses (abwabs) to 
the zamindar, a wake up call for the Muslim cultivators to realize that “it is haram to lend 
financial support to zamindar’s pujas.” Prajas are encouraged to join meetings in large 
numbers, draft resolutions, write open letters to the government, and protest the 
suggested amendments to the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. In addition, they are 
encouraged to draft resolutions demanding free and compulsory primary education, 
reduction in rates of interest, and the right to cut trees on their land holdings.  
 In the proposed Bill, the Kerr committee also addressed the issue of transferability 
of occupancy rights and proposed to legalize the practice.138 Transferability of occupancy 
rights had emerged as a thorny issue even in the past. Referring to the Tenancy Act X of 
1859, through which occupancy rights were legally secured to the cultivators, who lived 
on a plot of land for a minimum duration of 12 years, the zamindars lobbied that the right 
of occupancy should not be transferred by mortgage, sale, gift or exchange, nor was the 
right saleable in the execution of a decree of money against them.139 When the Tenancy 
Amendment Bill of 1883 proposed to confer the free right of transfer of tenant 
occupancies, the proposal was dropped in the face of opposition from zamindars who 
argued that such an unqualified right would lead to land holdings passing into the hands 
of non-resident and non-cultivating classes. In the end, the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 
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138 John Kerr Committee’s Report, p. 4-7. 
139 Krishnakali Mukeerji, ‘The Transferability of Occupancy Holding’ in The Bengal 
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had left the question of land transfer open to local custom rather than to a prohibitive 
regulation.140 But the Kerr Committee was in favor of legalizing such transfers by fixing 
a fee of 25 per cent of the consideration money payable to the zamindar, and by enabling 
the zamindar the right to pre-emption, i.e. by conferring on the zamindar the right to 
transfer the holding to himself on paying the consideration money and an additional 10 
per cent as compensation, together with any sum which the transferee might have paid as 
rent or the landlord’s fees.141 Legalization of land transfer on these terms was anathema 
to the raiyat associations since fixing a salami amounting to 20 per cent of the sale price 
to the zamindar would, they feared, put an end to the flexibility of terms and modes of 
negotiations customarily practiced through, as a pamphlet states, “flattery, hospitality 
(khatir andaz) or simply tears” by which a smaller sum was often arrived at. The 
landowners’ right to pre-emption made the raiyat associations equally anxious. In this 
specific clause, raiyat associations saw a golden opportunity for the zamindars to acquire 
occupancy land holdings and convert them into khas mahal lands, which were 
government lands allocated at low revenue rates and with special facilities in the deltaic 
region of eastern Bengal. It was said, with this piece of legislation, the zamindar would 
be “like a bear with a bunch of bananas in his hands” greedily buying off land holdings 
from actual cultivators, thus rendering them landless, and then letting land out to actual 
cultivators on a more profitable barga basis.142 Indeed, as Iftekar Iqbal’s study has 
revealed, this process was well underway by the 1920s, when the British government 
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of the Hindu bhadralok, in part, to “enable persons who have abandoned terrorism to 
settle down to a life of productive citizenship” and in part, to contain possible resentment 
arising from high employment rates among educated bhadralok youth in the inter-war 
period.143 The number of actual cultivators possessing occupancy rights had been 
undergoing a steady decrease. Between 1921 and 1931, there was an estimated 49 per 
cent increase in the number of landless laborers in Bengal.144 A settlement officer from 
Chittagong noting this increasing trend in the seizure of actual occupancy raiyat’s long-
accumulated rights and entitlements during the Depression era, remarked: 
 Formerly the term chasi (cultivator) used to stink in the nose of the cultivators 
themselves as being a term of opprobrium. But at the advent of the present 
century, the gradually increasing unemployment among middle class youths and 
the prevailing high prices of agricultural produce brought about a change in the 
outlook; as a member of middle class took to agriculture as the only available 
professions, others were tempted to lay out money or lands as a safe form of 
investment – this has accelerated the process of transfer of lands from the 
cultivators to the non-cultivators. The transfers count among themselves not only 
the moneylenders, but also landlords and pleaders, muktiars and service holders. 
A section of the transferees let out their lands on bhag or barga and take half the 
produce rent while they let out on rate of money rent.145   
As more and more cultivators got reduced to the status of bargadars, the onslaught on the 
possibility of conferring any substantive rights on the bargadars intensified from all sides 
involved in the debate – the praja leaders, the zamindars, as well as the bhadralok neo-
raiyat. In the debates that ensued in the legislative council when the Tenancy 
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Amendment Bill came up for discussion in 1928, Akhil Chandra Datta of the Swarajist 
bloc, in defending status quo, declared that bargadari was:  
[T]he most equitable arrangement that one can conceive of between capital and 
labor… May I ask if there is any other industry where you can find a more just 
share given to labor than what is given, viz., half to the capital and half to the 
labor…If you want a Bolshevik legislation have it by all means. Let us improve 
the condition of the actual tiller of the soil, even by sacrificing all other people.146 
Particularly concerned with championing the interests of the bhadralok neo-raiyats who 
were supposed to be “returning” to agriculture, J.L Banerjee said:  
Let us accept the plain fact that at present we cannot recognize the bargadar as a 
tenant…We are not legislating in vacuo: we are legislating upon a background of 
past history and custom: and we cannot leave public opinion out of the account. 
Under the existing condition the bargadars and adhiars [sharecroppers] are not 
recognized as tenants and the Government cannot give them the rights of tenants 
without flouting public opinion. Is the only cultivator of the land the man who tills 
the land with his own hands? Has the bhadralok agriculturalist who invests 
money in land no place in economy of things? And should not his land be 
recognized as much as the right of the man who actually tills the soil?147   
 Datta and Banerjee sought to posit the institution of bargadari (sharecropping) as a fair 
and equitable distribution between the owners of land and the owners of labor power. The 
presupposition underpinning such formulations was that the owners of land and the 
owners of labor met in the domain of exchange: both parties engaged in an economic 
activity where in an exchange of land and labor, both sides took home an equal share of 
value produced in and through such exchange. Here, economic activity in being 
determined by exchange was shown to occur, to use a spatial metaphor, on a planar 
surface. In an understanding of economic activity dominated by an idiom of exchange (of 
land and labor), the owners of capital were deemed to have contributed as much to the 	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production of value as “the man who tills the land with his own hands”. Banerjee’s 
argument was not very carefully crafted, its logic weak and quite obviously flawed.  By 
Banerjee’s own logic, the bargadars ought to have been granted rights on the land by 
virtue of being participants in the economic activity of exchange, but his formulation 
does not follow this logic to its end and instead, led the likes of Banerjee to completely 
disregard the rights of the bargadars, in upholding the rights of the owners of capital. Yet 
notwithstanding the relative strength or weakness of these arguments, they bring into 
sharp relief the manner in which the problem of granting rights (or not) in land was 
linked to conflicting concepts of the economic or, to use a Althusserian distinction, the 
theoretical presuppositions that underwrote the ‘economic’ not as an “object of the real”, 
but as an “object of knowledge”.148 
Contra Banerjee, the champions of praja interests aggressively touted a very 
different concept of the economic. Unlike the pro-landlord lobby, which located value-
producing economic activity in the site of exchange, the pro-peasant praja activists 
sought to displace an understanding of labor as commodity-in-exchange to give way to a 
profoundly powerful presupposition about labor in which labor becomes a 
producing/productive activity that is the source of value. If a pro-landlord understanding 
of labor as commodity made labor subject to price fluctuations, demand, and supply, in 
the praja movement’s understanding about labor it acquired the status of an ontology, 
which far from being effected by fluctuations in variables, was posited as the constant 
and reliable source of all value. In 1921, in an open letter to the Governor of Bengal, 
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Lawrence John Lumbley Dundas, Earl of Ronaldshay, the Secretary of the Bengal Raiyat 
Association – Naziruddin Ahmed – pleaded the governor to make a tour of rural Bengal 
to witness the miserable plight of the raiyats, who were the “backbone of the nation”, the 
“real producers”, the motor which drove society, for on their labor rested “the nawab’s 
nawabi, the babu’s babudom, the bradralok’s genteel manners, the zamindar’s 
arrogance”.149 
 The 1920s praja pamphlet from Mymensingh written in the form of a dialogue 
between the bargadar and the jotedar, which I have discussed before, gave an account 
that was fairly typical of the widespread manner of narrating the history of accumulation 
of wealth in tracts issued by praja associations: 
Not only is the raiyat (tenant-cultivator) not the owner of wealth, as a matter of 
fact, in the eyes of law, he is not even the owner of land.  Those that have 
accumulated wealth through deceit and force, those whose ancestors had endeared 
themselves to Lord Cornwallis’ Company agents and those who in broad daylight 
committed theft through usury are today the owners of land. But those poor 
creatures who turned their lifeblood to sweat – clearing dense jungles or by 
ceaseless toil, ploughed deeper and deeper into the earth to bring out ambrosia 
(amrita) – have no claims on the land today; they are merely hired hands.150 
As per such accounts, capital was fundamentally theft and not simply a thing produced 
via a mutually beneficial exchange between the owners of land and the owners of labor 
power.   
Praja pamphlets such as Krishker Unnati provided detailed guidelines on how 
raiyat interests were to be organized. It recommended that raiyat samitis at the village 
and district levels under the umbrella of a Bangiya raiyat samiti (Bengal tenant’s 	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association) – a well-linked network of organizations – be set in place so that “if one part 
is affected the entire body reacts”. Praja pamphlets also advised that in case of forceful 
eviction of a raiyat from his land by a zamindar, no other raiyat ought to come forward to 
buy the right of tenancy on such land, and when the Bangiya raiyat samiti declared a 
particular zamindar as an oppressor or the collector of illegal cesses (abwab), raiyats 
ought to collectively boycott such a zamindar by refraining from taking up employment 
as the zamindar’s doorman, or paik or barkandaj. Most importantly, such pamphlets lay 
down that in order to protect the interest of the raiyats, there could be no discrimination 
on the basis of localities, districts, or the religion of the affected raiyat. 151 Such non-
sectarian call for unity was, however, at the expense of the bargadars who owned no 
rights on the land on which they cultivated. But given that improvements texts and praja 
pamphlets had already forged a regime of value that accorded primacy to the labor of 
cultivation, on what terms could a staunch resistance to conferring rights to the bargadars 
be justified by the praja movement? 
In the Bengal Legislative Assembly, two pro-peasants councilors, Ekramuk Haq 
and Emdadul Huq, argued that where ordinary poor but respectable cultivating families 
made a living by letting out their holdings to the bargadar, conferring tenancy rights to 
bargadars would be extremely mischievous – it would foster strife and litigation. For fear 
of such strife and litigation, they claimed, many holdings would remain unploughed and 
those who tilled on barga, unable to make a living in their villages, would be forced to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Khademol Islam, Krishaker Unnati (Maulana Mohammad Moyejjuddin Hamidi, 
1929). 
	   118	  
make way to the hills and jungles of Assam, and perish there.152  In demonstrating the ill 
effects of the proposed legislation, the praja tracts and pamphlets constantly played on an 
anxiety about the exodus of cultivators from Bengal to the wilderness of Assam. As an 
effect of the legislation, bargadars, they projected, would be driven to the unfriendly 
jungles of Assam because occupancy raiyats would refuse to let out land on a 
sharecropping basis, and occupancy raiyats, reduced to landless labor following the 
conversion of their holdings into khas mahal lands, would be forced into the tiger-
infested jungles of Assam too.  This anxiety of depeasantization was conveyed 
powerfully by activating an imagination of Bengal as a civilized realm of sedentary 
cultivation vis-à-vis its neighboring Assam, a supposedly inhospitable and “uncivilized” 
wilderness.  Such pamphlets pleaded with the prajas: “Teach your children the name of 
Allah and Rasul. Even if you have a tiny plot of land left, do not go to Assam. Stay back 
in your desh and plough the land. If required work as a coolie, there’s no shame in 
that.”153 Since the late nineteenth century the Bengali word desh operated on a rather 
fluid semantic terrain – it could refer to one’s ancestral village or place of “origin” but 
also mean country or nation. Even today, the word desh continues to be used in both 
these senses. The praja pamphlets played on this double semantic usage of desh.  The 
discourse of the praja movement emphasized desh as a place to which affiliation was 
understood to be structured by ties of kinship, through land which the “son inherits from 
his forefathers”.154  Yet, in praja discourse, one’s ties to one’s desh did not simply appear 
as a matter of inherited occupancy or proprietary rights, but as an affective relationship 	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that had to be maintained by continuing the activity of labor of cultivation. It was through 
the labor of cultivation that one’s relationship to one’s desh, as place, and to the province 
of Bengal could be rightfully maintained.  
In introducing the new Tenancy Bill in the Bengal Legislative Council in 1928, 
Provash Chandra Mitter remarked, “ if this house can settle the conflicting interests with 
justice and fairness to all, it will be laying the foundation of true nationalism in this 
Province.”155 If in Mitter’s understanding, desh or nation was an agglomeration of 
different and conflicting sectional interests, and the forging of national unity required that 
no one sectional interest be ridden over roughshod, in praja literature, the interest of the 
cultivators did not make an appearance as a sectional interest but as an expression of 
national interest, since prajas were posited as the motor driving the entire nation of 
Bengal, the “life force of the nation”: 
The fact is that the government and a handful of our countrymen have been 
conspiring against the prajas who are the life force of Bengal… The Government 
has enslaved the educated bhadralok by bestowing upon them zamindaris and 
clerical jobs. The educated have spread their influence over the administrative 
institutions of the country. They come to represent their interest as the interest of 
the desh, politics is the politics of their interest, and the Congress and the Council 
are playgrounds for their moves.156 
Therefore, the praja pamphlets asserted that the zamindars in reducing the actual 
cultivators of the soil to their present plight had in fact reduced the whole of Bengal, the 
“jannat-e-belat” (“heaven on earth”) of the Mughal era to “a burial ground.”157   
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The praja movement’s avowedly non-sectarian claims of protecting peasant 
interests irrespective of locality, district, and religion, however, rested on propagating 
acute xenophobia at another level, directed not only at the “Marwari moneylenders” and 
“upcountry Bhatias”, but also at the wage laborers and coolies from Bihar and Orissa – 
the “pashchima coolies” as they were called in popular praja literature. The bargadars 
were advised to drive the “pashchima coolies” out of Bengal, and via the continuing act 
of the labor of cultivation claim their desh – both in the sense of a place to which one is 
attached through kinship ties and to the land of Bengal. As I have shown in the first 
chapter, improvement tracts posited cultivation as the highest form of ibadat (worship) to 
Allah, and reinforced an older idea of Adam as the first cultivator and cultivation as the 
foremost command of Allah, and in so doing created a religio-ethical vision of Muslim 
self and community rooted in linking the cultivation of the self to the act of cultivating 
the earth. The relationship between land and labor was posited as a religiously sanctioned 
one; to respect this relationship was the duty of a good Muslim and the proof of his 
Muslimness. 
 Praja pamphlets continued this discourse where the labor of cultivation was the 
source of all value, but also linked the act of cultivation to the land of Bengal. Popular 
praja literature including tracts and pamphlets that circulated in the Bengal countryside, 
thus went a long way in the production of Bengali Muslim identity at a grass-roots level.  
In the historical context of Bengal, the setting up of a relationship of contiguity 
between land, labor, and Muslim-ness was significant. For as Rafiuddin Ahmed has 
noted, an interesting aspect of ashraf behavior in Bengal of the late nineteenth century 
was reflected in their attitude to physical labor. In general, any Muslim, with even the 
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barest claims to high social status, held such labor in great contempt.158 In his work 
published in 1876, Carstairs noted that in the late nineteenth century, the repugnance for 
physical labor extended even to many of the less privileged groups, particularly in 
Eastern Bengal, so much so that the work force for public works generally had to be 
imported from outside.159 Carstairs’ observation was most certainly a gross exaggeration, 
for the bulk of Bengal’s peasant-cultivators were Muslims. But what it points to was a 
tendency among Muslims in Bengal, which Ahmed identifies as ashrafization. The fear 
of being labeled “atrap” (derogatorily connoting a low-born peasant “convert” who was 
only nominally Muslim), led to a tendency of adopting “foreign” lineages and adopting 
names and manners of the “high-born” ashraf who claimed superior social status, mostly 
resided in urban centers and claimed to be of Persian, Arabic, Pathan or Mughal descent. 
As Ahmed points out, Islamic reform movements, as they surged through the Bengal 
countryside in the latter half of the nineteenth century had created a strong tendency 
among the Muslims in Bengal to make claims of racial purity by adopting fictitious 
ancestries of “extra-territorial” origins harking back to Arabia, Persia, or Afghanistan.160 
But by the second decade of the twentieth century, Muslim identity in Bengal had not 
only come to be structured by labor’s relationship to land, where this relationship itself 
was represented as sanctioned by religion, but the relationship was also structured as a 
relationship between labor and the land of Bengal. Thus, as the basis of Bengali Muslim 
identity, assertions of belonging rooted in the land of Bengal emerged at this specific 
historical juncture. Precisely because this identity was forged in the improvement-praja 	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movement discursive terrain, the issue of Bengali identity played out most explicitly in 
the campaign of the Krishak Praja Party (KPP) before the 1937 elections, where the 
League Parliamentary Board’s assertion of Muslim solidarity faced direct challenge from 
KPP leaders on account of the fact that the League was dominated by non-Bengali 
Muslims. Among the League Board’s candidates there were as many as 10 members 
belonging to the Urdu-speaking Dhaka nawab family.161  
The Dacca nawabs were prosperous hide merchants from Kashmir who had first 
moved to Delhi and then to Bengal in the eighteenth century. After the Permanent 
Settlement of 1793, the family invested in land, purchased from the profligate Nawabs of 
Bengal. In the years that followed, they married into local families who helped them 
strengthen their hold over new territory of Bengal. In 1835, they purchased a dilapidated 
French factory building, refurbished it in the style of old nawabs and christened it “Ahsan 
Manzil”. This palatial residence on the banks of the river Padma became a hotbed of 
intrigue: in later times it was to become a headquarters of the Muslim League, not only 
for Dhaka but for the whole of Bengal. In 1875, the government gave Abdul Ghani the 
title of the “Nawab” in belated recognition for being conspicuously loyal during the 1857 
revolt and the title was made hereditary two years later.  The family prospered in the 
subsequent decades under the royal patronage of the British, to whom they remained 
unswervingly loyal until the Partition of Bengal was revoked in 1912. And although 
Nawab Salimullah died in 1916 disillusioned with his British patrons, his descendants 
adhered to the family tradition of loyalty to the Raj and kept away from the Khilafat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Harun-or-Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh: Bengali Muslim League and 
Muslim Politics, 1906-1947 (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd., 2003), p. 70. 
	   123	  
agitation. In the twenties, the family rose to new heights. Khwaja Nazimuddin, a cousin 
of the Nawab, showed that the faithful could still expect handsome rewards from their 
British masters. Educated at Cambridge, Nazimuddin returned to become Chairman of 
the Dacca Municipality. In due course, Nazimuddin became Minister of Education in 
1929, and finally in 1934, he was appointed to the Viceroy’s Executive Council. His 
family stuck to their “Persian” pretentions, married into prominent north Indian Muslim 
families and spoke only in English and Urdu. By 1934, the family estates covered almost 
200,000 acres and was spread over some seven districts in eastern Bengal together with 
property in Shillong, Assam and in rent roll of some 120,000 pounds a year. The treasurer 
of the new party was one of the wealthiest merchants in the province.162 In the 1937 
elections, League Parliamentary Board candidates from the Dhaka nawab family included 
Nawab Khawaja Habibullah, Nawabzadah Khwaja Nasrullah, Khwaja Shahabuddin, 
Farhat Shahabuddin, Khwaja Nooruddin, Syed Abdul Hafiz, Syed Abdus Salim, Syed 
Abdus Saheed, Khwaja Ismail and Khwaja Nazimuddin.163 Drawing the attention of the 
electors to this phenomenon of non-Bengali influence within the Muslim League, Fazlul 
Haq, the chief of the KPP declared that the 1937 elections would determine whether there 
would be Bengali or non-Bengali raj in Bengal.164  That candidates such as Khwaja 
Nazimuddin, in attempting to project a Pan-Indian Muslim image and influence, recruited 
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Muslim students from Punjab, UP, and NWFP to canvass for him in his constituency of 
Patuakhali – his zamindari estate – did him more harm than good in garnering votes.165 
 During the 1937 elections the League strategy was to discredit the KPP as a 
stooge of the Congress Party and harp on religious solidarity. With a view to creating 
paranoia among the Muslim electorate, the League campaigned that if the KPP won the 
election, “all maktabs and madarsas where the Quran is taught would be closed 
down.”166 What occasioned such propaganda was probably the fact that even though the 
KPP was contesting elections from separate electorates reserved for the Muslims, not the 
general electorates, there was nothing in the Party’s manifesto that was sectarian per se, 
none of its promises addressed Muslims qua Muslims. In the 4th annual session of the 
KPP held in July 1936, where the 14 point election manifesto was adopted, the party’s 
aims included: abolition of zamindari without compensation; establishment of the 
proprietary rights of the cultivators in land; reduction of land rent for fixing a maximum 
rate for each class of land right; annulment of the landlord’s right to pre-emption; 
abolition of nazar salami and the criminal punishment of all illegal exactions or abwabs; 
the establishment of debt settlement boards and fixing of the rate of interest on long-term 
loans at 4 per cent as a solution to the problem of indebtedness of the cultivators; 
restriction of jute cultivation and fixing a minimum price for jute; resuscitation of dead 
and dying rivers and the improvement of agriculture, trade, commerce and sanitation; full 
self-government in Bengal; free and compulsory primary education; reducing the cost of 
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administration; fixing minister’s salary at Rs 1000; and, release of all political 
prisoners.167  
   But despite KPP’s non-sectarianism in its election manifesto, which in any case 
was restricted to the literate audience, in its election campaign in the rural areas, no 
frontal attack on the League’s line of communal solidarity was mounted.168 Instead the 
line taken was that real Muslim unity had to be forged among the ninety-five per cent 
Muslim cultivators living in the villages of Bengal, and not in the courtyard of Ahsan 
Manzil – the residence of the Urdu-speaking Dhaka Nawabs.169  In Mansur’s own district 
of Mymensingh, in spite of the fact that Jinnah himself had undertaken a visit to the 
district to campaign for the League, the KPP emerged victorious.170 The League 
campaigns in general were much better financed, in comparison to the KPP – which was 
not patronized by Muslim zamindars and Calcutta-based Muslim trading families to the 
extent that the League was.171 It was not that the KPP did not enjoy the patronage of 
Muslim zamindars at all – Ismail Chowdhury of Chiramati, Abdul Latif of Ulania, 
Barisal, Ghyasuddin Chowdhury and Moham Mian of Faridpur, Ashrafuddin Chowdhury 
of Comilla and Nawabzada Hasan Ali from Tangail were KPP members and patrons.172 
Yet in comparison to the League, the KPP’s campaign budget was modest, its meeting 
and rallies could not display the pomp and show of the League meetings; the KPP 
primarily depended on door-to-door canvassing. At the rural level, with a masterstroke as 
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it were, the KPP managed to turn its ill-financed campaign into an advantage, rather than 
an impediment. Deploying the rhetoric of frugality and austerity reminiscent of the 
Muslim improvement discourse (see chapter 1), the KPP chided the ostentatious rallies 
and meetings of the League as wasteful expenditures, which were essentially bleeding the 
Muslim community, and were also, implicitly, out of line with the Muslim improvement 
ethic. Instead, it proposed that joint meetings where both parties would debate each other 
face-to-face in the tradition of the bahas (theological debates between rival madhabs), 
familiar to rural Muslims from the nineteenth century onward, be popularized as a 
modality of pre-election campaign. That the League recoiled in the face of such 
proposition was, according to Abul Mansur, one of the major reasons leading to the 
undoing of its electoral fortunes in much of rural eastern Bengal. 173 
As far as KPP leaders were concerned, the real cause for worry was the defection 
of Akram Khan, Tamizuddin Khan, and Abdul Momin to the League before the 1937 
elections, as these were senior KPP leaders who had been associated with the praja 
movement since its early days.174 But the crisis cut both ways. The League too was 
forced to posit itself not only as the true Muslim party, but, indeed, as the “true praja 
party”. In addressing a meeting in Comilla, H.S. Suhrawardy claimed that the League 
Parliamentary Board was the “true krishak dal.”175  Maulavis and pirs were recruited by 
the League to make statements against the KPP. In November 1936, Pir Abu Bakr of 
Furfura, the patron of several raiyat associations in the 1910s and 1920s, issued a fatwa 
stating that the League being the true Muslim party and the true praja party, anyone 	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casting a vote in favor of the KPP or any party subservient to the Hindu Congress would 
mean the destruction of the Muslim community.176  Evidently, even in the domain of 
formal politics, praja identity had assumed a certain hegemonic status, which any party 
aspiring to be a serious contender from the electorates reserved for Muslims had to lay 
claim to.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to provide an account of how the hegemony of praja 
identity was forged in the domain of Muslim politics. By focusing on the early days of 
the praja movement, I have tried to demonstrate that early praja demands were not 
merely about the economically exploitative nature of the relationship between the 
zamindar and the praja, but pertained to the unjust and discriminatory nature specific to 
the relationship between the zamindar and the Muslim praja. As such discriminations 
were directed to Muslims qua Muslims, in its early days, assertions of self-respect were 
central to praja demands. The All Bengal Praja Samiti was formed in 1929. In 1931, the 
All Bengal Praja Samiti resolved to participate in government institutions, legislatures, 
municipalities, and union boards. From 1936, it came to be called the Krishak Parja Party 
(KPP). Even when it entered the domain of formal politics, and its demands and 
programs became more or less economic in nature, the early legacy of praja assertions 
that were responses to social discrimination was never entirely lost. This explains why 
the KPP enjoyed the robust support of young Muslim professionals – lawyers, doctors, 
journalists, and teachers – both at the level of leadership and sympathy. KPP leaders such 
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as Shamshuddin Ahmed, Abul Mansur Ahmed, and Humayun Kabir were all members of 
professional classes who had made their journey to the metropolis of Calcutta from 
provincial towns and villages as young students to attend Presidency College, Bangabashi 
College, or Calcutta University. As Suchetana Chattopadhyay has noted, for Muslim 
students, accommodation in the city was a persistent problem as Hindu house-owners and 
mess-keepers refused to let out their premises to them. This shortage of accommodation 
sometimes forced Muslim students to give up their studies in Calcutta and return home.177  
Such experiences of discrimination faced as Muslim qua Muslim by young boys and men 
from provincial towns and the countryside trying to get an education in Calcutta led them 
to gravitate toward the praja cause as well, since it was only in the articulations of the 
praja movement that the problem of social discrimination of Muslims (not religio-
communal unity) was nailed down.  
Secondly, the early history of praja assertions points to the manner in which 
conceptions of spiritual discipline shaped by discourses of Islamic reformism popularized 
by the Faraidis and the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya, which emphasized the principle of 
tauhid, were coded into praja demands. Again, ideas of spiritual discipline, rooted as 
they were in the everyday practices of frugality and austerity enjoined by the Muslim 
self-improvement discourse that emerged in the early twentieth century, were later 
mobilized by the KPP in countering the well-financed electoral campaigns of the League 
and delegitimizing big rallies and public meetings as wasteful expenditures (by 
implication a sign of a lack of spiritual discipline). As I have pointed out, the KPP, 
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despite its secular manifesto, was endorsing election meetings reminiscent of forms of 
public associations centered on dialogic theological debates or bahas, which were 
popular in the Bengal countryside from the nineteenth century onward. Notwithstanding 
the secular nature of the KPP’s aims and political programs, its strategies of political 
mobilization were not, strictly speaking, secularized. Its demands – of abolishing the 
practice of abwabs, for instance – secular though they were, resonated with distinctly 
reformist Islamic dispositions.  
Thirdly, I have very schematically pointed to the curiously antinomian nature of 
praja patronage in the 1910s and 1920s, whereby potentially conflicting class interests 
between the Muslim zamindar and the Muslim raiyat were simultaneously produced and 
contained. Such contradictory double movements were effected by networks of patronage 
pivoted on popular religious figures (such as Pir Abu Bakr), who patronized raiyat 
associations in far-flung villages of Bengal, thus, accentuating fractures within Muslims 
along class lines while simultaneously financing religious festivals of the nature of Isal-i-
Sawab that had the effect of displaying how the wealthy Muslim landowner could use his 
wealth in productive ways toward the building of a harmonious Muslim community. It is 
not surprising then, that the League would, in 1936, recruit a figure such as Bakr to 
legitimize its claim to being both the “true Muslim party” and “the real praja party”.  
This curious nature of patronage during the early days of the praja movement also made 
it possible for a Muslim zamindar such as Nawabzada Hasan Ali from Tangail to position 
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himself both as a representative of praja interests and their paternalistic patron in seeking 
election with a KPP ticket in 1937.178 
Fourthly, the popular literature disseminated by local-level raiyat associations, as 
I have shown in this chapter, played a key role in the production of Bengali Muslim 
identity at the grass-roots level. This was achieved by harping on the affective ties of the 
cultivator to the land on which he cultivated, and by a clever rhetorical maneuver, 
expanding the scale of representation to the land of Bengal, while propagating 
xenophobia directed to Marwari moneylenders, upcountry traders, Oriya wage laborers 
and Bihari coolies alike. The production of Bengali Muslim identity in this manner also 
led the bargadars to support the praja cause, against their own interests. At this level too, 
the praja movement had achieved hegemony, where Bengali Muslim became a sine qua 
non for the cultivators of Bengal, and praja became an all-encompassing term under 
which solidarity was sought, irrespective of the gradations of land-holdings or the lack of 
it. As the movement formalized into a party and entered the domain of formal politics, 
the bargadars, acting against their interests, also became the mass base of the party, 
although their support did not translate into votes as they were still disenfranchised in a 
time where voting depended on property qualifications.179 The KPP’s rhetoric of routing 
out the non-Bengali raj of a League, dominated by Urdu speaking candidates, certainly 
had an affective purchase that could enlist the support of bargadars who otherwise had 
little to gain from the KPP’s program.  
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 It is because Bengali Muslim identity was being forged at a grass-roots level via 
praja discourse that literary institutions such as the Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Samity 
(Bengal Muslim Literary Association; henceforth BMSS), formed by the urban Muslim 
intelligentsia with the express agenda of building a Bengali language and literature for 
the Bengali Muslim community, drew on the political vocabulary of the praja movement 
to assert a distinctive Bengali Muslim identity. In the presidential address of an annual 
meeting of the Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Samiti, S. Wajed Ali related the 
“backwardness” of the Bengali Muslim community to its neglect of the mother tongue. 
Every self-respecting community, he claimed, needed a jatiyo sahitya (national literature) 
of its own. He argued that until the Bengali Muslims could build a national literature of 
their own, they would remain objects of contempt, or at best, sympathy in the eyes of the 
Bengali Hindus and the Muslims from other parts of India. Modern Bengali literature, he 
remarked, had thus far been nurtured by the Hindus and shaped by the mental-world and 
ethical universe of Hinduism. To make Bengali literature fit for Bengali Muslim society 
and religion, he urged, the language and the content of literary works had to be shaped 
anew.180 But how was literary language to be recast? 
In 1919, at the third convention of the BMSS, Akram Khan, in his presidential 
address, responded to the problem of words that were too Hindu-ised to be used by 
Bengali Muslims in their literature. According to him, although Bengali was the mother 
tongue of the Muslims of Bengal, the Sanskritized Bengali, which had become the 
hallmark of Bengali literary production, was not something Bengali Muslims could claim 
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as their own, especially since words pertaining to religion were imbued with Hindu ideas 
and symbolism. For Bengali Muslim literary production, some Islamic words were 
fundamental and could not be substituted by more prevalent Bengali words. For example, 
according to Khan “allah” could never be replaced by “Iswar”; the Hindu connotations of 
Iswar meant that it smacked of polytheism and was thus not adequate to the (tauhid) 
monotheism of Islam. Similarly, according to him, roza could not be substituted by upvas 
– since roza was a specific kind of religious fasting, and upvas was fasting in a general 
sense and could even result from the husband refusing to eat his dinner in showing that he 
was upset with his wife. Akram Khan countered allegations that the Bengali Muslim 
Literary Association was trying to needlessly inject an excess of Perso-Arabic words into 
the Bengali language in order to stamp it with the mark of Muslim communal identity. 
According to him, greater currency of certain Perso-Arabic words was a necessity for 
Bengali Muslims and he was baffled by why that would upset the Bengali intelligentsia 
and literati at all. To quote Khan: 
There are several naturally existing Arabic and Persian words in the Bengali 
language. Now, even certain English words have become naturalized in the 
language. If these can exist, why not a few other words? Adherence to certain 
words is crucial to our religious identity. In the upper echelons of the literary 
establishment it has been ascertained that only words that are in usage under the 
current arrangement (haal bandobasto) have the right to occupancy (kayemi 
satva). Why our authors would want to banish words such as allah, rasul, namaz 
and roza from the realm of the literary, I cannot fathom. In banishing such words, 
we (the Bengali Muslims) will give permanency (sthayitto) to a language that is 
not our own. 181 
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It is telling that Akram Khan in attempting to carve out a separate space for Bengali 
Muslim literature, used words such as “occupancy right” (kayemi satva), “permanency” 
(sthayitto), and “current arrangement” (haal bandobasto) that were staples of the political 
vocabulary of the praja  (tenant-peasants’) movement which was gaining momentum in a 
fragmented fashion across large parts of eastern Bengal where Muslims were most 
populous. In using a political vocabulary that would resonate with the grievances of the 
tenant-peasants’ (praja) movement against zamindari and the Permanent Settlement (of 
land), he sought to merge the political affect that was being mobilized against the then 
current colonial arrangement of proprietorship in land with an affective response against 
the current arrangement (haal bandobasto) of Bengali literary language as well.  
Since specifically Islamic dispositions coupled with reactions to widespread 
attitudes of social discrimination against Muslims had congealed in the articulations of 
praja grievances and assertions, they provided apt analogies for speaking of 
discrimination in the domain of culture as well. Thus when Akram Khan in addressing 
the Bengali Muslim Literary conference drew on the political vocabulary that had come 
to be identified with the praja movement in order to make an argument for a distinctive 
vocabulary for Bengali Muslim literature, he was exploiting this widespread perception 
of the praja issue as a Muslim issue. In effect, he was implying that just as the 
arrangement in proprietorship in land was tilted against praja/Muslim interests, similarly 
the current arrangement of Bengali as a formalized, literary language was tilted against 
the Muslims, and thus, required unsettling.  
One of the most remarkable features of the Pakistan demand, as it emerged in 
Bengal in the 1940s, was the intensity of literary activism surrounding it. This is a topic I 
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have dealt at length in a subsequent chapter. But here, suffice it to say that for the pro-
Pakistan literary activists, Pakistan was a demand for “cultural autonomy” or “tammaduni 
azadi”. In 1944, Abul Mansur Ahmed, who by then had joined the Muslim League, in 
delivering his presidential address at the East Pakistan Renaissance Society asserted that 
both religion and culture accounted for the distinctiveness of Bengali Muslim identity. 
Culture’s relationship to religion, he argued, was analogous to that of a tree and a seed: 
while religion, in the manner of a seed, could traverse geographical boundaries, culture, 
like a tree, even as it sprouted from the seed (religion), remained firmly rooted in the land 
on which it flourished. Ahmed’s botanical metaphors chalked out a space of cultural 
autonomy for the Bengali Muslims, vis-à-vis Bengali Hindus as well as Muslims in other 
parts of India. He contended that the creation of Pakistan was imperative for the 
realization of this cultural autonomy of Pak-Bangla where its distinctive literature and 
language could flourish and words integral to the speech of Bengali Muslims such as 
“allah-khuda, haj-zakat, ibadat-bandagi, wazu-goshol, khana-pani” would not be 
shunned by littérateurs and universities as “foreign”. Pak-Bangla literature’s relationship 
to Bengali literature was, for him, structurally the same as the relationship between Irish 
literature and English literature – in short, the former could not realize itself without 
asserting its independence against the oppression of the later.182 Clearly, Pak-Bangla 
literary activism was drawing on ideas already popularized by institutions such as 
Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Samiti, which in turn had drawn its energies from the 
political affect generated by the praja movement at a grass-roots level.  	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Even in the domain of party politics, following Mansur Ahmed’s defection to the 
Muslim League in 1944 there was a slew of defections from the Praja Party, which 
included Abdullahel Baqi, Hasan Ali, Shamshuddin Ahmed, former Praja Party Secretary 
and its former assistant secretary, Nurul Islam Chowdhury.183 Ahead of the crucial 1946 
elections, where success would establish the Muslim League as the sole spokesperson of 
the Muslims in Bengal, Abul Mansur Ahmed was appointed the publicity secretary of the 
Bengal Provincial Muslim League. Under his supervision, from the Central Election 
Committee office in Calcutta posters were printed with slogans that had emerged in the 
crucible of the praja movement in Bengal, which read: “the land belongs to the tiller”, 
“abolition of permanent settlement without compensation”, “the worker is the owner”, 
“People’s Pakistan”, “Pakistan belongs to peasants and workers”.184 These posters were 
sent out to far-flung mofussil towns and villages. In areas with a history of strong praja 
movements such slogans readily gained in popularity, and contributed to the 
overwhelming electoral success of the League in 1946. 
Faisal Devji has argued that Jinnah’s idea of Pakistan as a Muslim nation was a 
“pure abstraction” that worked for a thorough erasure of religion as it was lived in 
“nature and history”. For Jinnah and the Muslim League, according to Devji, “Muslim” 
remained a juridical rather than a phenomenological category. In other words, the 
demand for a Muslim nation was a matter of the “right” of the Muslims and not how they 
inhabited their religion, because the business of inhabiting religion was itself tricky, and, 
ultimately, ridden with energies that were potentially more divisive and differentiated 
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than with the unifying forces needed to build a constituency.185 Contra Devji, in this 
chapter, I have attempted to show that the success of the League in the 1946 elections 
which established it as a credible mouthpiece of Bengali Muslims were due, at least in 
part, to phenomenological densities that had accumulated in colonial Bengal’s Muslim 
society via practices and ideas popularized by the praja movement, which coded 
specifically Islamic dispositions to spiritual discipline alongside experiences of 
discrimination faced as Muslim qua Muslim in secular, non-sectarian terms, thus shaping 
ideas of Bengali Muslim self and community in relation to specific pressures exerted by 
colonialism. I hypothesize that such an approach is fruitful in showing the manner in 
which the territorial nation, not as a thing but as a relationship between the nation-state 
and the individual citizen, far from being an outcome of abstract juridical conceptions of 
an individual (Muslim) citizen-subject rightfully inhabiting a (Muslim) nation, was 
historically an outcome of concrete practices of religio-cultural and political assertions 
through which regionally specific colonial conditions were negotiated and inhabited.  
Yet the figure of the individual abstracted from social bonds, as it were, coming 
together to demand a nation would indeed become a claim quite central to the cultural 
politics of Pakistanism in Bengal; such claim would be raised primarily by literary 
organizations committed to articulating the demand for Pakistan such as East Pakistan 
Renaissance Society and Purba Pakistan Sahitya Samsad that were developing in the 
1940s. This praxis of abstraction was hardly an invention of such organizations, which 
were essentially drawing their energies from literary and religious discourses, and 	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institutions developing since the 1920s. My point however is quite simple: the praxis of 
abstraction – whose nature will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter – 
had to acquire phenomenological density, i.e., it had to be inhabited. In the next chapter, I 
delve into how this habitation became possible.   
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CHAPTER 4 
The Cultural Politics of the Pakistan Demand: Islam, Egalitarianism 
and the Individual in Bengali Muslim Literary Praxis 
 
The Pakistan movement in Bengal has been typically understood in terms of the failure of 
class mobilization in the 1920s and the subsequent triumph of religious-communal 
consciousness among the Bengali Muslims. Existing historical scholarship has viewed 
the demand for Pakistan as a parochial and communal demand.186 But archives bearing 
records of the literary-cultural activism of Bengali Pakistanism bring to light a 
completely different picture – the demand for Pakistan was hailed as a revolutionary 
movement, a people’s movement which, far from being parochial, sectional, or 
communal, was seen to be a blow to imperialist tendencies that inhered within 
nationalism. Indeed, for Bengali Muslim cultural activists and littérateurs, the idea of 
Pakistan implied a more robust variety of nationalism – one committed to diversity, 
redistributive justice, and conducive to the flowering of myriad forms of self-expression. 
This chapter attempts to show how a subjectivity that could inhabit the Pakistan 
movement as a non-sectarian, “people’s movement” in the 1940s was historically 
instantiated.   
Literary Separatism and Non-sectarian Nationalism: A paradox of Bengali Muslim 
Culture 
The fifth meeting of the Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Sammelan (Bengali Muslim Literary 
Conference) was held in Albert Hall, Calcutta in 1932. It was a three-day long affair 	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featuring most of the prominent Bengali Muslim litterateurs, journalists, and intellectuals, 
as well as aspiring writers and educationists from far-flung mofussil towns.  In 1932, for 
the first time in the history of the Bengali Muslim Literary Conference, the presence of 
key members of the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad (Bengal’s Literary Association) was 
noticeable. One reason for this could be the fact that the 1932 meet was happening in 
Calcutta, the home city of the Parishad, whereas earlier such meetings were held in places 
such as Chattagram in Eastern Bengal, and Bashirhat in North 24 Parganas. But the 
enthusiasm of the Parishad members cannot be adequately explained by the proximity of 
the conference venue alone, for Bengali Muslim Literary Conferences were held in 
Calcutta twice before – for the first time in 1914, and then once again in 1925.  
In providing a very brief gloss on the Parishad, suffice it to say that in 1872 John 
Beams had proposed the institution of a Bengali Academy of Literature in order to 
consolidate the Bengali language into a “literary language” to make it at par with “other 
European languages”. The academy was set up in 1893 and renamed Bangiya Sahitya 
Parishad in 1894.187 The Parishad was committed to the project of forging a coherent 
national/linguistic identity. An avowed purpose of the Parishad was to reconstruct a 
history for the Bengalis through the building of a Bengali literary canon by recovering 
texts, archiving them, and disseminating them through publications. The importance of 
this institution cannot be overstated, for not only did it quickly evolve into a key site that 
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mediated the emergence of national consciousness in Bengal,188 it was the model after 
which, in 1911, the Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Samiti (Bengali Muslim Literary 
Association) was established with the express agenda of  “cultivating learning and debate 
about Bangla literature among the Muslims of Bengal”, “translating important historical 
and religious texts from Arabic, Persian, and Urdu into Bengali”, “recovering and 
archiving the history of literary production by Muslims in Bengal”, “publishing 
periodicals suitable for the Bengali Muslim society”, “the fostering of communal amity 
between Hindus and Muslims in the sphere of literature” and “ encouraging all the key 
literary figures of Bengal to become its members”.189 
To return to the year 1932, the day after the fifth meet of the Bengali Muslim 
Literary Conference ended, its chairs and organizers were invited by the Parishad 
members to visit the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad Bhavan, which they did, and were warmly 
greeted at the door. Abul Kalam Shamshuddin, a journalist, recounts how they were 
escorted to the hall on the second floor of the Bhavan along a staircase on both sides of 
which hung large, impressive oil paintings of writers and poets from the past and present 
who were supposed to have shaped the course of Bengali literature. Shamshuddin also 
recounts the pain of having noticed only one Muslim litterateur displayed in the 
Parishad’s stairway gallery – that of Mir Mosharaff Hossain, the author of the novel 
Bishad Sindhu (Sea of Sorrows). Abul Kalam Shamshuddin tells us how the Parishad 
members began with showering great praise for the Bengali Muslim Literary Conference 
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and then, ultimately, pleaded the conference organizers and members to co-operate with 
the endeavors of the Bangiya Sahitya Parisad (Bengal’s Literary Association) and join the 
institution, at which point Abul Hussain – a professor of Dhaka University, a founder of 
the Muslim Sahitya Samaj, (Muslim Literary Society) a prolific writer, polemicist, and 
public intellectual of sorts – made a speech in response, defending the need for a separate 
space for the development of Bengali Muslim literature.190 The text of this speech was 
published in the journal Navya Bharat in 1933 under the heading “Sahitye Swatantro” or 
“Autonomy in Literature”.  
The proposal to merge with the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad was first raised in the 
Bengali Muslim Literary Conference by the chemist, academic, and entrepreneur, P.C 
Ray, and later seconded by other Parishad members.  Responding to implicit charges of 
separatism in the sphere of literary activities, couched though they were in the language 
of invitation and harmony, Abul Hussain furnished several arguments for the Bengali 
Muslim community’s need to maintain a separate space for the development of Bengali 
literature. What made this defense of Bengali Muslim autonomy, or “separatism”, in the 
sphere of literary or broadly cultural productions striking was that Hussain had, in the 
previous year (1931), forcefully argued against the institution of separate electorates 
(self-contained electoral constituencies) for Muslims in the political sphere. At a 
gathering of Bengali Muslim intellectuals at Dhaka University’s Muslim Sahitya Samaj, 
Abul Hussain denounced the protectionism inherent in separate electorates as essentially 
enervating the Muslim community, making it dependent on institutional concessions won 
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from the British. He allayed fears of Hindu majoritarianism at an all-India level by stating 
that the power to govern was not a function of numbers, but a matter of intellect, 
knowledge, and strength of character by which one could govern oneself. According to 
him, since modernity privileged ganashakti or “people’s power” as the life of the state, 
sovereignty had been parceled out to individuals. He wrote: 
 The state is an expression of the people, and thus government is accountable to 
them and has to heed their advice on how to govern, and in this regime of power, 
since the people are participants in their own governance, the ‘greater personality 
of the individual’ (brihattara bektitva) is realized.191  
Joint electorates, he argued, would routinely create situations where candidates would 
have to seek votes from the people, not from Muslims or Hindus, and the voter would 
learn to exercise his judgment on what is good or bad and in so doing he would train and 
develop his own intellect and personality. This development of the voter’s individuality, 
he claimed, “is the most instructive part of elections.”192  
And yet, if joint electorates were, in Hussain’s assessment, desirable and worthy of 
welcome, why was he so quick to decline the Parishad’s overtures of a shared literary 
institution? According to him:  
There are some community-specific problems, for instance, the state of madrasa 
education, the mode of transmitting Koran and Hadith, as well as sundry other 
social problems. Hindus would not venture to take a public stand on these matters. 
Our young (Muslim) writers are engaged in vigorous discussions on the issue. … 
Literature is a matter of feelings. In a specific kind of environment feelings 
(anubhuti) can be concentrated. By channelizing those feelings, our community’s 
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problems could be solved. So we need a specific kind of environment, a separate 
institution. If we merge with you, our feelings will not be activated. 193 
What we see emerging is a vision of the individual as a locus of feelings (anubhuti), in 
that sense, for Abul Hussain, the argument for separateness in literary activity was an 
argument in favor of training individuality, just as voting in joint electorates was. But this 
individuality, as an active literary cultivation of the self, required a specific environment 
– a sense of being embedded in a culture. Where ganashakti or “people’s power” was the 
touchstone of political sovereignty, “people” was defined by the ineffable and abstractly 
equal capacity of each individual for autonomy or free choice. The “people” thus 
represented an ideal, a vision of individual autonomy, rationality, and choice that stood 
apart from the social bonds that constituted “society”. In this scheme of things, separate 
electorates as state-given concessions marked precisely those social bonds that prevented 
the exercise of autonomy, rationality and free choice.  But the real training ground for the 
‘enchanted self’ – the fount of rationality, autonomy and free choice – was seen to be in 
the cultivation of literature and culture, or more precisely it was in forging a subjectivity 
that inhabited “Muslim culture” in the best sense of the phrase, as he understood it. 
Hussain wrote several treatises on Muslim culture – notable among these were essays 
titled “Muslim Kalcar” (Muslim Culure), “Muslim Kalcar’er Dhara” (The Path of 
Muslim Kalcar), and “Muslim Kalcar O Tar Darshanic Bhitti” (The Philosophical 
Foundation of Muslim Culture). In “Muslim Kalcar” he writes, “ modern Europe is 
indebted to Islam for its cultural achievements. Enlightened Europe did not gain much 
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from the church. In the hands of the church, the learned were oppressed, tortured, and 
burnt at the stakes”. Also, for him it is telling that:  
Western nations expanded their mental horizons by divorcing themselves from 
religion. But for the Muslims, the reverse is true. In shunning religion they 
became blind and superstitious. The truth is that prior to the advent of Islam, 
openness (oaudarjo) was never preached as an essential part of religion.194 
 In the manner of Hussain, several Bengali Muslim writers from the 1920s onward tried 
to forge a representation of Muslim culture that was inherently rational, open, and 
devoted to redistributive justice.  
Interestingly, while in the sphere of political and social activism figures such as 
Akram Khan, Muzaffar Ahmed, Nazrul Islam, Abul Hussain were of vastly differing 
stripes ranging from the religious reformist-Muslim Leaguer (Akram Khan) to the 
avowed communist-Communist Party of India founder member (Muzaffar Ahmed), with 
varying and often conflicting views on social and political questions, all of them 
converged on the need for a separate literary space (in terms of associations and 
institutions) for Bengali Muslims.  And collectively they redefined Muslim culture in 
ways that could be made congruous with current ideas about political sovereignty whose 
source was the “people”. 
Joya Chatterjee’s work has shown how in the context of reacting to what was seen 
as the unfair arrangement put forth by the Communal Award (1932) in which of the 250 
seats in the proposed Bengal Legislative Assembly, 80 seats where given to Hindus and 
119 to Muslims, bhadraloks’s (the Hindu genteel class’s) self-perception of being a 
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cultured elite acquired new significance.195 Among many such memorials submitted to 
the Government, one widely read memorial forwarded by the Raja of Burdwan and 
signed by the good and great of Bengal including Rabindranath Tagore, the novelist Sarat 
Chandra Chattopadhyay, the philosopher Brajendranath Seal, and the chemist-
entrepreneur academic P.C Roy (who in 1932 had proposed the merger of the Bengali 
Muslim Literary Association with the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad) drew Governor 
Zetland’s attention to:	  
The enormous predominant part (the Hindus of Bengal) … have played under the 
British in the intellectual, the cultural, the political, the professional, and the 
commercial life of the province … The Hindus of Bengal, though numerically a 
minority, are overwhelmingly superior culturally, constituting as much as 64 per 
cent of the literate population … while their economic preponderance is equally 
manifest in the spheres of independent professions.196 
The memorialists to Lord Zetland also “begged leave” to make the claim that “the Hindus 
of Bengal, though numerically a minority, are overwhelmingly culturally superior”. The 
argument was that the cultural superiority of the Hindus more than outweighed the 
numerical majority of the “backward” Muslims and entitled Hindus to a share of power in 
the Provincial Assembly far in excess of their numbers. Thus putative cultural superiority 
was the central idiom of bhadralok communalism, which ostensibly justified the demands 
of a minority elite for political power in an era of expanding mass franchise and majority 
rule. Not only was this argument an explicit rejection of democratic principles, it bore a 
striking resemblance to British legitimations of colonialism, which argued that racial 
superiority made Britons more “fit” to rule India than Indians themselves. Thus, 
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beginning in the 1920s, Hindu discontent with the Bengal Pact, proposed by C.R Das, 
arose from the perception that Muslims were being massively over-represented in the 
Provincial Council (under dyarchy) as well as in government employment, and the 
intensification of this discontent in the post-Communal Award phase in the 1930s, were 
expressed as arguments for greater share in political power in ways which constantly 
veered away from ideas of popular sovereignty, people’s mandate, democratic principles. 
These were arguments in favor of making political power a function of superiority in the 
sphere of culture, intellect, and acumen for commercial activity. In some ways, this was a 
throwback to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century presuppositions about 
political representation as evinced in the thought and writings of the likes of prominent 
Muslim public personalities such as Ameer Ali and Nawab Abdul Latif (discussed in 
chapter 2). But within the Bengali Muslim community, by the 1920s, such premises were 
becoming increasingly untenable as legitimate prerequisites for political representation.  
Bengali Muslim literary production from the 1920s on, increasingly enabled the 
creation of subjectivities that could inhabit the enchanted idea of “the people” with great 
vigor.  The idea of the “people” as it came to be instantiated in Bengali Muslim 
imagination can be seen as an effect of two broadly defined strands of thought operating 
within society – one, the Ahl-i Hadis style normative reformist tradition, exemplified by 
influential figures such as Akram Khan who emphasized going back to the Koran and the 
hadith – the “original text” – and doing away with mediation of commentaries, exegesis 
and hand-holding pirs (spiritual guides). In his essay “Back to the Koran”, he stated in no 
uncertain terms that it was heart-rending that to become a maulavi did not require a 
thorough study of the Koran, and even those who considered themselves learned in 
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Islamic theology, were more familiar with texts such as Jaygun Hanifa (an eighteenth 
century Bengali romance) than with the Koran. “In our society” he asked, “ how many 
maulavis are able to say with sincerity that their study of the Koran is a tenth of their 
study of jurisprudence… and the principles of the jurisprudence?”197 Cutting out 
mediation (of pirs or fiqh) presupposed an individual with the capacity to read and 
understand, thereby extricating the individual from the social within which he/she was 
embedded, and empowering the individual with an ineffable essence via which one could 
get to truth by protecting reason from the corrupting influence of “society”.  The other 
strand was relatively novel, that of apocalyptic poetry and prose combining the trope of 
revolution with unfettered individualism in Nazrul Islam’s avant-garde literary 
experiments of the early 1920s. This image of revolution was inspired by socialialism, 
emerging hot in the heels of the Bolshevik revolution, but it also pointed, no less 
fundamentally, to a personal liberation of the individual. In some ways, Nazrul remained 
a liminal figure around whom contrary camps formed amongst the Bengali Muslim 
literati and reading public. Yet, the debates which took place about the value of Nazrul’s 
work can be read for the visions of “Muslim culture” that were at stake. I will discuss his 
works, the debates they spawned and his dwellings on the fringes of leftist politics as well 
as Muslim society in the subsequent section to trace a long history of subjectivity that 
materialized as the effect of his kind of literary practice. It is the argument of this chapter 
that Nazrul’s literary practice inaugurated a subjectivity among the Bengali Muslim 
literati that could inhabit Pakistan as a revolutionary movement, a people’s movement, 	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and thus combat allegations of communalism, parochialism, and separatism. In effect, 
left-minded intellectuals were drawn to the movement and spoke in its favor.  What made 
this possible, I argue, was the specific way in which Islam, individualism, and 
communism/socialism/egalitarianism were conjoined in Nazrul’s literary oeuvre, which 
spanned the two decades that preceded the Pakistan movement.  
In 1943, Abul Mansur Ahmed, the praja (tenant movement) activist, writer, and at 
the time a Muslim Leaguer, a key mouthpiece of the Pakistan demand in the 1940s 
published an essay titled “Pakistan-er Biplobi Bhumika” or  “Pakistan’s Revolutionary 
Role” in the journal Mohammadi. This essay is telling in the way in which communism 
and individualism are made reconcilable, a maneuver that was key to articulating claims 
of Pakistan as a revolutionary, anti-imperialist movement, but a revolution compatible 
with liberal democracy style popular mandate.  Abul Mansur is a particularly interesting 
character because for a long time he remained skeptical of the Pakistan movement, 
viewing it as communal, and was suspicious of the Muslim League and especially of 
Jinnah. This in spite of the fact that the leftist M.N Roy had already expressed his 
sympathy for the cause of Pakistan, visited the gatherings of the East Pakistan 
Renaissance Society (EPRS) (an organization set up as a cultural wing of the Pakistan 
movement in Bengal), and other non-Muslim communists such as Bankim Mukherjee, 
Somnath Sarkar, Gopal Halder and Anil Kanjilal followed suit in establishing 
relationships of camaraderie with the EPRS.198 When two founder members of the EPRS, 
Mujibur Rahman and Abul Kalam Shamshuddin, visited Abul Mansur in his Calcutta 
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residence to discuss the possibility of his joining the EPRS, he politely turned them away. 
But soon enough he was there at the EPRS office.199 Abul Mansur’s essay “Pakistan’s 
Revolutionary Role” is possibly a good entry point into working out the reason for this 
change of heart, as it were.  
 In the essay Abul Mansur made an important analytical distinction between the 
origins of the Pakistan movement and its potential. The origin, he averred, was from “a 
clash of bhadralok Hindus and bhadralok Muslims” that stemmed from their inability to 
agree on a satisfactory power-sharing arrangement. In that sense, the origin was 
“reactionary”, lowly – essentially a “conflict of ruling interests”.  Yet notwithstanding the 
origins, he emphasized, the conflict had the potential to unsettle status quo and “lead us 
(sic) along the revolutionary road”. According to him, socialist elements within the 
Congress Party had completely failed to challenge the imperialist-fascist tendencies that 
inhered within the idea of “Akhanda Bharat” or “Undivided India” which the Congress 
bandied about as synonymous with “nationalism”. Only the idea of Pakistan had 
successfully shaken up the foundations of that imperialism. The idea of “Akhanda 
Bharat” was fascist in the same way as the colonizers and dictators were, in that it 
demanded the creation of individuals who were uniform, not individuals who were equal 
but different. To quote him: 
Are the expressions of individuality uniform or multiform? That is the conflict 
between fascism and democracy.  This is also the difference between the all-
powerful Allah and the all-powerful dictator. Allah has not created uniformity, 
but a strange, beautiful world and variegated humankind (adam jati). The dictator 	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wants to break this multiform-ness and cast the world in monochrome. The 
dictator wants to recast the world in his own image, in the image of his liking. 
Thus, this uniformity is only external, a superficial thing. The difference is 
between “like me” and “equal to me” – there’s a big difference between the two. 
The aim of the dictator is not equality but uniformity – in short, an institution of 
copies, which is another name for an institution of ghulami (slavery). 
Like the creation of Allah, democracy allows multiform individualism to flourish. 
In this variety, it seeks to build unity, equality, and brotherhood. Lack of 
democracy has affected both the material and spiritual dimensions of humanity.  
So we see that the dictator or the imperialists have not merely seized the lands of 
people, but also tried to destroy the homes of their minds. They steal material 
goods and thought commodities (bhav panno) brought on the ship called 
“civilization” and sold as “education”. This process has ensured that imperialism 
has not only destroyed artisanal skills but also destroyed culture or tamaddun. The 
greater the spread of imperialism, the more it destroys the multiform, the 
heterogeneous, and the varied forms of Khuda’s creations. Possibilities of self-
creation and self-expression have been constricted.200 
For Abul Mansur, the idea of Pakistan was a challenge to the fascist drive toward 
uniformity that killed self-expression and individual fulfillment.  According to him, the 
idea of Pakistan not only had the potential to restore the natural order of variegated 
splendor with which Allah had endowed the world, it also resembled the ultimate aim of 
communism, which contrary to what its detractors believed, was actually the flowering of 
multiform and variegated self-expressions by ensuring that the pre-requisite for self-
fulfillment was the equality of wealth. He insisted that Marxists such as Lenin and Stalin 
had made the concept of patriotism – a Congress boogie – useless. Stalin, who Mansur 
Ahmed addressed as “comrade” had, in his opinion, build a huge conglomerate 
comprising parts of both Asia and Europe within which every culture had a right to self-
expression. The Pakistan movement, he declared, was revolutionary in that it was a 
hammer that struck hard at the heart of imperialist tendencies inherent within the idea of 	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“Akhanda Bharat” (Undivided India), and would ensure that Bharatvarsha emerged as a 
federated socialist conglomerate. In his own words:  
It (Pakistan) is not a communal demand of 10 crore Muslims – it is a national 
demand of religious, cultural, and geographical minorities (a minority co-
operative). It has raised hopes of self-determination in the hearts of the neglected 
and the oppressed, by giving them the slogan of azadi. In relation to revolution, 
this is Pakistan – it is not a revolutionary state, but a revolution in thought. The 
outcome of this revolution has to be beautiful.  On the remains of Akhanda 
Bharat, will be born a Bharat of new aspirations and heterogeneity.  In this 
bouquet will thrive many- colored cultures, civilizations, and literatures.201 
Well before Abul Mansur had joined the East Pakistan Renaissance Society (EPRS), the 
Society’s manifesto had declared that one of its primary aims was to counter 
“reactionary, and fascist anti-Pakistan trends in literature”. In addition, the manifesto 
mentioned the need to create a literature that could bring about Hindu-Muslim harmony 
via an internationalist perspective, even though the precise meaning and context of that 
internationalism remained unexplained.202 EPRS spoke in a language that was 
“progressive” and “non-sectarian”, and in its second major conference hosted at Islamia 
College Hall, Calcutta, in 1944, the sessions on Political Science and Folk Literature 
were chaired by non-Muslims, Professor Sushobhan Sarkar and Manoranjan 
Bhattacharya, respectively. For the cultural program of the conference, the organizers 
toured remote villages in the districts of Sylhet, Rangpur, Mymensingh, Comilla, and 
Chattagram scouting for folk performers who could showcase their talent through 
performances of jari gan, shari gan, bhatiyali, bhavaiyya, marfati and punthi path.203 The 
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literary-cultural energies for East Pakistan would not be marshaled from the city-based 
literati alone, but also from the myriad folk-oral traditions that were well and alive in the 
countryside, or so was the claim.  
In every way “tamaddun” (an Urdu word which the EPRS and Abul Mansur 
consciously employed to designate “culture”) was made congruous with the idea of “the 
people”, with “democracy”, and “samyavad” (used loosely to designate egalitarianism, 
communism, and socialism). Individuals who were committed to the ideology of 
Pakistanism – whether Muslim or not – were welcome to associate and exchange views. 
In a crucial sense, their individuality was abstracted from social groups as it were - of 
“caste”, “religion”, “village”, etc - that the British saw as the organizing principles of 
Indian polity. Very importantly, this association of individuals coming together as a 
“people” was made to closely approximate the natural order decreed by Allah. Thus the 
literati’s demand for Pakistan as “tamadduni azadi” or “cultural freedom” was put forth 
as a universal vision, not a sectional, particular, or narrowly partisan one.  
What was unique though about the literary-cultural activism devoted to the 
ideology of Pakistanism in Bengal was that this universal vision was arrived at through a 
dialectical process, at the interplay of two quite distinct understandings of the universal – 
the first, where individuals abstracted from their moorings in social particularities could 
come together as a nation through their commitment to an idea – namely, Pakistan, and 
the second, where a commitment to universality – a vision of Pakistan where members of 
all communities would be accorded equal dignity and rights – was rooted in the 
particularity of the “spirit of Islam”, and did not, in principal, require the erasure of this 
particularity but a realization of its nature. Abul Mansur, in a widely publicized address, 
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delivered in the EPRS in 1944, stated in no uncertain terms that the spirit of Islam was 
“Huq-Insaf” (truth and justice), “adhikar o samya” (rights and equality).204 Thus for him, 
“ (Pakistan) (was) not a communal demand of 10 crore Muslims – it (was) a national 
demand of religious, cultural, and geographical minorities (a minority co-operative).”  
At the peak of the Pakistan movement, the East Pakistan Renaissance Society 
declared Nazrul Islam as its cultural icon, the “national poet” of the soon-to-be-attained 
East Pakistan, and the first modern poet whose works, in capturing this distinctive 
Islamic sensibility oriented to rights and redistributive justice, resonated with the 
Muslims of Bengal in a way the “highly developed literature” of Tagore could not.205 
According to the literary figures associated with the EPRS, Tagore’s vision was 
essentially other-worldly, devotional, and renunciatory, born as it were from the 
“essence” of Hindu dharma which valued “bairagya”, “tyaga”, and “bhaktivad”, while 
the “spirit of Islam” was this-worldly, action-oriented, and committed to social justice. 
The credo “art for art’s sake” was firmly rejected by the EPRS; art, it was asserted, was 
for society.  To explain what society and justice-oriented literature precisely meant, the 
figure of the woman was taken up as an instructive example. Bengali Hindu literature, it 
was claimed, was populated with images of women who were either celebrated as 
exemplary devotees (for instance, the figure of Radha) or imagined as mysterious cities 
(rahasyapuri) whose ways and wiles the poet could never discover. Bengali literature, 
driven as it was by a Hindu aesthetic impulse, it was said, worshipped the widow as a sati 
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and a devi. But in the literature of East Pakistan, the woman would not be worshipped as 
a devi (goddess) but represented as a manabi (a female human), the widow would not be 
revered as a sati, but respected as a human being whose property rights had to be secured, 
and the woman’s heart (nari mon) was not to be won by navigating her wily and 
mysterious ways but by ensuring equality that was rightfully due to her. 206 
Although Nazrul Islam was held up as the literary icon of cultural autonomy 
(tamadduni azadi), which was the key demand of the literary-cultural politics of the 
Pakistan movement, in the 1920s when the maverick author-poet-singer shot to fame and 
notoriety, he was a deeply divisive figure. He evoked vastly contradictory responses from 
the Bengali Muslim literati and reading public – embraced as a “Mussalman” (Muslim) 
by some and denounced as a “Shaitan” (Satan) by others. He was known as the rebel 
poet, the iconoclast, and remained the object of suspicion for the British government. As 
late as 1941, a secret file of the Government of Bengal noted that his book Yugavani,  
Breathes bitter racial hatred directly against the British, preaches revolt against 
the existing administration in the country and abuses in very strong language ‘the 
slave-minded Indians’ who uphold the administration. Three articles – “Memorial 
to Dyer”, “Who was responsible for the massacre?” and “Shooting the Black 
Men” are especially objectionable. I don’t think it would be advisable to remove 
the ban on this book in the present crisis. On the whole it is a dangerous book, 
forceful and vindictive.207 
But in 1942, the very year that the East Pakistan Renaissance Society was instituted, 
Nazrul had begun to show severe signs of physical affliction. He lost his mental balance, 
his voice, and slipped rapidly into amnesia.  His condition was diagnosed as “advanced 
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207 As cited in Arun Kumar Basu’s Nazrul Jeevani, (Calcutta, 2000), p. 437. 
	   155	  
organic dementia, with loss of speech, agitation, and uncontrolled personal habits.”208  
Henceforth, he would completely disappear from public life. During the time that the 
Pakistan movement peaked in Bengal, he was languishing in a mental asylum, somewhat 
forgotten and unattended. Later in post-colonial East Pakistan, during Ayub Khan’s 
regime, the government set up a Nazrul Academy in Dhaka whose objective was to 
present Nazrul as a “Muslim nationalist” who had worked to promote the “culture and 
integrity of Pakistan on the basis of Islamic traditions and heritage.” In 1970, Yahya 
Khan was invited by the Academy to preside over Nazrul’s birth anniversary where he 
sought to establish Nazrul as the father of Pakistani nationalism in East Pakistan.  Bengali 
Marxists of erstwhile East Pakistan led by Badruddin Umar reacted sharply to such 
efforts of appropriating Nazrul to narrow, state-sponsored ends, much in the manner in 
which they had along with such intellectuals such as Abul Mansur opposed the ban on the 
broadcast of Tagore’s songs from Radio Pakistan that followed in the wake of the Indo-
Pak war of 1965. 209 
It is not that Nazrul – an iconoclast, whose very self-fashioning was a rebellion 
(bidhroho) against bigotry and political orthodoxies of all sorts – was the literary 
progenitor of the Pakistan movement in some narrow sectarian sense. Far from it, his 
poetry gave expression to an energetic, unfettered individualism that refused to be bound 
up under neat little labels. In his own words: 
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New troops of “non-violents”, “non-cos” are cross with me 
“Violin of violence” – its radical they feel. 
“Moderate” - extremists say the charkha song give it away 
The pious find me agnostic, Confucian rest decree! 
Swarajis feel I oppose them, the others too feel uneasy! 
Men believe I close on women, women accuse of misogyny! 
“Been to billet ? Never?” the friend abroad is aghast with me! 
New Age Rabi, devotees say! 
Age or rage, poet of the day 
I stretch my lungs and think, well, 
That sure becomes me! 
Slept with my glasses on, much longer, more soundly.210 
 In the following section, I shall argue that he pioneered and made available a literary 
sensibility that combined individualism with socialism, personal liberation with an 
egalitarian ethos, which in effect created a subjectivity, a mode of being that could be 
inhabited by cultural activists and writers who were cultural spokespersons of the 
Pakistan demand in Bengal. And this sensibility, in turn, was crucial to making the claim 
that Pakistan -- far from being sectarian, communal, or separatist - was indeed a 
“people’s” movement. 
The Poetics of Samyavad and the Politics of Self-expression 
Nazrul’s short story “Byathar Daan” (“The Gift of Pain”), published in the tri-monthly 
periodical Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Patrika in 1919, was most likely his first piece of 
writing to appear in print.  At the time of its publication, Nazrul, a havildar in the 49th 
Bengal Regiment was posted in Karachi, where his life in the army lasted roughly a year 
and a half – from the end of 1917 to March 1920. All the way from Karachi he had 
mailed his story to Muzaffar Ahmed, the assistant editor of the Bangiya Musalman 
Sahitya Patrika  (Bengali Muslim Literary Magazine) who would later, upon Nazrul’s 	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return to Calcutta after the disbanding of the regiment, become his close friend, 
roommate, co-editor and interlocutor. 
 Although the manuscript of “Byathar Daan” reached the periodical’s office in 
1918, the story would not see light of day in print until the following year. Since the 
periodical did not have a fixed press, the editorial board decided that it would print the 
December issue (in which Nazrul’s short story was to be carried) from India Press located 
in Middle Road, Entally, which also printed a journal titled Grihasta run by the well-
known nationalist, Benoy Kumar Sarkar. With the manuscript of the issue, Muzaffar 
Ahmed met with Ramrakhal Ghose, the owner of India Press. At the time, it was 
customary for a press to minutely scrutinize the contents of the entire manuscript before 
agreeing to print it, primarily to ensure that the press was not endangering its own 
existence in any way by printing what in government parlance would be classified 
“seditious material”.  After combing the contents of the manuscript, which Ahmed had 
submitted for printing, the owner of the press politely returned it, congratulating the 
young assistant editor of the Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Patrika (BMSP) on the 
energetic patriotism of the short story “Byathar Daan” but declining the request to print it 
on the pretext of police surveillance on his press for its association with the revolutionary 
terrorist, Benoy Kumar Sarkar’s journal. Yet Ahmed, convinced of the merit of Nazrul’s 
writing would remain persistent in his efforts at getting it published.211  
Ahmed’s persistence would finally be rewarded, but not before he had made a 
critical editorial decision, imposed a censorship of sorts, made an elision that would stick 
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stubbornly to “Byathar Daan” through its life in many reprints - in anthologies, collected 
works, and omnibi. After a good forty-nine years from the time it first appeared in print, 
Ahmed in his book Kazi Nazrul Islam: Smritikatha (1965) – part reminiscence of his 
friendship with Nazrul, and in part his own assessment of the socio-historical import of 
the poet’s life and works – made clean breast of the editorial censorship he had imposed 
upon the story. He urged subsequent editors and publishers to return to “Byathar Daan” 
the two words from Nazrul’s original manuscript that he had made disappear with a 
proverbial scratch of the editorial pen. They words were “Lal Fauj” or “Red Army”.  In 
the story, Ahmed had changed Lal Fauj to Mukti Sevak Sainna Dal  (Army in Service of 
Freedom). 
Yet the work is not centrally about the Red Army or incitement to revolutionary 
activity; far from it, “Byathar Daan” is ostensibly a love story with a pair of pining 
lovers, circumstances that tear them apart, their all-consuming desire to be reunited, the 
pain of separation, the heroine’s self-perceived sense of moral failing at having “cheated” 
on her lover, lyrical laments bordering on the maudlin, and the failure of union when the 
opportunity presents itself.  It is a collage of first person narratives from three different 
voices – the protagonist Dara, who wanders half-crazed across Balochistan and 
Afghanistan looking for his lost lover; his ladylove Bedaura, who in waiting for Dara 
falters, as it were, and overtaken by sexual urges succumbs to the advances of one Saiful 
Mulk; and finally, Saiful who on witnessing the sufferings and moral dilemmas he has 
inflicted on the lovers, upon Dara’s return, is struck with great remorse and regret. Pangs 
of conscience lead Saiful to wander off to a far off place where he joins the Mukti Sevak 
Sainna Dal (The Army in Service of Freedom; the Red Army/Lal Fauj in Nazrul’s 
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original manuscript). He is at once amazed by how they embrace a foreigner like him and 
filled with admiration at the ways in which “ their great selfless desire is shoring up 
strength in the recesses of the universe”.212 In recognizing the army’s unbeatable will “to 
fight for the oppressed”, he becomes “one in a great collective of individuals 
(byektisangha)” – an act which assuages his personal guilt.213 Soon he discovers that 
Dara, pained by the Bedaura’s inconstancy, has also driven himself to this distant land 
and joined the Mukti Sevaks. He has been fighting courageously, if somewhat recklessly, 
with guns, grenades, and bombs, without sparing a thought for his own safety. His 
recklessness, ultimately, results in blindness when splinters from a grenade enter his eyes. 
Finally, he has to retire from the army. In bidding farewell to the valiant Dara, the 
commander-in-chief of the Mukti Sevaks says, “Khuda is great and good deeds shall be 
rewarded!” – this is a saying from your very own Koran. O valiant soldier, perhaps in the 
depth of your physical blindness sleeps a restful peace. May peace be upon you!”214 The 
blind Dara returns to Gulistan where Bedaura still awaits him. In his blindness, he has 
achieved the gift of forgiveness – toward both Saiful Mulk and Bedaura. In his loss of 
sight, Dara has achieved a vision – a vision of love that is unselfish, beyond the body. 
Unsurprisingly, he expresses this newfound vision in the text with song lines of Tagore’s 
composition: 
 If you love another, if you do not return, 
Still, may all you desire be granted to you, 
 May a world of sorrows be granted to me! 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Kazi Nazrul Islam Rachanasamagra, Vol. 1 (Kolkata: Pashchimbanga Bangla 
Academy, 2005), p. 258. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid., p. 259. 
	   160	  
For you are who I desire, you are all I have in this world.215 
 
He returns to Gulistan to tell Bedaura that he is convinced of the purity of her love – a 
purity untouched by all outward action – but refuses union with her, choosing to retire to 
the other side of the waterfall by which she lives. On another side, Bedaura carries on 
with her life, bearing their separation as a gift of pain (byathar daan) from Dara.  
“Byathar Daan” was a particularly significant work of Bengali Muslim literary 
modernity primarily because it inaugurated the practice of effecting abstraction in a 
manner that would transmit itself into a distinctly new mode of politics, and become the 
hallmark of the literary-cultural politics of Bengali Pakistanism as espoused by 
institutions such as the East Pakistan Literary Society in the 1940s. In “Byathar Daan”, 
at the heart of Dara’s judgment of the purity of Bedaura’s love, despite her outward 
actions, lay a conceptualization of personhood whose meaning and worth derived from 
intentions and feelings located firmly in the internal realm, and abstracted, as it were, 
from the social in which she/he operates. In being represented thus, that this interiority 
gave the woman a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis society was not unimportant. Its legacy 
would impact the literary-cultural activism of the Pakistan movement in Bengal by 
creating the conditions of possibility for upholding the “manabi” (the female human) as 
an equal claimant to the nation of East Pakistan. 
Now to return to the curious life of Byathar Daan in print: though the appearance 
of the Mukti Sevaks occurs somewhat briefly in the story and features in rather general 
terms without specifying where the battle is happening or against what kind of 
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oppressors, it is hardly surprising that Muzaffar Ahmed would anticipate the extent of 
alarm which a mention of “Lal Fauj” (Red Army) in print would raise in government 
circles. In the colonial Indian state, anti-Bolshevik surveillance networks were already in 
place by the 1919, and their institution could be traced back to the closing years of the 
First World War, even though it was not until 1921 that the Bolsheviks were actually 
trying to send back ex-muhajirs and other emissaries into India to organize and establish 
contacts with networks sympathetic to communist ideas. As Suchetana Chattopadhyay 
has pointed out, high-powered inter-departmental committees were put in place in India, 
British Conservatives as a whole, and Churchill in particular ensured that significant 
financial resources were mobilized to combat the “Bolshevik Menace” in the British 
Empire. In Bengal, P.C Bramford was appointed to the new post of the “Anti-Bolshevik 
Officer” created to monitor suspicious activities at a provincial level. He ordered special 
surveillance in the industrial suburbs of Calcutta, and his query on methods of keeping 
watch were circulated in the districts of Hooghly, 24 Parganas and Howrah to 
Superintendents of Police in charge of district intelligence. Muzaffar Ahmed was 
obviously aware of these developments.216 He wrote: 
After the October Revolution, the Indian government revamped its intelligence 
departments. The provincial branches became more active in acting according to 
the orders of the Central Intelligence Department. They did not want any news of 
the October Revolution to reach India. Yet we know that news of the October 
Revolution and the Red Army had reached the army camps in Karachi.   
During the publication of “Byathar Daan”, I made the editorial decision of 
replacing the words “Red Army” with “Mukti Sevak Sainna Dal”. The police of 
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Red Army. Moreover, Nazrul was then a soldier in the 49th Bengali Regiment; the 
army would not tolerate it either.217 
As mentioned before, at the time of publication and for a long period of time thereafter, 
Nazrul’s mention of the Bolshevik revolution in “Byathar Daan” remained unknown to 
his readers. But it is interesting to note that in the author’s own imagination, as the story 
reveals, there was no contradiction between the principles of Islam and the practitioners 
of communism. Thus the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, to his mind, could 
credibly bid farewell to Dara by iterating sayings from the Koran.  
Elsewhere, however, the assertion that Islam had no conflict with socialist 
principles had to be defended with arguments, and could not simply be assumed or stated. 
In dispelling the idea that socialism was atheistic and an enemy of Islam, an idea that 
seemed to have currency among some Muslims, Langal (The Plough), the journal co-
edited by Nazrul and Muzaffar Ahmed, reprinted a summary of the speech made by the 
poet and journalist Hazrat Mohani at a conference on socialism.218 In his speech, Hazrat 
Mohani set out to debunk three myths about socialism – first, that the path to socialism 
was always a violent one; second, that socialists were against personal property, and, 
finally, that socialism or samyavad was the enemy of Islam. He countered allegations that 
violence necessarily preceded a socialist revolution by stating that the path to socialism 
was not always a violent one, although according to communist understandings, 
Gandhian non-violence was not the only legitimate path either. In dispelling fears of 
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arguing that communists and socialists were against “private” property, not “personal” 
property, thus they are against the private ownership of everything that was a daan (gift) 
from God – air, water, and most significantly, land. With regard to the alleged 
contradiction between Islam and Communism, Mohani remarked: 
Some Muslim leaders have alleged that Samyavad is the enemy of Islam. Quiet to 
the contrary, it is only Islam that is a greater oppositional force to dhaniktantra 
(Plutocracy) than samyavad…According to Islam, even if a single soul remains 
hungry, the wealthy have no right to accumulate wealth. This is the reason zakat 
has been made mandatory. In the Koran, zakat occupies a position second only to 
the duty of namaz. The first Caliph declared jihad against those that refused to 
give zakat.219 
Islam was posited squarely as the religion of redistributive justice – not merely 
compatible with socialism (samyavad), but indeed as a greater and older force for the 
destruction of plutocracy in the world. 
 In Nazrul’s poem Samyavadi, first published in 1925, the rich were shown to be 
indebted to the poor – indebted to their labor, which build mansions and roads, ran trains 
and steamships; the rich had to repay their debt through the realization of an apocalyptic 
vision of the universality of man. This apocalyptic vision was artistically conveyed in 
imageries of excess – of an energetic unhinging of doors of the heart, of ripping off 
blindfold and outward skin, of exposing oneself to unruly winds from the sky: 
Tell, whose gift this is! Your mansion/is brick-red with whose blood? Tear off 
that blindfold and read their names scripted on the bricks/You still do not know, 
but every speck of dust on the streets do/the meaning of these highways, the ships, 
the trains, the mansions. 
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The big day is fast approaching/ by the day your debt increases, you’ll have to 
repay!...You sleep upstairs as we toil downstairs/ and still call you the “Lord”, 
that’s a false trust you keep/ Those whose minds and bodies are moist with 
affections of the earth/this world-boat’s ors shall remain with them/…Break open 
the rusty-hinged doors of your heart/ take off that dress of painted skin!/ the winds 
from the sky that have coagulated into a thick blue/ let them in as they rush pell-
mell through the unhinged doors of your heart/…Stand in this estuary and listen 
to that song of union/the humiliation of one man/ is shame brought upon universal 
man and mankind!/ the universal man rises/ as God smiles from above and the 
shaitan trembles beneath!220 
Interestingly, Nazrul’s revolutionary vision was all encompassing – it included the 
awakening of the consciousness in the builder of mansions and steam-ships to the worth 
of their labor, but equally included the realization of the worth of labor in the usurpers 
being. Since both the haves and the have-nots were agentive (in terms of an awakening of 
consciousness) in Nazrul’s artistic universe, the vision was not sectional, but universal. 
Socialism was imagined as a post-apocalyptic moment steeped in an egalitarian ethos 
arrived at through the vision of the rise of “universal man”.  But socialism, in Nazrul’s 
poetic universe, was also an un-secularized moment invoking the Islamic imagery of the 
trembling “shaitan” (Satan).  
In Dhumketu, the journal Nazrul edited in the early 1920s, he wrote fiery 
editorials, which appeared as clarion calls for class revolution.  In the third issue of 
Dhumketu (The Comet), his editorial titled “Rudra Mangal” (Song of Destruction) was 
addressed to what he saw as the productive force of the nation – namely, workers and 
peasants. He advocated a vision of national liberation through the uprising of this 
productive force. He urged them to bring down the palaces of the oppressors, to strike at 
oppression with their hammers and ploughs. Interestingly, this apocalyptic vision of 
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revolutionary tumult conflated class revolution with national liberation, the violent 
upsurge of workers and peasants with the tour de force of anti-colonial struggle. The 
iconography of the nation as a mother, encapsulated in the slogan “Bande Mataram” 
(worship the mother) and made popular by the Swadeshi movement at the turn of the 
twentieth century, was invoked by Nazrul to channelize affect. Class revolution and 
national liberation were posited as matters of saving the honor of Mother India. To quote 
from this editorial:  
Look at a population of 33 crores Indian languishing in deep darkness while their 
mother, naked and helpless, is being dragged through the streets and whipped. 
Rise O People (jago janashakti)! O my neglected, and walked-on peasant, O 
laboring brothers, may the plough in your hand shine with rage and blaze in the 
sky. Let it upturn this world of oppression! Bring your hammer – break down the 
palace of the oppressor! Let the head of the bloodsucker roll in dust! Strike the 
hammer and move the plough! Raise high the red flag that has been reddened with 
the blood of your breast! Those that have forced you under their feet, bring them 
under yours! Drown their arrogance in their tears. Bring them to your feet. Drag 
them down by their hair. Their walls are made of the blood, flesh and marrow of 
your ancestors; their grace comes from the tears of your grihalakshmi (wife) and 
wringing at the heart of your infant. Burn down their graces and appearances with 
the poison of your curse. My oppressed brothers and sisters, say: 
Jai Vaibhav, jai shankar 
jai jai pralayankar.221 
Nazrul’s editorial was audacious not only in calling for a class/anti-colonial revolution 
but also in the Hindu imagery and Sanskritized words he used without regard for the 
ways in which the Bengali language had become politicized during this time. Nazrul 
indiscriminately used Sanskritized words and Hindu imagery – “Shankar” is another 
name of the Hindu god Shiva, “Vaibhav” a Sanskrit word for prosperity, and 
“pralanyankar”, a Sankritized form meaning the god of destruction.  	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Noted reformers such as Akram Khan and sections of the Muslim clergy wrote 
treatises and issued fatwas about words and ideas that they deemed un-Islamic and 
advocated that such words be shunned from the Bengali Muslim literary corpus and, 
even, political sloganeering. Anxieties about language were curiously at its peak among 
the ulema (clergy) in the early 1920s when Hindu-Muslim unity was both a political 
necessity and a political reality in Bengal during the Khilafat movement, and political 
action spilled over from the realm of formal politics to the level of a mass movement 
engulfing moffusil towns and distant villages alike. Gandhi’s support of the cause of the 
Khilafat had, in part, made this unity possible. Khilafat Andolan Paddhati (The 
Procedures of the Khilafat Movement, 1921) by Emdad Ali, an alem (cleric) from the a 
Barisal madarsa, was professedly a compilation of the views of Abu Bakr Siddiqui of 
Furfura, an influential Muslim preacher in Bengal, and Maulana Shah Sufi Haji 
Nesaruddin Ahmad of Barisal (in eastern Bengal) on the jaiz (permissible) methods of 
conducting the Khilafat movement.  The text written in the form typical of fatwas was in 
a question and answer format. One of the questions asked of the ulema is strikingly 
revealing of the anxieties concerning the use of language for Muslims partaking in the 
Khilafat movement, since the issue of language was also related to if a practice (in this 
case the practice of specific kinds of sloganeering) was Islamic or not222: 
Q: Hajur! In seeking to protect the Caliphate, many Muslims chant Gandhiji ki jai 
and Mohammed Ali ki jai after chanting the Bande Mataram. Is this jaiz 
(permissible)?  
A: Son! “Bande Mataram”, means worship (Bande) the Mother (Mataram). To 
utter this is shirk (unlawful innovation) and kaferi (behavior of the infidels). In the 
Koran, Allah has instructed, “Worship me, do not include any other. To include 	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another in worship is gunaah (sin).” Thus Muslims should never say Bande 
Mataram. During the (Khilafat) movement, while uniting with Hindus, they 
should say “Allah hu Akbar”.223 
In light of such widespread anxieties among Bengali Muslims about the use of 
vocabulary in forging a Bengali language they could call their own mother tongue, the 
self-assured quality of Nazrul’s fiery prose and his indiscriminate use of Hindu imagery 
and Sanskrit words would appear all the more striking.  
Although Akram Khan vehemently opposed the style of Nazrul’s writings, in the 
conviction that literary endeavor should be married to aspirations of redistributive justice, 
figures as divergent as Khan and Nazrul were in fact on the same page. Khan stated the 
overall aim of the kind of literature the Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Samiti (Bengali 
Muslim Literary Society) attempted to forge in non-sectarian, universal terms. In the 
presidential address of the 1918 conference he said: 
“Samyavad (egalitarianism) and the redistribution of wealth are inextricably 
linked to Islam. To secure the right of every individual in this world is the Islamic 
way of running society (samajtantravad). Service to humanity is the removal of 
all oppressive forces from the minds and bodies of universal man (vishwamanab). 
This is the kind of literature we want – one attentive to patriotism and the story of 
the service to universal man.”224 
Not only was Islam equated with redistributive justice, in Khan’s formulation, a truly 
Islamic way of ordering society entailed the “securing the rights of every individual in 
this world”, and a literature directed to the building of such society was deemed to be the 
aim of the Bangiya Musalman Sahitya Samiti.  Here again the vision was universal, not 
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sectional/communitarian. But the universality was rooted in the particularity of Islam, in 
the realization of its redistributive ethic.    
Khan was not alone in denouncing Nazrul’s poetry. Among the Bengali Muslims, 
Nazrul’s literary style had as many detractors as it had admirers. There were vigorous 
debates about the implications of his writings on religious identity, literary merit, and the 
art of criticism in several Bengali Muslim journals. Mohammadi (edited by Akram 
Khan), Islam Darshan and Moslem Darpan carried the most inflammatory articles 
against Nazrul, where he was labeled an infidel and a shaitan (devil). In an issue of Islam 
Darshan, an editorial dated 1925, Sheik Mohammad Idris Ali, a well-regarded writer 
who wrote under the pen name Abu Nur, expressed outrage at Nazrul’s audacity in 
comparing the politician C.R Das with Hazrat Ibrahim, and Bibi Maryam with prostitutes 
in the poem “Indrapatan”.225 Referring to another image from the poem, the writer of the 
editorial, which appeared in Moslem Darpan in August 1925, noted how blasphemous 
Nazrul’s writing was: 
Allah’s holy light, which even Hazard Musa could not bear to look at, according 
to the poet, is being reflected in the eyes of C.R Das. Who can be so blind to 
religion? 
These insults to religion mean that Nazrul Islam is guilty in the eyes of the entire 
Muslim community. It is the duty of society to warn him to rein in his writings 
and refrain from insulting Islam. It would not be inappropriate to mention here 
that if he does not mend his ways, it will be necessary to take him to the court of 
law. We hope that Nazrul will educate himself in the basic principles of Islam and 
work within the confines of the boundaries set forth by religion, and thereby 
establish his reputation as a poet and bring glory to the community.226 
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Another piece by Munshi Mohammad Reyazzudin Ahmad, which appeared in Islam 
Darshan in 1922, expressed regret that although Nazrul appeared “like a comet in the sky 
of the Muslim world”, it soon became apparent that the poet’s sensibility was thoroughly 
Hinduized and he was an utter disgrace to the community. He alleged that Nazrul’s 
writings often evinced an un-Islamic belief in rebirth and his poetry described Allah in 
anthropomorphic terms, thus compromising the basic principles of Islam.227 
Nazrul’s admirers, on the other hand, never failed to put up a spirited defense. 
Writing in Saugat, in 1926, Abul Mansur, the left-minded intellectual, writer and praja 
movement activist who would later emphasize the revolutionary dimensions of the 
Pakistan movement and join the East Pakistan Renaissance Society at the behest of Abul 
Kalam Shamshuddin, unequivocally celebrated the appearance of Nazrul on the Bengali 
literary stage. He wrote: 
Not too many Muslims have been practitioners of Bengali literature. Only very 
recently has Nazrul appeared on the literary stage. When Bengal’s lyric poetry 
had almost died from the fatigue of celebrating alcohol, women and paradise, just 
then Nazrul arrived with his musical instruments to shake up the hearts of the 
Bengalis. Their languor of love has left them. New doors have opened up for 
Bengali lyric poetry.228 
Abul Kalam Shamshuddin, a well-regarded literary critic, who was a founding member of 
the East Pakistan Renaissance Society, described Nazrul as an epoch-making poet in a 
Saugat issue of 1927, and hailed him as the national poet of Bengal. Shamshuddin sought 
to silence Nazrul’s critics by pointing out that: 
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Most Muslim littérateurs do not have the ability to evaluate where the greatness of 
good literature lies. Even today, most critics are of the opinion that kavya (poetry) 
is a bunch of religious sayings in rhyme. They do not realize that the objective of 
poetry is autonomous from instruction. If we do not understand this, we won’t 
develop the ability to be critics. Without understanding that the principal aim of 
poetry is the creation of beauty, we appraise bad poetry as good, and good poetry 
as bad. Most evaluate poetry in terms of religion. They have no concern for the 
poeticity of poetry.229 
The premise of Shamshuddin’s dismissal of the detractors of Nazrul’s works is 
surprisingly similar to Abul Hussain’s argument against separate electorates in the sphere 
of politics, which I have summarized earlier in this chapter. In the manner in which 
Hussain argued that separate Muslim electorates hindered the development of the 
“greater personality of the individual” because in such electorates choices were 
constrained by social bonds (of religious community), which prevented the flowering of 
individual autonomy and personality, Shamshuddin argued that literary criticism when 
constrained by social strictures (of religious community) prevented the flowering of the 
critic’s ability to judge literature on its own terms, and therefore hindered aesthetic 
education. Yet both Abul Hussain and Abul Kalam Shamshuddin spoke as Muslims to a 
Muslim audience. Both emphasized the need for the development of individuality 
(premised on autonomy from society) as the path to the Muslim community’s progress. 
Nazrul’s literary practice was exemplary of such individualism, marked, as it were, by a 
lack of regard for societal norms in any conventional sense. In Abul Mansur’s evaluation, 
Nazrul’s literary tour de force not only put the Bengali Muslim litterateur on the map but 
rejuvenated Bengali poetry as a whole.  
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It was not the detractors of Nazrul, but his admirers who would go on to become 
key cultural activists in the Pakistan movement. Both Abul Mansur and Abul Kalam 
Shamshuddin were important figures in the East Pakistan Renaissance Society. For Abul 
Mansur, as I have mentioned earlier, the idea of Pakistan was a challenge to the fascist 
drive toward uniformity that killed self-expression and individual fulfillment. Nazrul was 
a figure whose literary style resisted sameness – he resisted the dominant Hindu literary 
mode of writing and disregarded the strictures placed on the use of literary language 
placed by his own community. As Ahmed Kamruddin wrote in 1924: 
I believe that Nazrul who can break the bones and ribs of the Bengali language 
that have stilted and ossified with time. He can give the Bengali language new 
appearance, life, and body. Most Bengalis are Musalmans. But the sadhu 
(sanskritized) Bengali is not conducive to the expression of the thought-world of 
the Muslims. Thus it was needed for a man of great daring appear on the literary 
stage with a hammer. Kazi showed the promise of being such a figure of 
daring.230 
This “figure of daring” expressed his distinctive individualism not only in stylistics and 
use of language, but also in content. In the first issue of the journal Dhumketu (August 
11, 1922), which he edited, his very first editorial was a clarion call to reject blind 
obedience to religion, custom, and society’s good and the great. He equated 
unquestioning obedience with slavery. He declared that the day “people” broke away 
from all relationships of dependency, would be the day when Bharat would be truly free: 
 I am the oarsman of myself.  My truth will show me the way. The fear of the 
state, the fear of society cannot misdirect me. I believe if you know yourself, you 
can know others. This knowing oneself, privileging one’s own truth, directing 
oneself, this is not neither empty pride nor arrogance. Even so, pride is better than 
fake humility…If passivity and earnest reverence for the great could save the 
country, then a country of 33 crore deities would not be paradhin (unfree) for so 
long…Dhumketu seeks to wipe out the enemies of the country – the liar, the 	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fraudulent, the artificial…Dhumketu has no guru (spritual guide) or devata (lord). 
Dhumketu will not take anyone’s words as Vedavakya, unless they resonate with 
in his heart. Dhumketu is completely free from slavery. This is not a communal 
(sampradayik) paper. Humanism is the greatest religion of all.231 
Even though he spoke of revolution, his writings never addressed the issue of how to 
organize a class-for-itself. Every call to revolution was, ultimately, a call for self-
expression, a celebration of individualism. Muzaffar Ahmed, a founding member of the 
Communist Party of India and a long-time friend of Nazrul, speaks in his memoir about 
the late November night in 1921 when the decision to found the CPI was taken in a 
rented house at Taratolla Lane, Calcutta, where he and Nazrul lived as roommates. But as 
Ahmed mentions, though the poet remained sympathetic to the organization, he never 
became a member of the party. 232 
Yet the 1920s was an intensely political period of the Nazrul’s life.  He was 
arrested in November 1922 from Comilla and imprisoned for a year for publishing two 
articles – “AnandamayeerAgamane” and “Bidrohir Kaifiyat” – which the colonial 
government had proscribed as “seditious matter”.233  While doing his time in jail, he 
started a hunger strike against the ill treatment of political prisoners. Morhul Mohammad 
Moddabber mentions how in 1926, in a secret meeting in J.C Gupta’s house in Park 
Circus in Calcutta, Subhash Bose and Nazrul Islam arrived with the proposal of creating 
an all-India level revolutionary party, called the Hindustan Republican Army. At the 
meeting, Bose and Nazrul expressed dissatisfaction with the Congress, which according 
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to them “could not bring freedom to our (sic) country”.234 They produced a manifesto of 
the new party, composed by Nazrul and read out to the gathering by Bose. Moddabber 
described the manner in which Nazrul elicited each member’s pledge to the manifesto 
and the party: “The poet insisted that we sign the manifesto with our blood, by making a 
cut on our fingers. Bose and Nazrul were among the first to sign on – with their own 
blood.”235 This gesture of signing a political manifesto with one’s own blood signaled the 
arrival of a specifically modern mode of politics – where politics was seen as the 
expression of some “authentic”, “inner” self, a matter of an individual’s inner conviction 
and commitment. Marcus Daeschel has termed this mode of conducting politics as the 
“politics of self-expression”.236 According to Daeschel, this “politics of self-expression” 
was in sharp contradistinction to the “politics of interest”, which was essentially about 
managing social relationships, negotiating hierarchies and navigating patronage 
networks, and not centrally about the expression of an “inner self”.237 Nazrul’s literary 
and political praxis exemplified the “politics of self-expression”. Debates that raged in 
the Bengali Muslim public domain about his literary works and occasionally his life 
choices (such as his decision of marrying a Hindu woman) publicized a new mode of 
being political, which was essentially about the integrity of the self, interiority, about 	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“inner” convictions, and individual choice whose exercise was predicated on maintaining 
a degree of autonomy from “society”.  
Ironically, for a man so vigorously committed to the politics of self-expression, 
when he contested elections from east Bengal for the upper house of the Central 
Legislative Council in 1926, on an independent ticket, Badshah Pir (a religious leader), 
grandson and spiritual successor of the Faraidi leader Dudu Miya, canvassed on behalf of 
Nazrul and urged his disciples (muridan) to vote for the poet.238 Tapping into Farazi 
constituency via a decree of its highest spiritual leader entailed being “sullied” by that 
very “politics of interest” which Nazrul sought to constantly escape. The Faraizis were 
religious reformists, a community of believers whose aim was to reinforce the proper 
practices of Islam. Muslim cultivators in eastern Bengal comprised the overwhelming 
bulk of the Faraidis. The religious leadership of the Faraidis were instituted in a strictly 
hierarchical structure with the chief spiritual leader (the ustad) at the apex, his advisors 
called the uparastha khalifas (top-rung deputies) on the next rung, followed by the gird 
khalifas who looked after a cluster of villages, and finally the gaon khalifas who looked 
after the well-being of a single village. The khalifas performed both siyasi (political) and 
dini (religious) functions. In carrying out their religious functions, they imparted Islamic 
education to the men of families, and maintained guesthouses for public prayers, religious 
instructions and Sufi mediation. To meet the expenses necessary for such activities, they 
would collect 1/40th peasant’s income – the rate of tax set by shariah law. As part of their 
siyasi (political) functions, the khalifas would train clubmen to maintain the security of 
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the villages under their influence, and put in place espionage systems to identify the 
enemies of Faraidis.239 Both espionage and the training of clubmen were absolutely 
critical to the Faraidis whose followers were mostly cultivators who had occupied char 
lands which emerged from the rivers and were khas lands (under direct government 
control, and without intermediaries such as zamindars or jotedars/wealthy tenants). 
Settling on government-owned khas-mahal lands, where there were no rentiers mediating 
between the cultivators and the government, was in line with Faraidi religious belief as 
well, since their ustad (spiritual master) preached that rent was unlawful because land 
belonged to God, but tribute – that was paid directly to the government – was lawful. But 
char lands that occasionally rose from the rivers were highly contested spaces, zamindars 
wanted to grab char lands and profit from creating sub-tenures from new property, rich 
jotedars seeking to climb the social ladder and accumulate property also had interest and 
resources to compete with the zamindars for these char lands. The Faraidi clubmen were 
trained footmen, who pushed back the men send by zamindars and jotedars to occupy the 
land in hand-to-hand combat and thus protected the Faraidi cultivators.240 Politics here 
was a politics of protection in return for the religious allegiances of the cultivators to a 
Faraidi way of life. Often Muslim jotedars (large tenants) entered into relationships with 
the Faraidis by exchanging promises of reduced rent for the security of Faraidi protection. 
Colonial records tell of an instance in Char Manika, where a government assessor who 
had arrived to impose income taxes on the jotedars was driven away by Faraidi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Kevin R. Downey, Religious Revival and Peasant Acitivism in Bengal: Agrarian 
Society and the trajectory of the Faraizi Movement, 1820-1947 (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2009), pp. 103-110. 
240 Ibid., p. 107. 
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clubmen.241 It was a mutually beneficial relationship where jotedars gained experienced 
Faraidi cultivators to work their lands, and the Faraidis gained patronage and reduced 
rent. Badshah Pir in canvassing to his constituency of disciples on behalf of Nazrul was 
exploiting such socially embedded relationships of spiritual hierarchies and Faraidi 
patronage networks. 
Conclusion 
It is not the argument of this chapter that a certain kind of Bengali Muslim literary 
activity that combined egalitarianism with individualism, as exemplified by Nazrul, 
completely displaced the “politics of interest” with the “politics of self-expression”. As 
the Badshah Pir episode illustrates, this was far from the case – realpolitik still very much 
involved exploiting patronage networks and managing social relationships and 
hierarchies. But when the literary praxis of figures as different as Nazrul and Akram 
Khan converged on creating an emphasis on the individual as the fount of meaningful 
action, this curious convergence in Bengali Muslim literary culture helped engender the 
politics of self-expression that would become the hallmark of the cultural activists of the 
Pakistan movement in Bengal. Nazrul’s unfettered individualism, without regard for 
societal mores, reveling in an apocalyptic revolutionary moment and bringing down the 
existing status-quo was one expression of this political mode. Akram Khan’s reformist 
vision which placed premium on the capacity for individual judgment, separated from the 
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1869, Nos 102-103 as quoted in Nurul Hasan Chowdhury, Peasant Radicalism in 
Nineteenth Century Bengal: The Faraizis, Indigo and Pabna Movements (Dhaka: Asiatic 
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spiritual-material hierarchies of society (in which the likes of Pir Badshah Mia were 
engaged), and rooted in an internal realm, influenced by scriptures, validated a less 
flamboyant, but equally individuated and interiorized mode of being.242 This figure of the 
enchanted individual as the fount of political and religious meaning, the source of 
commitment and judgment, endowed with an interiority and abstracted from society, that 
was produced in the Bengali Muslim literary domain in the two decades preceding the 
Pakistan movement would deeply impact the cultural politics of the Pakistan movement 
in Bengal.  
For the cultural activists of the East Pakistan Renaissance Society (EPRS), the 
idea of the  “people” as the touchstone of political sovereignty was envisaged as a 
collective formed by the abstractly equal capacity of each individual for autonomy and 
free choice. Thus the EPRS was welcoming of all members irrespective of caste, creed, 
and religion. For them, membership to the EPRS, and in a larger sense, investment in the 
Pakistan movement, were matters of inner commitment and autonomous choice, 
abstracted from society and its constraints. 
Again, both Nazrul and Khan (as figures at two ends of the literary spectrum) 
stressed egalitarianism, and in their writings, forged relationships of affinity between 
Islam and the politics of redistributive justice. It was this heady mix of Islam, 
individualism, and egalitarianism forged, as it were, in the literary crucible during the 
early decades of the twentieth century that made possible an assessment of the Pakistan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 In his influential work Moslem Bangla’r Samajik Itihash, Akram Khan attributed the 
degeneration of Muslim society in Bengal to the corrupting influence of pirism. In my 
chapter on debt, I have already mentioned how Akram Khan emphasized the tradition of 
ijtihad or independent judgment.  
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movement as a revolutionary one. Thus Abul Mansur in his address to the EPRS, not 
only proposed an understanding of the Pakistan movement in terms of its potential to 
restore the natural order of variegated splendor with which Allah had endowed the world; 
he simultaneously equated the aim of the movement with the ultimate aim of communism 
which was, according to him, the flowering of variegated self-expressions by ensuring 
that the pre-requisite for self-fulfillment was the equality of wealth. The unique cultural 
politics of Bengali Pakistanism cannot be adequately understood without attending to the 
emergence of the figure of the individual in Bengali Muslim literary culture. Also, it 
cannot be understood without attending to the connection between egalitarianism and 
Islam that had been forged by litterateurs over two decades that preceded the movement.     
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CONCLUSION 
 
According to David Gilmartin: 
Punjab witnessed in 1947 the almost complete collapse of a mediatory political 
framework previously linking local communities culturally to a sense of regional 
collectivity. If there was a provincial “party of the soil” in the Punjab before 
partition, grounding communities and leaders in a provincial vision of territorial 
collectivity, it was the Unionist Party. Openly “Punjabi” in its cultural (if not 
linguistic) orientation, the Unionist Party had also seen itself as the provincial 
protector of local and “tribal” identities and influence. But the Unionist Party – 
and the principles it stood for – were anathematized by the Muslim League in the 
mid-1940s, and Punjabi identity (including the regional “tribal” and biradari 
associations that helped to produce it) discredited as yet another form of amoral 
particularism.243 
In contrast to Punjab, the Pakistan movement in Bengal could not discredit provincial 
visions of self and community quite in the same way. In this dissertation I have tried to 
show why this was the case: 
Influential pirs were important to political parties vying to represent the Muslims 
in the electoral arena of Bengal. As the case of Pir Abu Bakr illustrates, since the 1920s, 
the sphere of influence of such pirs themselves came to be connected to their patronage 
of local, village-level tenant associations, which increasingly became staunch critics of 
landlordism. In stark contrast to the role of the landed pirs of Punjab, through whom rural 
hierarchy was maintained, in Bengal, many of the pirs even though they were patronized 
by the landed Muslim ashraf class, got linked to counter-hierarchical, anti-landlordist 
tendencies of rural society. Such counter-hierarchical tendencies were intensified by 
transformations in the composition, agenda, and rhetoric of the rural anjumans, which 
were key to disseminating visions of Muslim community where the display of rank, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 David Gilmartin, ‘Pakistan, Partition, and South Asian History: In Search of a 
Narrative’, Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 57, no. 4, (Nov, 1998), p. 1087. 
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wealth, and influence were seen as corruptions of Islamic community, and not the basis 
on which the community could be adequately represented, as had earlier been the case. 
At another level, I have tried to show how a Muslim “improvement” ideology 
circulating in rural Bengal, in linking a notion of cultivation of Islamic moral community 
to the cultivation (tilling) of land, and the literature generated by the praja movement – 
which in latching on to the ethical impulses of the  “improvement” discourse, expanded 
its meaning by tying conceptions of cultivating an Islamic self and community anchored 
in the value of labor to the soil of Bengal – created claims of ethnic belonging rooted in a 
regionalism, thereby forging Bengali Muslim identity at a grassroots level. This identity, 
forged in the crucible of the praja movement with a counter-hierarchical edge, made its 
way into the domain of provincial electoral politics in the 1930s; it came to be seen as the 
authentic basis of representing the Muslim community.  
Such claims of ethnic belonging were also taken up and consolidated by the 
Muslim urban intelligentsia and littérateurs striving to carve out a space of literary-
cultural autonomy and Muslim modernism in order to remedy the problem of Muslim 
cultural “backwardness”. A prominent ideological strand operating in this literary-
cultural domain from the 1920s onward, as it engaged in the project of ushering in a 
Muslim modernism in Bengal, developed a conception of  “Muslim culture” as inherently 
open, democratic, socialistic, redistributive, and committed to securing the interests of 
labor and individual self-expression. The cultural politics of Bengali Pakistanism, as it 
emerged in the early 1940s, was deeply impacted by this ideological strand. At one level, 
this enabled articulations of the Pakistan movement as a revolutionary people’s 
movement committed to the realization of a state to be founded on supposed Islamic 
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values of redistribution. At another level, the demand for Pakistan was put forth as an 
aspiration for the realization of Bengali Muslim cultural autonomy and likened to 
movements such as the Irish Literary Revival. Since from their very early days, literary 
institutions centered in cities, such as the Bangiya Musalman Shahitya Samiti, involved 
in promoting this idea of Bengali Muslim cultural autonomy were engaged in validating 
it by merging the political affect mobilized against the then current colonial arrangement 
of proprietorship in land (Permanent Settlement) generated by the religiosity-infused 
praja movement with an affective response against the arrangement (haal bandobasto) of 
Bengali literary language, the articulations of Pakistan as a state committed to 
redistributive justice rooted in Islamic universalism as well as an idea of cultural self-
determination rooted in regional particularity could co-exist seamlessly.  
It is not that a style of self-expressionist politics – defining itself through an 
emphasis on the individual and a stress on anti-societalism – that was so central to the 
ideology of the Pakistan movement in Punjab and UP, as noted by Gilmartin and 
Daeschel, was entirely absent in Bengal. Here, this self-expressionist politics developed 
through the somewhat opposed currents of Islamic reformism, on the one hand, and the 
unorthodox literary praxis of Nazrul Islam, on the other. While Nazrul’s unfettered 
individualism, without regard for religious or societal strictures, reveling in an anti-status 
quoist, revolutionary moment was one expression of this political mode, Islamic 
reformist visions which placed premium on the capacity for individual judgment, 
separated from the spiritual-material hierarchies of society and rooted in an internal 
realm, influenced by scriptures, validated a less flamboyant, but equally individuated and 
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interiorized mode of being. Despite their differences, both the Islamic reformists and the 
likes of Nazrul Islam were united in their commitment to redistributive justice.  
This figure of the enchanted individual as the fount of political and religious 
meaning, the source of commitment and judgment, endowed with an interiority and 
abstracted from society, that was produced in the course of the two decades preceding the 
Pakistan movement deeply impacted the urban cultural politics of the Pakistan movement 
in Bengal. Thus in the articulations of the urban cultural activists of the movement in 
Bengal, Pakistan was envisioned as a state where individuals abstracted from their 
moorings in social particularities of class, religion, and sect could come together as a 
nation through their commitment to an idea of a state rooted in redistributive justice. This 
enabled forging links with several non-Muslim communists (such as M.N Roy) in the 
sphere of cultural activism. This also explains why several left-minded members within 
the League continued to have friendly relations with Hindu leaders of the Communist 
Party in Bengal, even at the peak of the movement.244 As Abul Hashim, the General 
Secretary of the Muslim League in 1944, recounts, before the 1946 legislative elections, 
the League attempted to convince such Communist Party leaders to refrain from 
contesting the Muslim League in any of the Muslim constituencies.245 Even though such 
an arrangement did not ultimately work out, that this was seen as a distinct possibility by 
Leaguers such as Hashim and Abul Mansur point to how strong the idea of Pakistan as a 
coming together of individuals, abstracted from socially generated identities and 
committed to redistributive justice was. At the same time, for activists like Mansur and 
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Hashim, a commitment to universal justice and democracy – a vision of Pakistan where 
all individuals and communities would be accorded equal dignity and rights build on the 
redistribution of wealth – was rooted in the particularity of the “spirit of Islam”, and did 
not, in principal, require the erasure of this particularity but a realization of its nature. Yet 
this connection between Islam and socialism, which historically emerged through the 
urban intelligentsia’s appropriation of the specific labor-centric spin given to the Islamic 
theological discourse on riba by the improvement discourse circulating in the 
countryside, points to how the energies of the “prepolitical” Muslim rural social domain 
continued to inflect the urban cultural politics of Bengali Pakistanism, as it validated 
itself as a non-parochial, non-communal, revolutionary people’s movement committed to 
fighting imperialist tendencies and establishing a state founded on redistributive justice.   
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GLOSSARY: 
 
 
ahwab traditional arbitrary exaction in addition to formal rent levied by 
zamindars and other public officers 
 
adhiar a person sharing half the crop with the landlord 
 
alim man trained in religious sciences 
 
amla a petty official 
 
anjuman society, committee, association 
 
ashraf a Muslim of respectable status 
 
azadi freedom 
 
bahas religious debate 
 
bandobast settlement 
 
barga sharecropping 
 
bhadralok literally ‘respectable’ but used in historical discourse as an analytical 
category to imply a status group in Bengal who came from the upper 
caste; were economically dependent on landed rents and professional and 
clerical employment and kept a distance from the masses 
 
bhag-chashi sharecropper 
 
bidat                innovation that goes against the Koran and the hadith 
 
bigha a measure of land, 1/3 of an acre 
 
biradari brotherhood, a community based on the model of common descent 
 
char alleviated land, typically alluvial deposits created by the fluvial action of 
rivers 
 
chaukidar guard; village police 
 
kutcherry office of a zamindar 
 
daroga chief policeman 
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din/deen faith, the Islamic religion 
 
duniya world  
 
fatwa generally written opinion on a point of Islamic law given by theologians or 
religious leaders 
 
goshol ablutions 
 
gunah sin 
 
hadis traditions of the prophet 
 
hajj pilgrimage to Mecca 
 
halal lawful, with religious sanction; (an animal) slaughtered as prescribed by 
Islamic law 
 
ibadat worship 
 
imam leader in prayers 
 
iman faith 
 
jihad striving; an Islamic war against unbelief, whether external or internal 
 
kafir unbeliever, non-Muslim 
 
khas mahal personal demesne land 
 
khet majur agricultural landless labor 
 
khuda God 
 
madarsa a higher school or college teaching Islamic laws and jurisprudence as 
primary subjects 
 
mahajan moneylender 
 
maulavi a Muslim doctor of law or a Muslim learned man 
 
mofussil interior of a district, away from the town or city 
 
murid disciple of a pir 
 
naib a senior official in a zamindar’s estate office 
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nawab a title or rank conferred like peerage on Muslim gentlemen of distinction 
and good service 
 
nazr present / tribute 
 
paik armed retainer 
 
pir sufi guide 
 
praja tenant 
 
qazi Islamic judge 
 
raiyat peasant, cultivator, tenant 
 
raiyati belonging to a tenant 
 
sabha association 
 
sajjada nishin literally one who sits on the prayer carpet; successor to the authority of a 
sufi saint at his shrine, usually a lineal descendant of the saint 
 
sanyasi ascetic 
 
salami traditional fee paid to the landlord on purchase of land or on obtaining 
tenancy 
 
shariat Islamic law 
 
shirk               associating false gods with the one, true God 
 
sufi Muslim mystic, one connected to the sufi orders 
 
swavarna high caste 
 
tabligh proselytization 
 
tammaduni cultural 
 
tauhid unity of God 
 
ulema plural of alim 
 
urs celebration of the death day of a sufi saint; major annual festival at many 
sufi shrines 
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zakat compulsory Islamic charity 
 
zamindar holder of a property in land who paid revenue to the government under the 
Permanent Settlement of 1793 
 
zilla district 
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